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Justice Stevens and the Emerging
Law of Sex Discrimination
JOHN P. WAGNER*
"ITIhe law supposes that your wife acts under your direction."
"If the law supposes that," said Mr. Bumble . . "the law is a ass-a id-
iot. If that's the eye of the law, the law's a bachelor; and the worst I wish
the law is, that his eye may be opened by experience-by experience." 1
INTRODUCTION
On November 29, 1975,2 President Ford nominated John Paul
Stevens to serve as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
At that time, Judge Stevens was generally viewed as having a rep-
utation for competency and integrity.3 Various women's groups,
* Associate, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, San Francisco. J.D., University of
Wisconsin Law School, 1980; A.M., University of Chicago, 1971; A.B., Western State
College of Colorado, 1968.
I gratefully thank the Honorable James E. Doyle for his initial guidance in this
endeavor. I also gratefully thank Professor Gordon Baldwin, Robert Lindquist,
Professor Kathryn Powers, and Thomas Wagner for their invaluable suggestions
and criticism. These legal scholars do not by any means all share my views, and,
of course, they are not responsible for my errors.
1. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223-24 n.10 (1977) (quoting C. DICKENS,
THE ADVENTURES OF OLIVER TwIsT, c. LI (1910) (Stevens, J., concurring) (empha-
sis added by Justice Stevens)).
2. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 8.
3. Beytagh, Mr. Justice Stevens and the Burger Court's Uncertain Trumpet, 51
NOTRE DAME LAw. 946, 946-47. See also Nomination of John Paul Stevens To Be A
Justice of the Supreme Court: Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
94th Congress, 1st Sess. 3-4 (Dec. 8-10, 1975) (testimony of Edward Levi, Attorney
however, severely criticized Judge Stevens' nomination, and
charged that he had consistently opposed women's rights4 while a
member of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The crit-
ics claimed that his Seventh Circuit opinions had been based on
personal philosophy rather than on the facts and laws involved in
the cases before him.5
Now that Justice Stevens has served on the United States
Supreme Court for over six terms, it is appropriate to examine his
Supreme Court decisions in the area of sex discrimination 6 in
light of the criticisms levelled at his nomination. This article will
begin by briefly examining Justice Stevens' Seventh Circuit deci-
sions, which initially prompted the criticism from the women's
movement. It will then sketch Supreme Court sex discrimination
cases decided before Justice Stevens' arrival. Finally, it will ex-
amine Justice Stevens' Supreme Court decisions in sex discrimi-
nation cases, assessing his contribution to the emerging legal
doctrine.
This article concludes that Justice Stevens' perspective on sex
discrimination has changed, perhaps as a result of the opposition
General of the United States) [hereinafter cited as Stevens Hearings]; id. at 17-22
(testimony of Warren Christopher, Chairman, American Bar Association Standing
Committee on the Federal Judiciary).
4. See generally Stevens Hearings, supra note 3, at 78-84 (testimony of Mar-
garet Drachsler, National Organization for Women); id. at 226 (statement by Bella
S. Abzug); id. at 227 (statement by Nan Aron, President, Women's Legal Defense
Fund). See also id. at 15-17 and 33-34 (testimony of John Paul Stevens):
Senator Kennedy: .... There are many Americans who feel that women,
too, have been discriminated against. I was trying to get a statement or
comment from you-which I must say has not been forthcoming to this
point-that would at least show some sensitivity to this particular kind of
a problem. If the answer that you are going to apply the law equally to
every citizen is the way you want to leave it, then that is the way the rec-
ord will stand. However, I believe it is not going to satisfy great numbers
of people in this country who feel as I do that there has been a broad sec-
tor of our society that has been denied certain rights because there are
statutes, ordinances, and regulations which discriminate on the basis of
sex. If you want to leave the record just saying that you are going to apply
every law equitably that is the way it will stand.
Judge Stevens: I'd be proud to have the record stand that way.
5. Stevens Hearings, supra note 3, at 83 (testimony of Margaret Drachsler).
Judge Stevens was also criticized for knowing surprisingly little about the legal
implications of the equal rights amendment. See id. at 226 (statement by Bella S.
Abzug); id. at 227 (statement by Nan Aron).
6. Professor Ginsburg has suggested that,
[f]or impressionable minds, the word "sex" may conjure up improper
images of issues like those that the Supreme Court has left to "contempo-
rary community standards" . . . [and that] the denotation and connota-
tions of the word gender make it more appropriate than the word "sex" for
a discussion of problems relating to treatment of women.
Ginsburg, Gender In the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 Sup. CT.
REV. 1 n.1 (1975) (citation omitted). I assume that the readers of this article are
not unduly impressionable and that "sex discrimination" is a clear and commonly
accepted way of referring to discrimination on the basis of sex.
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to his nomination. But his opinions reveal a curious inconsis-
tency. At times, Justice Stevens has emerged as a strong and per-
suasive voice-indeed, in some cases the critical force-in helping
the Court to recognize and eliminate sex discrimination. Yet at
other times Justice Stevens has been unable to recognize blatant
sex discrimination, and has acted to reduce the number of legal
avenues available to redress sex discrimination.
Although Justice Stevens may not represent the critical
"center" of the Court,7 his opinions may foreshadow the approach
the Court could take in future sex discrimination cases. If this be
true, then future cases may be decided on a pragmatic basis, fo-
cusing on how inequitable the discriminatory action appears
rather than on a logical basis. For, in terms of the logic of recent
decisions, as Yeats so eloquently said, "things [have fallen] apart;
the center cannot hold."8
Both Justice Stevens and the Supreme Court have "come a long
way" in their approaches toward sex discrimination. The opin-
ions of Justice Stevens document the giant step that has been
taken. It can now be said with certainty that any legislation
which discriminates solely and specifically against women will be
struck down. For both Justice Stevens and the Court, what a long
strange trip it's been. Each step forward has been followed by
hesitation and retrenchment. This pattern of bold advancement
followed by uncertain timidity has become the Court's usual
pattern.
Today, the Court confronts questions more subtle than discrim-
ination specifically and solely against women. The Court has re-
jected a tradition of "romantic paternalism," in which women
were subjugated to men, supposedly for the benefit and protec-
tion of women.9 Now, the Court confronts an emerging "prag-
7. See note 495 infra and accompanying discussion. But see B. WOODWARD &
S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 444 (1979).
8. W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming, SELECTED POEMS AND TWO PLAYS 91
(M.L. Rosenthal ed. 1962).
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
9. Powers, The Shifting Parameters of Affirmative Action: "Pragmatic" Pater-
matic paternalism," in which women plaintiffs claim they are
subjugated to men, supposedly for the benefit and protection of
employers and clients. 10 Although the Court has clearly rejected
laws which specifically disfavored women, the Court must also
confront laws which may incidentally disfavor women in the
course of accomplishing other objectives. Although the Court has
rejected laws based exclusively on limited role perceptions and
negative stereotypes of women, the Court must now confront laws
which subtly continue an effect of either confining women to the
"private sphere" of home and family or of limiting their participa-
tion in the "public sphere" of work, government, and the shaping
of social and economic policy."
These new issues before the Court will require new ways of
thinking about policies of discrimination. Justice Stevens' opin-
ions can provide insight as to how well the Court will meet these
new challenges. First, Justice Stevens has shown an ability to
adopt new approaches to problems. Second, although he appears
taken at times with theoretical models, he will typically respond
pragmatically to the unique factors of each situation; he probably
will not attempt to take the lead in developing doctrinal para-
digms. Third, Justice Stevens has become aware of the impor-
tance of negative stereotyping and role expectations. Where
these factors can be proved to have played a significant part in
legislation, he can be expected to reject that legislation. Fourth,
he is well aware of the importance of Supreme Court decisions to
lower courts. He can be expected to demand that the Court at-
tempt to establish clear guidelines for those courts. Finally, Jus-
tice Stevens must be persuaded that various laws actually
discriminate against women. Although he has become a sharp
critic of obvious discrimination, he sometimes views subtle dis-
crimination as non-discrimination. Sex discrimination plaintiffs
will have to mount massive assaults at this threshold test. But,
once Justice Stevens is persuaded that discrimination truly does
exist, he can be relied on to strike it down.
I. JUDGE STEVENS' SEVENTH CIRcurr SEX DIscRIMINATION
OPINIONS
At the time of his elevation to the United States Supreme
Court, Judge Stevens had written four 12 decisions involving sex
nalism In Sex-Based Employment Discrimination Cases, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1281,
83 (1980).
10. Id.
11. See generally Powers, Sex Segregation and The Ambivalent Directions of
Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 55 (1979).
12. Judge Stevens decided one case involving the equal rights amendment
[Vol. 9: 315, 19821 Changed Perspective
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discrimination issues. In three of those decisions, he found
against the plaintiff charging discrimination. Although the mere
existence of such a record does not per se show hostility to wo-
men's rights, an examination of his three negative decisions does
reveal a rather shallow approach to the issues, if not actual oppo-
sition to the sex discrimination challenges.
A. Sprogis v. United Airlines
In his first sex discrimination case, Sprogis v. United Airlines,13
Judge Stevens, in a formalistic dissent, displayed a poor under-
standing of sex discrimination issues. In Sprogis, the majority of
the three-judge panel held that a "no-marriage" rule which was
applied to airline stewardesses but not stewards was sex discrimi-
nation within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.14 The majority found that the rule discriminated against fe-
male employees and was not justified as a bona fide occupational
qualification.15
Judge Stevens dissented because the job categories of "stew-
ardess" and "steward" contained different job requirements.
Thus, he reasoned, because the plaintiff was treated no differently
than a male in the same precise job category would have been,
(E.R.A.), Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (7th Cir. 1975), but that case did not reach
the merits of the amendment. Rather, it involved a challenge to a procedural
change enacted in the Illinois Legislature, under which the amendment failed rati-
fication. Judge Stevens found the rule change constitutional. Although this deci-
sion was criticized by feminists, see Stevens Hearings, supra note 3, at 81
(testimony of Margaret Drachsler); id. at 227 (statement of Nan Aron), such criti-
cism is best seen as blaming the messenger for the bad news.
Judge Stevens was later criticized regarding the E.R.A. after giving testimony at
his nomination hearings that he was not certain whether the E.R.A. would provide
any protection beyond that offered by the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Id. at 15 (testimony of John Paul Stevens). Ms. Abzug stated
that Judge Stevens' lack of knowledge about the unsuccessful attempts to protect
women's rights under the fourteenth amendment was "shocking" and "out of step
with the times." Id. at 226 (statement of Bella S. Abzug). Ms. Aron said that
Judge Stevens' lack of knowledge of the legal implications of the E.R.A. was "sur-
prising" in light of the opinion he wrote in Dyer. Id. at 227 (testimony of Nan
Aron). The Dyer opinion, however, made no reference to the merits of the E.R.A.
390 F. Supp. at 1291-1309.
13. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
15. 444 F.2d at 1199. The rule was applied only to females, not males, in flight-
attendant positions. The majority rejected the argument that since only females
were hired for the position of "stewardess," technically there was no discrimina-
tion against males within the category of stewardess. Id.
her discharge was not based on sex.16 But even if the relevant
classification had included all United Airlines employees, Judge
Stevens would have found no discrimination because the plaintiff
had not shown that, had she been a male, she would have had
greater employment opportunities.1 7
Judge Stevens' dissent in Sprogis was sharply criticized by
feminists as anachronistic. 18 The first problem with the Sprogis
dissent is a practical one. Judge Stevens' reasoning would have
allowed an employer to group all members of one sex into a sin-
gle job category and then freely add additional job require-
ments. 19 Second, he incorrectly reasoned that sex discrimination
involved only "pure" discrimination of one sex and not "sex plus"
16. Id. at 1205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. Id. Judge Stevens declared that a "but for" test was appropriate in sex
discrimination cases, the test being "whether the evidence shows treatment of a
person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different." Id. Since
sex discrimination could not be found under the "but for" test, he indicated that it
was improper for the court to consider the question of whether singleness was a
bona fide occupational qualification for two reasons. First, the Civil Rights Act did
not offer guidelines for distinguishing between irrational stereotypes and reason-
able requirements. Second, the Equal Opportunity Commission, which had de-
clared the rule to be a violation of Title VII, did not have the statutory authority to
make such a declaration. Id. at 1205-06.
18. After learning of his statement yesterday that he would decide these
[sex discrimination] cases exactly the same way today, I am increasingly
concerned over this hasty confirmation process .... I am especially dis-
turbed about Judge Stevens' dissent in the [Sprogis] case .... This
opinion was anachronistic when written, but when it is examined again in
1975, with the hindsight of the progressive development of Title VII law in
the intervening four years, I find it unbelievable that Judge Stevens would
rule the same way.
See Stevens Hearings, supra note 3, at 226 (statement of Bella S. Abzug). See also
id. at 81-82 (testimony of Margaret Drachsler); id. at 226 (statement of Bella S.
Abzug); id. at 227 (statements of Nan Aron); Comment, Opinions of the Honorable
John Paul Stevens, 3 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 58, 58-60 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Stevens' Opinions 1. Contra Comment, Special Project, The One Hundred and First
Justice: An Analysis of the Opinions of Justice John Paul Stevens, Sitting as Judge
on The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 29 VAND. L. REV. 125, 138-39 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Special Project] (Judge Stevens applied the "comon sense" mean-
ing of the statute and refused to embellish the statute with speculation as to
congressional intent).
19. The sex discrimination plaintiff would be forced to attack the initial cate-
gory of classification. But she would fail in this attack because of Judge Stevens'
reasoning that females benefit from the creation of female-only jobs. Judge Ste-
vens reasoned that the no-marriage rule benefited females because the abolition
of that rule would increase the supply of eligible female applicants. Total demand
for employees would not be changed, thus, the absence of the rule would depress
the female wage level. 444 F.2d at 1205-06 n.21. Judge Stevens, however, only ad-
dressed this question in passing and did not specifically consider the question of
whether the hypothetical danger of wage depression outweighed the restrictions
of employment of married women. But see Stevens Hearings, supra note 3, at 82.
(Judge Stevens appeared totally unaware of the dangers of female only jobs; the
creation of "black-only" jobs characterized most of the worst cases of racial dis-
crimination) (testimony of Margaret Drachsler).
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discrimination, combining sex with another requirement. 20 Fi-
nally, the Sprogis dissent was formalistic; it did not examine the
actual nature of disparate treatment of flight attendants. Judge
Stevens' reasoning seemed strained and disingenuous. The opin-
ion was not consistent with his reputation as a pragmatist.2 1 The
airlines apparently determined that the chances of reversal by the
United States Supreme Court were poor and abandoned the no-
marriage rule after Sprogis.22
In addition to being his first sex discrimination case, the
Sprogis dissent is an interesting case from which to trace Judge
Stevens' views on sex discrimination because of his initial reac-
tion to legislation based on sexual stereotyping. Although the ma-
jority did not rely on a "negative stereotype" argument, Judge
Stevens characterized their argument as such. He then rejected
that argument because the Civil Rights Act provided no guide-
lines for determining "irrational stereotypes." 23 After ascending
to the Supreme Court, Justice, Stevens displayed a markedly
changed attitude toward legislation based on negative
stereotypes.
B. Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co.
While Judge Stevens' Sprogis dissent was exceedingly formalis-
tic and narrow, his dissent in Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co.24 was
quite broad in its dismissal of statistical evidence of sex discrimi-
nation.25 In Rose, the plaintiff held the job of blanking press oper-
ator, which required the ability to lift forty pounds.26 When she
attempted to return to work after a leave of absence, she was told
no jobs were available. The position of blanking press operator
had been changed to require an ability to lift eighty pounds,27 a
20. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), decided before
Sprogis, the Supreme Court had declared the use of "sex-plus" qualifications to
be sex discrimination and therefore illegal. See note 57 infra. Judge Stevens
stated, however, that Phillips turned merely on the procedural point that a sex
discrimination plaintiff should not be held to anticipate and disprove a speculative
defense. Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d at 1204.
21. Special Project, supra note 18, at 197.
22. Stevens' Opinions, supra note 18, at 60.
23. 444 F.2d at 1206 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. 487 F.2d at 804 (7th Cir. 1973).
25. See Stevens Hearings, supra note 3, at 82 (testimony of Margaret
Drachsler).
26. 487 F.2d at 805.
27. Id.
standard she could not meet. In a Title VII suit, the plaintiff al-
leged that the job position had been reclassified in order to ex-
clude women.
The majority of the Seventh Circuit panel reversed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant, holding
that the plaintiff did not have the burden of proof on the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment. The majority held that the
plaintiff's statistical evidence showing a drop in the percentage of
women employed in her job category from fifty-five percent to ten
percent clearly raised the possibility of sex discrimination. 28
Judge Stevens agreed with the majority that the district court
had incorrectly placed the burden for the defendant's summary
judgment motion on the plaintiff.29 Having agreed with the major-
ity on that point, there was no reason to proceed beyond the pro-
cedural issues. Because of the district court's error as to the
plaintiff's burden of proof, the case could have been decided on
that ground alone. Nevertheless, Judge Stevens proceeded to an-
alyze the substantive merits of the case. Virtually dismissing the
plaintiff's statistical evidence, he dissented from a reversal be-
cause he concluded that the evidence had supported a finding for
summary judgment under the proper standard. In going beyond
the procedural issue, in ignoring the statistical evidence, and in
accepting, without scrutiny, the defendant's argument that the job
changes were economically justified,30 Judge Stevens displayed a
strong hostility to the sex discrimination challenge. 3 1 His breezy
approach to the disputed facts was inconsistent with his prior
reputation for always conducting an exhaustive inquiry into the
facts of a case. 32
28. Id. at 809.
29. Id. at 812-13.
30. The plaintiff had alleged that the job reclassifications had not been shown
to be economically justified because they either created new inefficiencies or in-
creased the risk of breakdown and accompanying down-time. Id. at 809. Judge
Stevens summarily dealt with these arguments in a footnote and characterized the
changes as merely indicating a management decision to achieve a significant cost
reduction with a minimal increased risk of breakdown. Id. at 813 n.1. Thus, Judge
Stevens would have held the plaintiff to a higher burden of persuasion regarding
sex discrimination than would the majority.
31. Rose involved conflicting allegations of whether the employer's job reclas-
sifications were made purely on the basis of business necessity. Id. at 809. Judge
Stevens minimized the plaintiff's evidence that showed the changes were not
made purely on the basis of business necessity. Id. at 813 n.1. In addition, he dis-
counted the dramatic drop in the percentage of women in the relevant job classifi-
cation from 55% to 10%. Id. at 809.
32. See Special Project, supra note 18, at 197.
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C. Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology
While Judge Stevens' opinions in Sprogis and Rose were lone
dissents, he wrote for the three-judge panel rejecting a sex dis-
crimination claim in Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology.3 3 In
Rose, he had required a high standard of evidence for a showing
of sex discrimination. In Cohen, he placed a similar burden on
the plaintiff by requiring a very high showing of state action.
Cohen involved a professor who had been denied tenure at the
Illinois Institute of Technology, a private institution, and who al-
leged sex discrimination in violation of the equal protection
clause.34 Judge Stevens rejected each of the plaintiff's four theo-
ries for finding state action.3 5 Further, Judge Stevens rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the complaint should not be dismissed
and that discovery should be allowed as it might reveal some
nexus between the state and the defendant's wrongful conduct.36
Although Judge Stevens' opinion in Cohen was criticized for re-
quiring a very high standard of state action,3 7 the merit of that
criticism is not clear-cut. Writing for a unanimous court, Judge
Stevens was not out-of-step with his own court, or with other cir-
33. 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976).
34. The plaintiff had no remedy under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act because
that Act, until 1972, exempted from coverage employees performing educational
work for educational institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1964). The challenged activi-
ties occurred prior to 1972 and the removal of the exemption had been held not to
apply retroactively. 524 F.2d at 822. Thus, the only claim available for the plaintiff
was one alleging that the Institute's alleged violations amounted to "state action"
which denied her equal protection of the laws. Id. at 822-23.
35. The first argument was that because the Institute was chartered by the
state and used the word "Illinois" in its title, it acted under color of state law. Jus-
tice Stevens concluded that this use of the word "llinois" did not establish any
activities as being under the color of state law. 524 F.2d at 824. Second, the
financial support received from the state was found neither large enough to con-
sider the Institute as the equivalent of a public university, nor specific enough
such that the funding directly furthered the sex discrimination policies alleged.
Id. at 825-26. Third, even though the Institute was pervasively regulated by the
state, that alone, Judge Stevens held, did not establish state action. No allegation
had been made that the state affirmatively encouraged or approved faculty em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of sex. Id. at 826. Fourth, Justice Stevens
rejected the argument that the omission of any affirmative prohibition against sex
discrimination, even against the background of detailed state regulation of the In-
stitute, was tantamount to state approval of the objectionable policy. Id.
36. Id. Judge Stevens rejected discovery because he found the plaintiff had
not specifically alleged state support or approval of the discriminating conduct.
Id.
37. See Stevens Hearings, supra note 3, at 81 (statement of Margaret Drach-
sler); id. at 227 (statement of Nan Aron).
cuits.38 Although the decision showed a lack of receptivity to sex
discrimination claims in that it required a stricter standard of
state action than that required in some Supreme Court race dis-
crimination cases, Judge Stevens was able to demonstrate prece-
dential support for the higher requirement.3 9 Even though there
was room in the developing law to allow him to use a more liberal
standard, there was nothing in the law to compel the use of such
a standard. The Cohen decision may have reflected a strong be-
lief that the fifth and the fourteenth amendments prohibited sex
discrimination only where specifically initiated or supported by
the state.40 Additionally, perhaps Judge Stevens feared that a lib-
eral state action rule would open the "floodgates" in which many
private interferences would be made federal cases. 41
In another aspect of Cohen, Judge Stevens announced an inter-
pretation of section 1985(3)42 that he would have occasion to am-
plify as a Justice. In rejecting Ms. Cohen's equal protection
challenge, Judge Stevens also rejected her allegation of a conspir-
acy to deprive her of a constitutional right in violation of section
1985(3) for two reasons. First, such an allegation would also re-
quire a showing of state action. Second, although conspiracies re-
garding racial discrimination could be reached under section
1985(3), Judge Stevens questioned whether conspiracies involving
sexual discrimination could be similarly reached.43 Unlike other
issues on which his opinions changed, his views on this issue
have remained the same on the Supreme Court. In Great Ameri-
can Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Novotny,4 4 he reaf-
firmed his view that section 1985(3) does not cover sex
discrimination.
D. Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Association v. American
Air Lines
Unlike the decisions in Sprogis, Rose, and Cohen, Judge Ste-
vens' decision in Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Association v.
American Air Lines45 was in favor of the plaintiff. In a case in-
38. See Stevens' Opinions, supra note 18, at 67. The Cohen opinion was con-
servative, but carefully reasoned, staying within the bounds of established prece-
dent and embodying a standard of state action comparable to that adopted in
other circuits.
39. 524 F.2d at-822-26.
40. Special Project, supra note 18, at 138-39.
41. Id. at 139.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976).
43. 524 F.2d at 828-29.
44. 442 U.S. 366, 381 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). See discussion in Part HI,
infra.
45. 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974).
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volving important distinctions between competing groups of
claimants, Judge Stevens demonstrated that he was not totally
hostile to sex discrimination plaintiffs.
Air Line Stewardesses involved a challenge to a settlement ne-
gotiated between the Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Asso-
ciation and various airline companies regarding the airlines' rule
requiring discharge of pregnant stewardesses. 46 The settlement
was challenged by formerly discharged stewardesses, who argued
that the union improperly represented groups with competing in-
terests: stewardesses who had been previously discharged under
the rule as well as those stewardesses who, at the time of the set-
tlement, potentially could be discharged under the rule. The lat-
ter group, it was argued, sought only an end to the rule. They
resisted reinstatement and the awarding of full seniority rights
because reinstatement could cause layoffs which would affect
those with the least seniority. Judge Stevens found that the inter-
ests of the two groups were different, that the union could not be
considered the exclusive agent of the previously discharged stew-
ardesses with regard to questions of discrimination, and that the
previously discharged stewardesses could opt out of the class ac-
tion settlements. 47
Air Line Stewardesses is important in understanding Judge Ste-
vens' views on sex discrimination because it showed that he did
not view the class of female stewardesses in a monolithic fashion.
He recognized that the members' interests were not totally simi-
lar, and he carefully distinguished the competing claims of per-
sons who had been actually discriminated against, as compared to
those who suffered only potential discrimination.
E. Summary
At the time of his nomination to the United States Supreme
Court, Judge Stevens' "batting average" in sex discrimination
ranged from bad to fair, depending on how the cases are charac-
terized. In only one of four sex discrimination cases did he find
for the plaintiff. In the three cases where he found against the
plaintiff, a decision for the plaintiff would have been reasonable
46. In the settlement, the companies agreed to abandon the automatic dis-
charge rule and to place discharged stewardesses on a preferential hiring list for
new vacancies. Neither back pay nor reinstatement, however, were given; only
limited seniority rights were proffered. Id. at 638.
47. Id. at 640-43.
and consistent with existing law. Thus, the criticisms of his Sev-
enth Circuit decisions charging insensitivity, if not hostility, to
sex discrimination claims are valid.
Whether any shift in Justice Stevens' approach to sex discrimi-
nation is evident since he was elevated to the United States
Supreme Court is the critical question. Before that question can
be addressed, however, it is necessary to first review the develop-
ments in the law of sex discrimination by the Supreme Court
prior to his nomination.
II. THE EMERGING LAW OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
The area of sex discrimination law is one of recent develop-
ment.48 Until recent years, the law was that women did not have
the same rights as men. Any change with regard to those rights
was assumed to be up to state, not federal, law.49 Since 1971, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has increasingly reviewed challenges
against laws and policies which discriminate on the basis of sex
and has often invalidated them. There are three primary areas5 0
of sex discrimination cases in which emerging doctrines can be
seen: laws which disadvantage females, laws which ostensibly
benefit females, and laws which discriminate on the basis of preg-
48. The two cases generally considered to be the first major sex discrimination
victories were decided in 1971: Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (dissimilar treat-
ment of men and women competing for letters of administration held to be unrea-
sonable classification) and Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)
(equal employment opportunities regardless of sex). Two famous earlier cases
which had sex discrimination implications were Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (all workers' protection statutes, including those protecting men and wo-
men alike, held unconstitutional) and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (laws
for the protection of female workers held constitutional because women Were con-
sidered weaker than men, dependent on men and in need of special protection).
49. GiNSBURG, Women, Men, and the Constitution: Key Supreme Court Rul-
ings, WOMEN AND THE CouRTs 21-22 (W. Hepperle and L. Crites eds. 1978). See
Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination By Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective,
46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 676 (1971). The authors state:
With some notable exceptions [judges] have failed to bring to sex dis-
crimination cases those judicial virtues of detachment, reflection and criti-
cal analysis which have served them so well with respect to other
sensitive social issues .... Judges have largely freed themselves from
patterns of thought that can be stigmatized as "racist" . . . . [But]
"[s]exism," the making of unjustified (or at least unsupported) assump-
tions about individual capabilities, interests, goals, and social roles solely
on the basis of sex differences-is as easily discernable in contemporary
judicial opinions as racism ever was.
Id. at 676.
50. This article will deal only with the narrow issue of sex discrimination and
will not deal with cases involving such broader areas as reproductive and sexual
freedoms, marriage and family roles, right to privacy, status of children, public
assistance and other issues involving sex-based societal problems, expectations
and roles.
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nancy.5 1 It is helpful to trace the developing law as created by
some of the major Supreme Court decisions in each of these
areas.
52
A. Laws and Policies Which Disadvantage Females
The Court has become increasingly aware of the harmful nature
of sexually discriminatory laws and policies. 53 These harms in-
clude not only the direct disadvantages created by the policies or
statutes, but also the indirect effects of the negative stereotyping
created by and reflected in discriminatory laws and policies.5 4
This combination of direct and indirect disadvantages creates re-
51. Laws regarding pregnancy need not necessarily constitute a unique con-
ceptual area of analysis, but it will be seen that the Court has treated pregnancy.
issues differently than other sex discrimination issues.
52. For a more extended discussion of the history of sex discrimination cases,
see B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DIscRIMINATION AND THE
LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1975) [hereinafter cited as BABCOCK]; K. DAVIDSON,
R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, SEX BASED DISCRIMINATION (1974) [hereinafter cited as DA-
VIDSONJ; Cook, The Burger Court and Women's Rights 1971-77, WOMEN AND THE
COURTS 47 (W. Hepperle and L, Crites eds. 1978); Erickson, Women and the
Supreme Court Anatomy is Destiny, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 209 (1974); Getman, The
Emerging Constitutional Principle of Sexual Equality, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 157
(1973); Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975); Gins-
burg, Gender In the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 SuP. CT. REV. 1
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Ginsburg, Gender in The Supreme Court: 1973-74];
Ginsburg, supra note 49; Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-
1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 617, 621-23 [hereinafter cited as Johnston, Sex Discrim-
ination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974] (1974); Johnston, Sex Discrimination
and the Supreme Court--1975, 23 U.C.L.A. L REV. 235, 260-65 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1975]; Kanowitz,
"Benign" Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and Their Cure, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1379
(1980); Powers, Pragmatic Paternalism, supra note 9. For a discussion of lower
court cases which helped to change the legal climate between 1961 and 1973, see
BABCOCK, supra this note, at 104, 120-23.
53. See generally Brown, Emerson, Falk and Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis For Equal Rights For Women, 80 YALE L.J.
871, 875 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown]; Gunther, Foreward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Karst, Equal Citizenship Under the 14th Amendment, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the
Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications,
62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974); Note, Equal Protection: A Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny,
76 MICH. L. REV. 771 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Closer Look at Equal Protection];
and Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard For Classifications Based on Sex, 75
DUKE L.J. 163 [hereinafter cited as Emerging Bifurcated Standard].
54. For a thorough discussion of the harms of negative stereotyping regarding
employment, see Taub, Keeping Women In Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se As A
Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. REV. 345 (1980). See generally
Karst, supra note 53, at 22-26.
strictions on the fundamental right of each citizen to full partici-
pation in society.5 5 The Court has been groping for principles and
rationales by which to consider sex discrimination cases. Unable
to determine such principles, its decisions have instead been
reached by balancing tests which have attempted to ascertain
whether the social and economic principles supporting the chal-
lenged laws and policies outweigh the harm these laws and poli-
cies have caused. In its initial applications of this balancing test,
the Court gave broad deference to the legislature.5 6 But in 1971,
the Court began to strike down laws which discriminated on the
basis of sex.5 7
55. Karst, supra note 53, at 22-26.
56. In Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), the Court rejected an equal pro-
tection challenge to a Michigan law barring women from being employed as bar-
tenders (an exception was provided for women whose husbands or fathers owned
the bar in which they would work). The Court held that a rational basis for the
distinction could exist, despite the argument that the law served to protect the all
male bartenders' union from competition. Id. at 467. Many commentators view
Goesaert as based on the reasoning that the legislature could rationally have de-
termined that there was a need for "protection" of women. See, e.g., Ginsburg,
supra note 49, at 24. Professor Powers cites Goesaert as a paradigm of 'romantic
paternalism" embodying "the view of a woman as the unwitting seductress, [and]
the assumption that the mere presence of women bartenders might incite men
into violent and/or sexual behavior which women were too weak, both physically
and morally, to control." Powers, supra note 9, at 1285-86 (citation omitted). But
see Emerging Bifurcated Standard, supra note 53, at 168 n.31, suggesting the Court
was protecting the morality of society as a whole and not merely of women bar-
tenders, and, thus, the case should properly be considered "restrictive" rather
than "protective." Another example of early deference to the legislature can be
seen in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), where the Court held that a statute that
excluded females from jury selection, save for an exception allowing volunteers,
did not violate equal protection or due process.
57. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam), the
Court held that an employer could not, under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964)),
refuse to hire women with pre-school age children while, at the same time, hiring
men with such children. The type of discrimination practiced in Phillips was char-
acterized by the circuit court of appeals (which did not find a violation of Title
VII) as "two pronged": Ms. Phillips was denied employment because she was a
woman and because she had pre-school age children. Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1969). Three arguments were made for reversal of the
circuit court's decision. First, the combination of sex plus another factor (parent-
age of pre-school age children) had not been shown to be a bona fide occupational
qualification as required under the Act and was therefore prohibited. Second, the
combination had not been shown to be required as a business justification as re-
quired under the Act. Third, any "sex-plus" theory should have been rejected be-
cause sex cannot be even one factor of employment consideration under the Act.
Id. at 20. The Supreme Court appeared to adopt the first position. 400 U.S. at 544.
Phillips initially seemed important in the development of sex discrimination law
because it appeared to signal the rejection of "sex-plus" discrimination. See Boy-
lan, Ida Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 1 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 11, 12
(1972); Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 4. In actuality, however, the Court did not go so
far. The Court left the door open by indicating that "sex plus parent of pre-school
age child" might be the basis of a bona fide occupational qualification and, as such,
might justify discriminatory hiring. 400 U.S. at 547. For this reason, Phillips was
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1. Reed v. Reed
In 1971, more than a century and a half after the Supreme Court
upheld a statute limiting the practice of law to men,58 the
Supreme Court, in Reed v. Reed,59 handed down the decision that
would become characterized as the "breakthrough" in sex dis-
crimination cases. 60 In a unanimous decision, the Court held that
a statute which gave men mandatory preference over women with
regard to appointment as administrators of estates violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court
stated that it applied the "reasonable relationship" test to the
classification of women 61 and held that the manadatory prefer-
ence for men was unreasonable and arbitrary.62 Because this ar-
bitrariness was not outweighed by any possible goals of reducing
the workload of courts, or reducing intrafamily controversy, the
Court stated that the statutory preference for men bore no ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate state objective.63
Reed is important not only because of its finding for a sex dis-
crimination plaintiff, but also because of the test the Court actu-
ally used. Although the Court said it was using the rational
relationship test, it must have actually used a stricter test be-
cause the challenged classification could have been found to
achieve some efficacy. 64 Thus, the Reed holding indicated that
not uniformly regarded as a significant victory for women's rights. See Boylan,
supra this note, at 11.
58. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1872).
59. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
60. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 52, at 47; Ginsburg, Key Supreme Court Rulings,
supra note 49, at 26; Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-
1974, supra note 52, at 622. But see Hodes, A Disgruntled Look at Reed v. Reed
From the Vantage Point of the Nineteenth Amendment, 1 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 9
(1972) (arguing that not only was the Reed decision no improvement on the ex-
isting law, but also that it posed the danger of future use against sex discrimina-
tion plaintiffs).
61. 404 U.S. at 76-77.
62. Id. at 75-76. The Court was asked to hold that laws discriminating against
women should not be reviewed under the "rational relationship" standard but
under strict scrutiny. See Ginsburg, Comment on Reed v. Reed, 1 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 7, 7 (1972). The Court did not address this argument but merely stated that
the application of the rational relationship test led to its decision. 404 U.S. at 76.
In a later case, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court noted that it had
not reached the issue of whether the stricter standard should be used in Reed be-
cause the statute did not pass muster under the more lenient standard. Id. at 447
n.7.
63. 404 U.S. at 76-77.
64. Gunther, supra note 53, at 34. Professor Gunther argues that the use of an
sex classifications would be held to a more rigorous standard of
review than that of mere rational relationship.65
2. Frontiero v. Richardson
In its next major sex discrimination case, Frontiero v. Richard-
son,66 the Court appeared to be moving swiftly beyond the im-
plied "strict reasonableness" concept in Reed toward the use of a
strict scrutiny standard.67 In Frontiero, the Court was confronted
with a military benefits plan under which women were denied
procedural as well as substantive benefits 68 solely for reasons of
"arbitrary" sex classification is plainly relevant to a state's interest in avoiding ad-
ministrative disputes and would not be prohibited under equal protection requir-
ing merely a "rational relationship" or even a "significant relationship." Because
the classification was prohibited, Gunther argues the Court must have been imply-
ing some "special suspicion" of sex classifications. Id.
65. Id. See also Getman, Emerging Principle of Sexual Equality, supra note
52, at 164-65; Emerging Bifurcated Standard, supra note 53, at 177. But see Hodes,
supra note 60, at 12 (suggesting that Reed was unimportant because it was virtu-
ally moot as the law had been repealed by the time of the Court's opinion; it took
no courage or change of doctrine for the Court to reach the Reed result).
Although Reed cast doubt on the use of a sex classification for the purpose of
administrative convenience, the Court shortly thereafter allowed a sex classifica-
tion for that purpose in a per curiam decision regarding a state rule requiring that
a wife take and use her husband's surname after marriage. Forbush v. Wallace,
405 U.S. 970 (1972). See Ginsburg, supra note 62, at 8. It has been suggested that
some of the reasons for the Forbush decision were that the case was not pursued
as effectively as other women's rights cases, which had been viewed as being of
paramount importance, and the plaintiff had not been assisted by amicus curiae
briefs from national women's rights and civil rights organizations. In addition
there were other problems.
[T]he facts in the Forbush case were not developed at the trial court level
in the form most favorable to the plaintiff. For example, the record was
allowed to stand with the patent misrepresentation that the laws of all
fifty states requires married women to use their husbands' surnames. In
addition, no adequate record was even developed on the actual availability
and cost of the name change procedure when the person seeking the
change was a married woman wishing to regain her premarriage name. In
the Supreme Court, appellants were thus reduced to noting that the name
change procedure was discretionary and would not be "without cost"-
hardly a persuasive statement. Similarly, the plaintiffs did not make an
adequate record on the actual administrative cost of allowing married wo-
men to use their premarriage names on drivers licenses and other records.
BABCOCK, supra note 52, at 127 (footnote omitted).
66. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
67. See generally Cook, supra note 52; Ginsburg, Comment: Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 1 WOMEN's RTs. L REP. 2 (1973); Ginsburg, supra note 49; Note, Extension
versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statute: A Remedial Alternative, 12 COLum.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 115 (1975).
68. 411 U.S. at 678-80. Spouses of male military members, on the one hand,
were automatically considered "dependents" for the purposes of obtaining depen-
dents' benefits. Spouses of female military members, on the other hand, were not
considered "dependents" unless they showed that they were, in fact, dependent
on their spouse for more than one-half of their support.
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administrative convenience. 69 Four Justices7 O concluded that any
sex classifications would be considered inherently suspect and
must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.7 1
Frontiero was important for three reasons. First, it was the
high water mark of the movement to have sex classifications de-
clared inherently suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.72 Second,
the remedy was positive for the sex discrimination victim in that
it extended rather than invalidated the objectionable statute. 73
69. Id. at 681-82. The district court had reasoned that, because the military
was then 99% male, differential treatment might lead to administrative savings.
70. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Douglas, Marshall and White. Id.
at 678.
71. Id. at 688. Justice Brennan suggested three criteria for a suspect class:
(1) that the class suffer from an immutable characteristic determined solely by
accident of birth and bear no relationship to the members' ability to contribute to
society; (2) that the class have suffered a history of discrimination; and (3) that
the class face continuing discrimination in societal institutions and lack power in
the political area. Id. at 685-87. See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme CourM the
Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Inequality, 61 VA.
L. REV. 945, 980-81 (1975).
Justice Stewart, in a one sentence concurrence, stated that the statutes involved
worked an "invidious discrimination in violation of the constitution." 411 U.S. at
691. See Ginsburg, supra note 67, at 3-4 (suggesting that perhaps Justice Stewart
was implying that he would know sex discrimination when he saw it, just as he
had stated that he knew hardcore pornography when he saw it in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
Three other Justices agreed that in this case, the statute was an unconstitu-
tional discrimination which violated due process, but they specifically declined to
find that sex was a suspect classification for two reasons. First, the statute could
be found to be unconstitutional under the Reed test. Second, the Justices were
concerned that a judicial decision on this issue would be premature in light of the
fact that the state legislatures where then actively debating the proposed equal
rights amendment. 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
72. See Cook, supra note 52, at 47. See also Karst, supra note 53, at 22-26. Pro-
fessor Karst argues that there are two primary lines of reasoning which determine
the degree of scrutiny to be given a discriminatory classification: (1) solicitude for
the victims of the discrimination and (2) the equal citizenship value of participa-
tion in society. Frontiero established a higher level of scrutiny because it involved
major elements of both concerns: women were victimized by demeaning role-typ-
ing; women were also underrepresented in government. Id. at 24-25. Karst com-
bined both factors to suggest that the degree of suspectness of a classification is
determined by "the degree to which the classification interferes with the interest
in being treated as a person who belongs to the society as a respected, responsible
and participating member." Id. at 26.
73. 411 U.S. at 691 n.25. The Court did not invalidate, as it could have, the pro-
vision of dependents' benefits to the spouses of male military members. Rather, it
extended the same benefits to the spouses of female military members. Id. For a
discussion of the issues involved in the extension of statutes which are invalid be-
cause they are underinclusive, see generally Note, supra note 67, at 135-36. See
also Kanowitz, supra note 52, at 1412-29. Professor Kanowitz argues against "be-
nign" laws which sexually discriminate against men. Citing Frontiero and other
Third, the Court began to realize the constraining effects of "ro-
mantic paternalism." 74 But Frontiero may have been illusory as a
sign of dramatic change because it may have been an easy case.
The extension of benefits in issue presented little significant
threat to the public fisc. 75 Since relatively few women served in
the military, since even fewer were married, and since fewer still
were married to civilians,7 6 the extension of benefits would result
in virtually no increase in budget requirements. 77 Moreover,
Frontiero was essentially an equal pay case.78 The type of com-
pensation discrimination involved was clearly prohibited by the
Equal Pay Act of 196379 and by Title VII.80 Although these stat-
utes were not applicable to the military, the basic similarity of the
Frontiero situation to the type of situations meant to be pro-
scribed by federal law should not have rendered the finding of sex
discrimination in this case difficult.
3. Stanton v. Stanton
While the Court had shown some dissatisfaction with sexually
discriminatory laws in Reed and Frontiero, its 1975 decision in
Stanton v. Stanton,81 showed an increased understanding of the
problems of negative stereotyping. Stanton, however, did not
change the situation, evidenced in Frontiero, that there were not
five Justices willing to declare sex classifications suspect.
In Stanton, the Court struck down on equal protection grounds
a state statute which set different ages of majority for males and
females. 82 The Court held that the question of whether sex classi-
fications were inherently suspect need not be reached because
"under any test--compelling state interest, or rational basis, or
something in between-[the statute] ... does not survive an
cases, he argues that such laws should be extended to grant benefits to men rather
than abrogated such that no one gets the benefits.
74. There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long an unfortunate
history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was ratio-
nalized by an attitude of "romantic paternalism" which, in practical effect,
put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage ....
[O ur statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped dis-
tinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th cen-
tury the position of women in our society was, in many respects,
comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.
411 U.S. at 685.
75. See Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 29; Note, supra note 67, at 134-36.
76. Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 29.
77. Note, supra note 67, at 136.
78. See Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 28.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
81. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
82. Id. at 17-18.
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equal protection attack."83 The Court found that the state had no
rational reason to draw a sex-based distinction regarding age of
majority.8 4
The Court specifically confronted and rejected arguments based
on stereotypical "role typing": that the female is destined for the
home, not the marketplace, and thus requires less education and
a shorter period of protection, or that the female matures earlier
than the male and therefore requires less support.8 5 The Court
displayed a new sensitivity to the relationship of roletyping in the
creation of unequal stereotypes. In clearly rejecting statutes
based on discriminatory stereotypes, the Stanton Court took a
major step forward.86
B. Laws and Policies Ostensibly Benefiting Females
The decisions in Reed, Frontiero, and Stanton may have re-
flected the Court's uncertainty regarding the proper standard of
review for sexually discriminatory laws, but those decisions did
83. Id. at 17.
84. Id. at 14.
85. No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of
the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas
.... Women's activities and responsibilities are increasing and ex-
panding .... The presence of women in business, in the professions, in
government and, indeed, in all walks of life where education is a desirable,
if not always a necessary, antecedent is apparent and a proper subject of
judicial notice.
421 U.S. at 14-15.
86. [T~he Supreme Court in its tenth [sex discrimination] opinion forth-
rightly declare[d] what it should have said in the first: Governmentally-
imposed gender discrimination violates the guarantee of equal protection
when its sole or primary justification is adherence to an outmoded sex-
role stereotype. Reliance on such stereotypes does not satisfy even the
rational relationship test of equal protection.
Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1975, supra note 52, at 259.
See also Cook, supra note 52, at 62 (suggesting that because Stanton considered
the issue of socialization of children to sex roles, it was the most significant of the
sex equality cases).
The Court may have used the Stanton negative stereotype analysis in holding
that a system of jury selection which excluded women was unconstitutional. Tay-
lor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The Taylor decision, however, was not based
on an argument of sex discrimination per se, but on the argument that the defend-
ant's all male jury in a criminal trial violated his sixth amendment right to a jury
representative of the community. 419 U.S. at 537. Thus, because the sixth amend-
ment only applies to criminal cases it remained unclear whether sex discrimina-
tion in juries for civil cases was unconstitutional. See Cook, supra note 52, at 65.
But see Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1975, supra note
52, at 247.
not reflect any suggestion that the discrimination was actually
laudable. In the following cases, however, supporters of discrimi-
natory laws argued that sex discrimination should be allowed be-
cause it attempts, in some way, to recompense women for injuries
suffered due to past discrimination. Such laws create a tension
between concepts of pure equality and attempts to ameliorate
past injuries.87
1. Kahn v. Shevin
The Court first directly confronted the problems raised by "re-
verse" or "benign" discrimination in the case of Kahn v. Shevin.88
As Stanton marked a step forward toward requiring genuine
equality by the Court, Kahn marked a step backward. In Kahn,
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held that a statute giv-
ing a tax exemption to widows but not widowers did not violate
equal protection.8 9 His brief opinion implied that sex discrimina-
tion that benefited women in order to redress past discrimination
could be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.90
Justice Douglas first noted that because the statute involved a
87. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971), a tax decision in
which the Court rejected preferential treatment for women in certain circum-
stances. Although the Court did not directly examine the problems of "reverse"
discrimination, its analysis indicated changing attitudes with regard to the subor-
dination of a woman's identity in marriage. In Mitchell, the Court held that a wo-
man was liable for taxes on community income derived from community property,
even when she had such a slight interest that she could not actually be considered
an owner. Id. at 204-06. The wife was liable despite the fact that her husband had
mismanaged family income and had failed to pay joint tax obligations. Id. at 192.
If this case had been decided under a doctrine of "oneness," or of "compensatory"
treatment, the wife's identity would have merged into that of her husband's and
she would have had no liability. See Cook, supra note 52, at 67. Such a doctrine,
of course, would be repugnant to the ideal of equal treatment. Id. But, the prob-
lem remaining in the absence of such a doctrine, was that a "traditional" wife, who
left financial affairs in her husband's hands, was subject to statutes which placed
financial responsibilities upon her. Id.
For a thorough discussion of ostensibly compensatory discrimination, see Ka-
nowitz, supra note 52. Professor Kanowitz argues that, although "benign" discrim-
ination might be justified for racial classifications, it is not justified for sexual
classifications. He points out that men have been unfairly burdened by certain
sex classifications and that benign discrimination inevitably imposes burdens, as
well as benefits, upon the class it seeks to aid.
88. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See Erickson, Kahn, Ballard and Wiesenfeld: A New
Equal Protection Test in "Reverse" Sex Discrimination Cases?, 42 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 1 (1975).
89. 416 U.S. at 355-56.
90. Justice Douglas, in Kahn, departed from his previous position that any
sex-based classification was inherently suspect, requiring strict scrutiny. In Kahn,
he did not specifically address the level of scrutiny required, but his language was
that of the pre-Reed rational relationship test. See BABcocK, supra note 52, at 125-
26. See also Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974,
supra note 52, at 672; Emerging Bifurcated Standard, supra note 53, at 179; Gins-
burg, supra note 49, at 30.
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tax classification, it was subject to a lower degree of scrutiny than
other kinds of statutes.91 Second, he emphasized that the dis-
crimination was not made solely for purposes of administrative
convenience, as had been the discrimination in Frontiero.92
Rather, the purpose of the challenged classification, Justice Doug-
las found, was to ameliorate the disparities in the economic situa-
tions of widows as compared to widowers. 93
The Kahn decision was vigorously attacked in the dissenting
opinions.94 Nevertheless, it created an important precedent al-
lowing compensatory discrimination. 95 The decision has been se-
verely criticized as a "retrenchment"96 by the Court.9 7 In addition
to problems of paternalism and negative stereotyping, a major
91. 416 U.S. at 355-56. See BABCOCK, supra note 52, at 124; Johnston, Sex Dis-
crimination And the Supreme Court-1971-1974, supra note 52, at 672.
92. 416 U.S. at 355.
93. Id. at 354.
94. The majority opinion was challenged in two dissenting opinions. Justice
Brennan would have held, first, that all sex classifications, including compensa-
tory classifications, must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Id. at 357. Still, he would
have found that under such scrutiny, compensatory sex discrimination statutes
would meet a compelling state interest test. Id. at 359. See BABCOCK, supra note
52, at 24 (arguing that Justice Brennan's analysis purported to apply a strict scru-
tiny test but actually used a weaker version of the test than had been used in race
cases. The authors suggest that the weakness of the Brennan test was due to a
loose conception of what would constitute a compelling justification for a sex clas-
sification).
Second, Justice Brennan reasoned that compensatory classifications must be
precisely tailored and must use the least drastic means available. 416 U.S. at 360.
See Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, supra note
52, at 662 (arguing that the statute was not precisely tailored because it confined
the statutory benefit to women and did not correlate it to any determination of
need). On the basis of the lack of precision and least drastic means, Justice Bren-
nan concluded that the tax statute was unconstitutional. 416 U.S. at 360.
Justice White, dissenting, reaffirmed his view that sex-based classifications were
inherently suspect and indicated that, because of the imprecision in the statute,
the state had not met the burden required under strict scrutiny standard of re-
view. Id. at 361-62.
95. Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, supra
note 52, at 673.
96. Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 29.
97. First, Justice Douglas seemed to adopt a paternalistic view toward women.
Professor Johnston sharply assailed Justice Douglas' reasoning regarding "protec-
tion" of women, terming his departure from the equality principles of Frontiero
and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), and his reliance on the
protectionist opinions in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), as "simply astound-
ing" and "amazing." Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-
1974, supra note 52, at 669. Contra BABCOCK, supra note 52, at 124: "[a]lthough
the rationality of the legislative classification upheld by Douglas ... is certainly
questionable, the quality of the majority's inquiry is not markedly lower than
problem with the Kahn decision was that the Court did not in-
quire into the actual, as opposed to hypothetical, legislative pur-
poses of the statute.98 The failure to make such inquiry implied
that laws that did not benefit females might be upheld so long as
those laws could be "improved," as late as the time of argument
before the Court, with hypothetical justifications, including pro-
many of the Court's previous decisions applying the test of rational relationship to
non-sex-based classifications." Id.
Second, by relying on generalized statistical income data by sex and refusing to
consider individual deviations, the Court appeared to be actually upholding the
pattern of legislating by stereotype, which' it had rejected in Frontiero. See John-
ston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, supra note 52, at 670,
672. Professor Johnston argues that the problem with the Court's reliance on gen-
eral gross statistical summaries is that such summaries reinforce sexual stereo-
types. If the general statistics in Kahn were sufficient to uphold the statute, he
argues, the statute in Reed could have been upheld on the basis of evidence tend-
ing to show that more wives are dependent on their husbands for support than
vice-versa. Id. See also BABCOCK, supra note 52, at 124 (the authors direct a criti-
cism against Justice Brennan's opinion which could, with equal or more force, be
directed against Justice Douglas' opinion: they argue that the use of ameliorative
classification by sex undermines the basic concept of individual treatment without
regard to sex); Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 29 (suggesting the statute expressed
the lawmakers' view that the death of a wife carried less significance for the fam-
ily than the death of a husband).
The basic problem regarding the stereotypes involved in Kahn was that they
created the possibility that a rationale for remedying past discrimination could be
easily invented. Thus, a statute could discriminate against women under the guise
of benefiting them. BABCOCK, supra note 52, at 124. A "benefiting" rationale could
become the functional equivalent of "benign paternalism." See Johnston, Sex Dis-
crimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, supra note 52, at 672. See also
BABCOCK, supra note 52, at 125; Kanowitz, supra note 52, at 1380.
Third, the decision upheld a statute which was not truly remedial; the statute
included women who did not have any financial problems but excluded many wo-
men who would be in financial need. Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the
Supreme Court-1971-1974, supra note 52, at 671.
Fourth, the decision was criticized as retreating from the increased understand-
ing of sex discrimination which the Court had seemed to be showing in prior
cases. Id. at 673. Justice Douglas came under special attack because of the nature
of his dissent in De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), announced just the day
before Kahn was released. In De Funis, Justice Douglas disapproved of compen-
satory racial discrimination in strong terms. "There is no constitutional right for
any race to be preferred." Id. at 336. "Whatever his race, he had a constitutional
right to have his application considered on its individual merits in a racially neu-
tral manner." Id. at 337. "So far as race is concerned, any state-sponsored prefer-
ence to one race over another ... is in my view 'invidious' and violative of the
Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 343-44. In Kahn, however, Justice Douglas sug-
gested no reasons why reverse discrimination in sex cases should have a greater
protection than reverse discrimination in race cases. Thus, Justice Douglas' opin-
ion in Kahn seemed totally at odds with his opinion in De Funis. Johnston, Sex
Discrimination in the Supreme Court-1971-1974, supra note 52, at 667. See also
BABCOCK, supra note 52, at 124 (suggesting that the best way to understand the
Douglas opinion is as a decision more about the state power to tax than about sex
classifications); Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 42 n.78.
98. See Comment, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection Gender Discrimina-
tion-Califano v. Goldfarb, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 503, 508-09 (1978).
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tective rationales, by their supporters. 99
2. Schlesinger v. Ballard
In Schlesinger v. Ballard,l00 as in Kahn, the Court accepted a
hypothetical compensatory justification for a sexually discrimina-
tory statute. In Ballard, a male officer challenged, on equal pro-
tection grounds, the Navy's promotion system under which
women officers were given more time than men to "make the
grade" or face mandatory discharge for lack of promotion. The
Court applied the Kahn rationale,' 0 ' concluding that the disparity
in treatment was not merely for administrative or fiscal reasons,
as it had been in Reed and Frontiero, but stemmed from disad-
vantages caused by restrictions on female service in combat and
at sea.102 Because the longer waiting period was held to be com-
99. In two 1974 cases, the Court displayed conflicting attitudes toward protec-
tive rationales. In Corning v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974), the Court struck down
a practice of payment which allowed men to receive higher pay than women for
night work. Id. at 204-05. Corning is significant for two reasons. First, for a long
time, only men had been allowed to perform night work in the factory involved, id.
at 204, and in many factories across the country, Cook, supra note 52, at 64. This
exclusion had been based on the Muller doctrine that women were weaker and re-
quired protection. By requiring equality in pay, the Court's decision also implied
that the grounds for inequality of hiring in the first place no longer existed. 417
U.S. at 208. Second, the company had instituted a night pay differential when the
night work force was all male. Even though women were later hired for night
work and were still later given a night pay differential, the Court held that the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963), required that the mere exist-
ence of a differential was not enough; the differential had to be computed on the
same basis as that used for men. 417 U.S. at 206-10.
While Corning emphasized equal treatment, Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414
U.S. 573 (1974), although not a pure sex discrimination case, revealed that the
Court had not given up protective concerns for women. In Gaudet, a maritime tort
case, the Court allowed a widow to recover for loss of support, services and soci-
ety, as well as funeral expenses, even though her husband, before his death, had
recovered damages for wages, pain and suffering, and medical expenses. Id. at
591. Because maritime jobs are traditionally male, the effect of this decision could
be to allow women increased protection of their interests through civil tort actions.
Cook, supra note 52, at 65. The protective motive behind the Gaudet decision was
criticized by Justice Powell, in his dissent, as creating an area of "sentimental"
damages not traditionally allowed under admiralty law and as multiplying existing
maritime wrongful death laws. 414 U.S. at 595 (Powell, J., concurring).
100. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
101. Kahn was decided by a vote of 6-3 and Ballard, 5-4. The alignment of the
Justices was the same in Ballard as in Kahn except for the addition of Justice
Douglas, "who perhaps realized the error of his opinion in Kahn." Johnston, Sex
Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1975, supra note 52, at 240.
102. 419 U.S. at 505-08. Justice Brennan dissented in Ballard on grounds simi-
lar to his dissent in Kahn. He concluded that there was no compelling state inter-
pensatory for those disadvantages, it was found rationally related
to the state's goal of providing fair promotion programs for female
officers.
The problem with the Ballard decision was that it failed to con-
front the real issue of the underlying sex-role stereotypes behind
the Navy's dual-track promotion system. Even though the Navy
plan ostensibly favored women, 0 3 the decision upholding that
plan was not actually beneficial to women. Instead, it reinforced
the notion that women are unfit for combat and are physically in-
ferior to men.1 0 4 Ballard was also confusing because it is unclear
to what extent the Court was according its traditional deference
to Congress in matters involving the armed forces. 05
3. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,lO6 the Court reconsidered the wis-
dom of allowing hypothetical compensatory justifications of the
type allowed in Kahn and Ballard. Writing for the Court, Justice
Brennan struck down social security laws which provided benefits
to a widowed mother but not to a widowed father. 07 Justice
Brennan departed from his previous insistence that all sex classi-
fications were inherently suspect and required strict scrutiny.
Presumably in an effort to maintain a majority, his decision
papered over the conflict between the Justices regarding the
est in the rules because they were not actually compensatory and any
compensatory purpose which was hypothesized was merely to compensate for
other discriminatory policies:
Indeed, I find quite troublesome the notion that a gender-based difference
in treatment can be justified by another, broader, gender-based difference
in treatment imposed directly and currently by the Navy itself. While it is
true that the restrictions upon women officers' opportunities for profes-
sional service are not here directly under attack, they are obviously impli-
cated on the Court's chosen ground for decision, and the Court ought at
least to consider whether they may be valid before sustaining a provision
it conceives to be based upon them.
419 U.S. at 511-12 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, Justice Brennan argued
that even if there had been a compelling state interest, the statutory means were
unacceptable because women did not actually compete with men for promotions.
Id. at 518. See also Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 30 (citing Two v. United States, 471
F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973)) (arguing that in the typi-
cal case, the Navy promotional plan worked to the advantage of men and to the
disadvantage of women).
103. Professor Kanowitz argues that the dual-track promotion plan was not en-
tirely beneficial to women for two reasons. First, women became ineligible for sev-
erance pay for a period longer than men. Second, the plan eased the pressure on
superiors to promote women. Kanowitz, supra note 52, at 1407.
104. Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1975, supra note 52,
at 243-44.
105. Comment, supra note 98, at 509 n.40.
106. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
107. Id. at 653.
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equal protection tests to be used,l0 8 and he restricted his focus to
an analysis of the "means" used by the statute.109
The primary significance of Wiesenfeld is that the Court refused
to accept the hypothetical legislative purpose that the statute was
intended to aid mothers.110 The Court required an examination of
the actual purpose. In making that examination, it found that the
statute was intended to help neither males nor females, but
rather parents."' The Court implied that 'true" compensatory
legislation might be acceptable, but it failed to examine important
problems with such legislation: that favorable treatment for wo-
men continued the practice of paternalism and that special assist-
ance to one group of women (widows) actually harmed another
group of women (deceased covered employees whose husbands
would receive lower benefits) .112
Although the emerging doctrine was unclear, even after Wiesen-
108. Looking at the votes in Kahn ... and Ballard, however, one could
also predict that only two or at most three other justices would concur
with Mr. Justice Brennan's reasoning. We can only surmise the degree of
inner conflict that he must have experienced before committing himself to
a position in Wiesenfeld that a majority of his colleagues could support.
Be that as it may, Mr. Justice Brennan abandoned his previous insistence
on strict scrutiny analysis and tailored his opinion closely to the facts of
the case and the legislative history of the challenged statute.
Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1975, supra note 52, at 252-
53 (footnote omitted). For an analysis of the equal protection issues in Wiesen-
feld, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 774 (9th ed. 1975) and Comment, supra
note 98, at 510-11.
109. See Comment, supra note 98, at 510-11.
110. 420 U.S. at 648 n.16.
111. The fact situation in Wiesenfeld was especially appealing: Stephen
Wiesenfeld, the widowed father, was denied social security a similarly sit-
uated widowed mother receives; Jason Paul Wiesenfeld, newborn child of
a fully insured individual was denied the opportunity for the personal care
of his sole surviving parent. And Paula Wiesenfeld, the deceased wage
earner, did not secure through her employment the family protection that
would be afforded the family of a male wage earner.
Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 32-33. See also Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the
Supreme Court-1975, supra note 52, at 254-57.
Because the facts in Wiesenfeld were very strong, there was no ground to argue
that the statute actually was ameliorative or that the classification was not truly
sex based. Thus, Kahn and Ballard provided little support for the defenders of
the statute. See Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1975,
supra note 52, at 256-57. Perhaps the statute could have been upheld on grounds
of deference to legislative judgment regarding social welfare programs. That is-
sue, however, was not dealt with in the majority opinion. Thus, Wiesenfeld might
be seen more as a response to an appealing fact situation than as a decision which
provided progress toward clearing up the analytical confusions of sex discrimina-
tion into which the Court had fallen.
112. See Kanowitz, supra note 52, at 1409.
feld it appeared that the Court would review ostensibly compen-
satory classifications much more leniently than it would review
classifications which discriminated against women. The Court
held to this position despite attacks arguing that any unequal
treatment was a continuation of negative, patronizing, and stere-
otypical views of women. The Court was concerned with the is-
sues of federalism and legislative deference, concluding that
legislators should have wide latitude to experiment with social
programs.
Two aspects of the initial "compensatory" programs are impor-
tant. First, the two cases in which the Court upheld hypotheti-
cally compensatory programs are analytically confusing because
one was a tax case and the other was a military case; the areas of
tax and military matters are areas in which the Court exhibits
greater than usual deference to legislative judgements. Thus, it is
unclear whether deference in those cases was greater because of
the compensatory aspect or because of the nature of the regula-
tion involved. Second, the Court recognized in Wiesenfeld that
compensatory motives must be shown to be genuine. Otherwise,
virtually any discrimination could be saved by creative
argument.113
C. Laws and Policies Regarding Pregnancy
The Court has displayed an increased receptiveness to cases
challenging discriminatory treatment on the basis of sex, both to
those which disadvantage and to those which claim to benefit wo-
men. The Court has been unwilling, however, to display the same
degree of receptiveness to challenges against policies relating to
pregnancy.114
1. Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur
The difference in treatment of pregnancy cases from other sex
discrimination cases was first illustrated in Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur.115 In LaFleur, the Court struck down a
rule which required pregnant teachers to take an unpaid mater-
nity leave at a fixed stage in pregnancy and which also barred re-
113. It was not clear, however, whether actual compensatory motives need be
shown regarding tax or military matters. Perhaps the great deference in these ar-
eas would allow the continued use of hypothetical motives.
114. For a discussion of the economic and social effects of pregnancy discrimi-
nation, see Barkett, Pregnancy Discrimination-Purpose, Effect, and Nashville Gas
Co. v. Satty, 16 J. FAM. L. 400, 402-06 (1977-78). See also Kirp and Robyn, Preg-
nancy, Justice, and the Justices, 57 TEXAS L. REv. 947 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Kirp and Robyn].
115. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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employment prior to a fixed time after pregnancy.116 LaFleur is
important in the development of sex discrimination law because
it appeared to mark at least some shift in the Court's approach to
women's roles in society. The LaFleur decision also signaled a
different and more restrictive approach to pregnancy-based dis-
crimination than to other types of sex discrimination." 7
The Court refused to analyze LaFleur in equal protection
terms." 8 Rather, the case was discussed in due process terms,
116. Id. at 651.
117. See generally BABCOCK, supra note 52, at 126-29; Cook, supra note 52, at 57;
Johnston, Sex Discrimination and The Supreme Court-1971-1974, supra note 52, at
655-61; Karst, supra note 53, at 57.
Other commentators were divided as to whether the decision was actually an in-
dication of a broader view of women's roles. Professor Cook read LaFleur as sug-
gesting that the Court would not allow a woman to be reassigned from her career
role to a family role, and that the choice to have a child and work at the same time
belonged to the woman and not to societal institutions. Cook, supra note 53, at 57.
Professor Karst saw LaFleur as a "woman's role" case in which the Court dis-
played a sensitivity to negative role-typing and struck down a law which imposed
a dependent role upon women. Karst, supra note 53, at 57.
Contra, Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, supra
note 52, at 658-59. Professor Johnston, concluded that LaFleur typified the Court's
"continued failure to recognize sex discrimination as a pervasive problem deriving
from ancient preconceptions about the role of sex in determining a person's social
function and status."
118. See BABCOCK, supra note 52, at 128-29. The authors suggest three theories
to support sex discrimination cases: due process, equal protection-fundamental
rights, and equal protection-sex discrimination. LaFleur is analyzed as an excel-
lent example of the problems that result from the use of the due process theory.
First, the Court treated pregnancy as a unique problem, rather than comparing
rules relating to pregnancy to rules relating to other temporary disabilities. Sec-
ond, a due process approach implies a balancing test rather than a more rigorous
scrutiny, and, thus, discrimination may be upheld more easily than under equal
protection analysis. Third, consideration of sex discrimination under either the
due process or equal protection-fundamental rights theories, rather than an equal
protection-sex discrimination basis, tends to increase the examination of the injus-
tice of pervasive sex discrimination in the legal system and in the public institu-
tions. Id. See also Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-
1974, supra note 52, at 660 (suggesting the emphasis on due process in the major-
ity opinion coupled with the rejection of due process theory in the concurring and
dissenting opinions signaled a widening shift on the Court as to the application of
due process or equal protection theories to sex based classifications); Comment,
Pregnancy Based Discrimination-General Electric Co. v. Gilbert and Alternative
State Remedies, 81 DICK. L. REV. 517, 518-19 (1977) (suggesting that the Court's re-
fusal to adopt an equal protection analysis implied that it considered pregnancy
cases sui generis and that it would treat pregnancy unfavorably). But see Karst,
supra note 53, at 31 n.171, 57. Professor Karst argued that the considerations in-
volved in due process and irrebuttable presumption analysis are readily adaptable
to equal protection reasoning and suggests that LaFleur could just as easily have
been grounded on equal protection theory.
with a primary emphasis on irrebuttable presumption analysis. 19
The Court rejected arguments that rules requiring automatic
leave at a fixed time were necessary either to ensure continuity of
instruction or to ensure protection of the health of the teacher
and the unborn child.120 Although the objectives of both con-
tinuity and protection were seen as legitimate, the mandatory
leave requirement was held to be arbitrary and to have no ra-
tional relationship to the continuity interest.12 1 The requirement
swept so broadly as to create a prohibited irrebuttable presump-
tion with regard to the protective interest.122 Thus, although the
discrimination in LaFleur was struck down, the decision was not
a major step forward because of the very narrow grounds used.
2. Geduldig v. Aiello
While LaFleur signaled some uncertainty regarding pregnancy
classifications, the Court, in its next pregnancy case, Geduldig v.
Aiello,123 clearly announced that it would not automatically strike
down such classifications. 24 In Aiello, the Court upheld a state
disability insurance plan, which excluded normal pregnancies
from the disabilities covered by the plan, against an attack charg-
ing that the plan violated equal protection in that it constituted
unlawful sex discrimination.125 The Aiello Court found that a
classification concerning pregnancy was not sex-based and there-
fore implied that the statute needed only to pass the rational rela-
tionship test. 26
119. See generally Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in The Supreme
Court, 87 HABv. L. REV. 1534 (1974).
120. 414 U.S. at 641-43.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 644. The Court also struck down a mandatory waiting period before
return to employment for similar reasons, id. at 650, but allowed a scheme which
required both a medical certificate before return to work and guaranteed employ-
ment only at the beginning of the next school year following the medical eligibility
determination. Id. The latter scheme was held to serve the interests of continuity
and protection and, since it allowed for individualized determinations, was
deemed not to create an irrebuttable presumption. Id.
123. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
124. See generally BABCOCK, supra note 52, at 318; Johnston, Sex Discrimina-
tion and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, supra note 52, at 673; KiRP AND ROBYN,
supra note 114 at 949-51; Comment, Pregnancy and the Constitution. The Unique-
ness Trap, 62 CALiF. L. REv. 1532, 1560-63 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pregnancy
and the Constitution 1; and Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classification
and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L REV. 441, 448 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as Geduldig v. Aiello ].
125. 417 U.S. at 497.
126. Id. at 496-97. The first question was what standard of review should be ap-
plied. Although a majority had never concluded that any classification on the ba-
sis of sex was inherently suspect, it was evident from Reed, Frontiero and LaFleur
that a "sex-based" statute would have to meet a test of review stronger than that
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How can a classification regarding pregnancy not be sex-
based?127 Because, the majority concluded, it divided persons
into two classes: pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. 28
The plan "does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility be-
cause of gender but merely removes one physical condition-
pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities."12 9 Having
determined that the insurance plan did not need to be reviewed
under any standard stricter than that of rational relationship, the
Court then concluded that the pregnancy exclusion was rationally
related to a legitimate state goal of keeping the costs of the pro-
gram at their present level.' 30
The Aiello decision was sharply criticized in a vigorous dis-
sent.13' It was also criticized by commentators on many grounds,
including one view that the decision was a "constitutional sport"
which embodied an "Alice-In-Wonderland view of pregnancy as a
sex-neutral phenomenon.' 1 32 The formalistic Aiello decision indi-
cated that the Court would treat pregnancy classifications as sui
of rational relationship. If, however, the classification was not "sex-based," it need
only meet the rational relationship standard.
127. See Pregnancy and the Constitution, supra note 124, at 1532: "If you can
think of something which is inextricably related to some other thing and not think
of the other thing, you have a legal mind." Id. (quoting Professor Thomas Reed
Powell in Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1157 (W.D. Pa.
1974)).
128. 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
129. Id. at 496 n.20. The Court implied that a pregnancy exclusion might war-
rant a higher level of scrutiny if a showing could be made that the distinction was
a "mere pretext" designed to effect an invidious discrimination against women.
Id. at 496-97 n.20. But the Court found that the distinction in Aiello was not a pre-
text for invidious discrimination. Rather, it characterized the exclusion as a deci-
sion by the legislature to address certain, but not all, phases of a social problem.
Id. at 494-95.
130. Id. at 494-97. The program was self-supporting on the basis of a required
1% contribution from eligible employees. Although the cost figures were disputed,
it was clear that, in order for pregnancies to be covered, either the contribution
rate must increase, the level of benefits must decrease, or a state subsidy must be
granted. Id. at 493-94.
131. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall in the dis-
sent. The dissent concluded that the plan singled out for exclusion a sex linked
disability peculiar to women. Excluding pregnancy created a double standard on
the basis of characteristics inextricably linked to the female sex. Therefore, they
reasoned, Reed and Frontiero required that the plan be considered inherently sus-
pect and be subjected to strict scrutiny. Id. at 501-03. Under the application of this
test, the state's interest in not increasing the costs of the insurance plan would not
be compelling, and the statutory scheme would be unconstitutional. Id. at 503-05.
132. Karst, supra note 53, at 54 n.304. See also Geduldig v. Aiello, supra note
124, at 441:
generis. The Court did not appear to perceive the problems of
When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, it
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.
The question is, said Alice, whether you can make words mean so many
different things.
The question is said Humpty Dumpty, which is to be master-that's all.
Id. (quoting L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAss 94 (Random House ed.
1946) (emphasis added)).
Other criticisms of Aiello were that, first, the decision reverted to a discredited
pattern of blind deference to legislative judgments. See BABCOCK, supra note 52,
at 319. See also Karst, supra note 53, at 54 (suggesting that Aiello is a textbook
example of the effect of underrepresentation on "legislative insensitivity"). It has
been suggested that the Court's deference to the concept of legislative experimen-
tation for the solution of social problems was not appropriate to the pregnancy ex-
clusion in Aiello. There, the legislature was not "taking one step at a time" nor
was it "testing solutions to a complicated problem." Rather, it had already taken
steps to cover virtually every disability except normal pregnancy. Pregnancy and
the Constitution, supra note 124, at 1553.
Second, the Court's holding that an exclusion of pregnancy was not discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex appeared to be strained.
As an exercise in medieval logic, the reasoning that exclusion of preg-
nancy from coverage is not sex discrimination is interesting, but it has ab-
solutely no connection with reality .... The core argument presented by
the attorneys for the appellees was as follows:
The individual who receives a benefit or suffers a detriment because
of a physical characteristic unique to one sex benefits or suffers be-
cause he or she belongs to one or the other sex. Sex-unique physical
characteristics are precisely what define a man or woman as a mem-
ber of one class or the other.
See Erickson, supra note 52, at 278 (quoting Brief for Appellees at 31-32, Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)). See also Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello, supra note
124, at 461:
Without . . . "sex-unique" differences, men would be indistinguishable
from women, and the issue of sex discrimination would never have arisen
in the first place. If the Court were being realistic instead of formalistic, it
would have to recognize that sex-unique differences are in a real sense at
the root and heart of sex discrimination.
Third, two major problems were created by the Court's conclusion that preg-
nancy, and presumably other single-sex trait classifications, would not be struck
down unless the sex discrimination plaintiff could show that the challenged classi-
fications are a "mere pretext designed to effect an invidious discrimination." First,
it implied an intent requirement not found in previous sex discrimination cases.
See Geduldig v. Aiello, supra note 124, at 460. Second, the "mere pretext" require-
ment also placed a heavy burden on prospective plaintiffs. Solid proof of intent is
often scarce. Id. See also Erickson, supra note 52, at 280-81.
Fourth, although the Court concluded that the pregnancy exclusion did pass
constitutional muster under the rational relationship test, the decision did not pro-
vide clear support for that result. The purpose of the insurance program was to
reduce suffering caused by unemployment resulting from disability. The Court,
however, never explained how the exclusion of pregnancy was related to that pur-
pose nor why pregnancy related disabilities, rather than various other disabilities,
were excluded. See Erickson, supra note 52, at 279 (citing Brief for Appellant at
16-24, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)). See also Pregnancy and the Constitu-
tion, supra note 124, at 1561-63.
Fifth, the Aiello holding created the possibility that the "sex-plus" theory, which
supposedly had been buried in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542
(1971), see note 57 supra, might be resurrected. See also Erickson, supra note 52,
at 281-82; Pregnancy and the Constitution, supra note 124, at 1555-58.
Finally, the Aiello decision created increased uncertainty regarding the law of
[Vol. 9: 315, 1982] Changed Perspective
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
negative stereotyping and role-labeling created by such
classifications. 133
sex discrimination and reinforcing limiting stereotypes about "women's roles."
See Cook, supra note 52, at 57. Cook suggests that, after Aiello, the middle class
pregnant woman is encouraged to perform her "natural" function of staying in the
home. Yet, if she is neither poor enough for welfare nor from a monied family,
and desires the independence of self protection, she does not have any constitu-
tional right to the typical insurance plan which protects male disabilities. See also
Erickson, supra note 52, at 279-81 (suggesting the only way to account for the
Aiello decision is that the Court was simply unable to comprehend the totality of
the sex discrimination problem because of the societal structure erected on the
myth of "woman's place"); Powe, The Supreme Court and Sex Discrimination, 1
WOMEN L. REP. 1 (1974) (suggesting Aiello may have been decided the way it was
because of lack of political support for a decision which might have the effect of
raising taxes); Geduldig v. Aiello, supra note 124, at 461 ("about all the Supreme
Court accomplishes by its semantic approach in Aiello is to suggest that it does
not take sex discrimination very seriously").
The Court's failure to recognize the flimsy justifications for a law which
disadvantages many women suggests that the Court itself is blinded by
certain stereotypes about pregnancy .... The notion that pregnancy is
different from other disabilities with respect to a state disability insurance
program suggests the familiar set of stereotypes-that women belong in
the home raising children; that once women leave work to have babies,
they do not return to the labor force; that pregnancy, though it keeps wo-
men from working, is not a "disability" but a blessing which fulfills every
woman's deepest wish; that women are and should be supported by their
husbands, not themselves or the state. These stereotypes appear to be so
deeply ingrained, so tied to fundamental beliefs about woman's place in
the world as childbearer, that the Court apparently did not notice that
they have nothing to do with the express purpose of the disability insur-
ance program.
Pregnancy and The Constitution, supra note 124, at 1563-64.
133. In a per curiam decision, the Court, in Turner v. Dept. of Employment Se-
curity, 423 U.S. 44 (1975), struck down an unemployment compensation plan dis-
qualifying pregnant women for a fixed period of time before and after childbirth.
As in LaFleur, the Court refused to apply equal protection analysis but instead
applied due process analysis. Id. at 45-46. The Court saw two distinctions
between Turner and Aiello. First, the state's argument that the exclusion of preg-
nancy was not a presumption of inability as in LaFleur, but rather a limitation on
coverage as in Aiello, came too late. The Court found that the state, in prior argu-
ment before its state supreme court, had characterized the period near pregnancy
as one of inability to work. Id. at 45. Second, the Court found that the Aiello stat-
ute involved policy decisions regarding coverage limitations and insurance princi-
ples, but the Turner statute did not. Id.
Nevertheless, a state decision on whether to provide coverage under unemploy-
ment compensation seems to be one involving a legislative balance between poli-
cies of protection and desires to avoid spending increases. The Court really seized
upon the weaknesses of the state's prior argument as a way of avoiding the state's
new argument that the principles underlying Aiello also applied to Turner. This
decision could have been an attempt to soften the harshness of Aiello.
D. Summary
As he settled into his new chambers, had Justice Stevens asked
his colleagues what the status was of sex discrimination law, it is
doubtful whether he could have received a clear answer. Most of
the sex discrimination cases had revolved around equal protec-
tion concepts, but the justices were engaged in an ideological tug-
of-war regarding the appropriate standard of scrutiny. The Court
dodged the hard issues of sex discrimination when it could; when
it could not, it frequently decided them on narrow, if not arcane,
grounds.
The Court had developed, however, certain doctrines, and some
patterns had emerged. First, it was clear that sex discrimination
laws and policies would not be considered "suspect" and would
not receive "strict scrutiny." But on the other hand, the Court
would not grant total deference to legislatures by applying a mini-
mal rational relationship standard. The Court had rejected many
concepts of "romantic paternalism." To be sure, a "newer" equal
protection utilizing an "intermediate" level of scrutiny had been
created.
If the classification was seen as discriminating against women,
the scrutiny given by the Court might not be "strict," but it was
relatively vigorous. If, however, the classification was seen as at-
tempting to benefit women by recompensing them for past dispa-
rate treatment, the review would be much more lenient. The
Court had begun to emphasize that the compensatory motive
must be actual and not hypothetical. Finally, the Court did not
appear willing to consider challenges against pregnancy classifica-
tions on grounds of sex discrimination.
III. THE SUPREME COURT SEX DISCRIMINATION OPINIONS OF
JUSTICE STEVENS
When Justice Stevens assumed his position on the United
States Supreme Court, he might not have appeared to be a jurist
who would help the Supreme Court move forward in its under-
standing of sex discrimination issues. After all, several of his Sev-
enth Circuit decisions relied on mechanical, formalistic reasoning;
or, alternatively, on the brusque rejection of arguments in finding
against sex discrimination plaintiffs. 134 Challenged with criti-
cisms of those decisions at his nomination hearings, Justice Ste-
vens did not respond with any strong recognition of sex
discrimination problems.135 Although he told the Senate Judici-
134. See discussion in Part I supra.
135. See note 4 supra.
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ary Committee merely that he had an open mind on the question
of whether sex-based classifications were inherently suspect and
should be subjected to strict scrutiny,136 it soon became apparent
that Justice Stevens would not become the Court's fifth vote cate-
gorizing sex classifications as inherently suspect.
Despite these unportentious signs, Justice Stevens was to
emerge as a strong and creative, although strangely inconsistent,
force on the Court advocating a more serious consideration of sex
discrimination claims. Certainly, he is not the strongest sup-
porter for using the law to strike down sexually discriminatory
policies; that position is occupied jointly by Justices Brennan and
Marshall. Justice Stevens, however, may have created a critical
role within the dynamics of the ideological splits on the Court.
He has acted as conciliator and reconciler in tying the Court's de-
cisions to precedent, while at the same time acting as a catalyst in
helping the Court move forward to develop more progressive poli-
cies. His opinions show a development from early attempts at de-
veloping specific "models" to later opinions stressing the
importance of clear decisions that could be understood and ap-
plied by lower courts.
Justice Stevens is flexible and has focused on obtainable re-
sults. Although he has not espoused many vanguard positions, he
has written carefully, but also boldly, leading a majority of the
Court toward greater realization of sexual equality. The net effect
of his opinions may have been to help the Court move forward
more quickly than it otherwise would have, had he written more
dogmatic, albeit ideologically "pure", decisions.
136. Judge STEVENS: ... (Y]ou have pointed out where there is a classi-
fication problem in the racial discrimination cases, and I understand you
to be asking me if I would find a rational basis, a sufficient basis, for a
classification on racial grounds. Clearly I would not. I think the law is
well-settled, and properly so, that a much heavier burden, perhaps almost
as insurmountable burden, exists in order to justify any classification on
any such factor.
And now you turn to the question of sex discrimination. I think you
were asking me whether the heavy burden test should apply in sex dis-
crimination cases.
Senator MATHIAS: Whether you have a similar approach to the racial?
Judge STEVENS: I am not sure, Senator. I am not sure whether the
same test would apply or not. I don't think the court-the court has dodg-
ed and fenced a little bit on that question. They have made it clear . ..
that the classification is one that is subject to the equal protection clause,
but that the standard of review may or may not be the same as it is in
racial discrimination areas.
Stevens Hearings, supra note 3, at 57 (testimony of John Paul Stevens).
This Part examines Justice Stevens' opinions in four areas of
sex discrimination. His opinions in the three areas discussed ear-
lier of policies which disadvantage women, policies which ostensi-
bly benefit women, and policies regarding pregnancy will be
considered, but in a different order than discussed above. Ini-
tially, however, it is useful to briefly examine Justice Stevens'
opinions in two cases regarding access to the courts for sex dis-
crimination plaintiffs.
A. Access to the Courts
1. Cannon v. University of Chicago
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,137 Justice Stevens seized
the opportunity to declare that victims of sex discrimination in
educational programs covered by Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972138 must be entitled to access to the courts
via private actions. Although it does not specifically discuss is-
sues of sex discrimination, the Cannon decision is important be-
cause in the area of educational discrimination, it affords sex
discrimination plaintiffs rights similar to those afforded race dis-
crimination plaintiffs. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens' opinion in
Cannon is flawed. Although the opinion was a reaction to poor
enforcement of Title IX, it did not directly come to grips with the
question of what judicial approach should be taken in the face of
weak enforcement of such a statute. Further, the opinion's appli-
cation of the test announced in Cort v. Ash 139 is both off-handed
and imprecise. Justice Stevens could have reached the same re-
sult by forthrightly critiquing and modifying the Cort test. In-
stead, he strained the application of Cort in a demonstration of
judicial sleight-of-hand. While such approaches are certainly not
unusual on the Supreme Court, or other courts, Justice Stevens
eschewed the opportunity he had taken on other occasions to de-
mand that the Court clearly announce the "real" reasons for its
decision. 140
137. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
138. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
139. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
140. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). In Hague, a choice-
of-law case, the majority approved the application of the law of Minnesota, al-
though Wisconsin had far more significant contacts with the parties and the occur-
rence. In a strained opinion, the majority attempted to show that Minnesota's
contacts were more significant than Wisconsin's. Justice Stevens, concurring, re-
fused to participate in the charade that Minnesota's contacts were more signifi-
cant. Rather, he suggested that the Court announce its view that, although the
result was unsound as a matter of conflicts law, it could be affirmed because, de-
spite the Minnesota's lesser interest, the decision did not result in fundamental
unfairness. Id. at 320-32 (Stevens, J., concurring).
[Vol. 9: 315, 19821 Changed Perspective
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Cannon raised the troublesome question of when a private
cause of action should be inferred from a statute. Title IX specifi-
cally prohibited sex discrimination in educational programs re-
ceiving federal funds, but it did not explicitly provide for a private
right of action to enforce that prohibition. The only statutory en-
forcement scheme provided for termination of federal funds by
the Department of Health, Education & Welfare (HEW). Al-
though the Court has taken varying and inconsistent approaches
to the question of what criteria properly determines when a pri-
vate right of action should be inferred,141 Justice Stevens did not
refer to the history of those approaches. He began his analysis by
assuming that the applicable test was that used in Cort.142
The first of the four Cort criteria is whether the statute was en-
acted for the benefit of a special class of which the plaintiff is a
member. 4 3 Justice Stevens emphasized that Congress had not
written Title IX in an active voice banning discriminatory conduct
by federally funded educational institutions. He said, instead,
that Congress had used a passive voice which referred to the pre-
vention of harm against specific persons: 44 "no person ... shall,
on the basis of sex . . .be subjected to discrimination .... ,,145
Because this language is in contrast to the language used in crim-
inal laws and other laws for the protection of the public at large,
and because this language is similar to language in the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,146 in which the Court had inferred a private
cause of action, 4 7 Justice Stevens found that Title IX explicitly
conferred a benefit on a special class, namely, victims of sex dis-
crimination, and that the plaintiff was a member of that class.14 8
Turning to the second Cort criterion, legislative history, Justice
141. For a discussion of the various theories used to infer a private right of ac-
tion, see Note, An Overview of Implied Rights of Action: Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 40 LA. L. REV. 1011, 1012-18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Overview of Im-
plied Rights ]; see also Note, Constitutional Law: Cannon v. University of Chicago
Civil Rights and Private Wrongs: A New Remedy, 48 UMKC L. REV. 487, 490-93
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Civil Rights and Private Wrongs].
142. 441 U.S. at 688.
143. Id. at 689.
144. Id. at 690-93.
145. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972).
146. "[N]o person shall be denied the right to vote .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1970).
147. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 544-55 (1969).
148. 441 U.S. at 694. Petitioner Cannon had alleged that she was denied admis-
sion to federally assisted medical schools because she was a woman. Id. at 680-82
n.2.
Stevens found that the legislative history of Title IX plainly indi-
cated a congressional intent to create a private cause of action. 149
But if the intention were plain, Justice Stevens discerned it by a
rather circuitous route. He began by comparing Title IX to Title
VI. Both statutes used virtually identical language. Although
neither statute expressly created a private cause of action, in 1967,
a circuit court of appeals had held in Bossier Parish School Board
v. Lemon, 50 that Title VI did create a private cause of action.
The legislative history of Title IX did not mention Bossier. Since
that legislative history did refer to Title VI, Justice Stevens pre-
sumed that Congress was aware of the Bossier interpretation and
intended for that interpretation to apply to Title IX.15
Bossier was a circuit court, not a Supreme Court, decision. De-
spite this, Justice Stevens emphasized that it had never been seri-
ously questioned and that it had been cited with approval in
numerous lower court decisions. 52 Moreover, he emphasized
that the Supreme Court had found an implied right of action in
the Voting Rights Act,' 53 a statute with language similar to Title
IX, and in statutes much less clear than Title IX.'54 Thus, Justice
Stevens concluded that the Court could presume that Congress
was aware of prior Court decisions, that Congress would have
concluded that the Supreme Court would infer a private right of
action from Title IX, and that Congress' silence implied acquies-
cence in that interpretation.
Perhaps realizing the slender reed of his inferential legislative
history analysis, Justice Stevens found that there was a more di-
rect and persuasive reason for finding a private cause of action in
Title IX. Congress included Title IX within the scope of the Civil
Rights Attorneys Fees Award Act of 1976,155 which provides for
court awards of attorneys' fees in cases under Title VI, Title IX,
and other civil rights statutes. 56 Certainly if attorneys' fees are
allowed, he reasoned, the suits generating those fees must also be
allowed.
The third Cort criterion is whether a private cause of action is
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
149. Id. at 694.
150. 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967). Justice Stevens emphasized the distin-
guished nature of the Bossier panel: Judge John Minor Wisdom, who wrote the
opinion; then-Judge Warren Burger, sitting by designation; and then-Judge, now
Chief Judge, John Brown. 441 U.S. at 696 n.20.
151. 441 U.S. at 697-98.
152. Id. at 696.
153. See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
154. 441 U.S. at 698 n.23.
155. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1980).
156. 441 U.S. at 699 & n.25.
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scheme.1 57 In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,158 the Court
had implied that, to meet this test a remedy must be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of congressional purposes. 5 9 Although dis-
senting on other grounds in Piper, Justice Stevens seemed to
agree that the test should be whether a private remedy was nec-
essary to achieve full compliance with the congressional purpose
of a statute.160 In Cannon, Justice Stevens made a major change
in the third Cort test. He had stated that a private cause of action
should be "necessary or at least helpful to the accomplishment of
the statutory purpose."'16 This language, combined with the man-
ner in which Justice Stevens paraphrased the Cort test,1 62 indi-
cates that perhaps Justice Stevens viewed effective enforcement,
rather than an often ephemeral legislative intent, as the real key
to the creation of a private cause of action.' 63
Analyzing the issue of effective enforcement, Justice Stevens
concluded that the statutory enforcement mechanism was lim-
ited. First, the only weapon against a discriminating educational
facility was termination of federal funds. This severe weapon
would be rarely used and would not be effective for remedying in-
dividual, and especially isolated, acts of discrimination. 6 4 Sec-
ond, the HEW165 had a poor record of Title IX enforcement and
157. 422 U.S. at 78.
158. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
159. Id. at 41.
160. Id. at 61.
161. 441 U.S. at 703 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens did not refer to the
Piper opinion.
162. The Cort Court stated the third test as follows: "[IIs it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff?" 422 U.S. at 78. Justice Stevens phrased the test in a negative manner
much more favorable for the plaintiffs.
[U]nder Cort, a private remedy should not be implied if it wouldfrustrate
the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme. On the other hand,
when that remedy is necessary or at least helpful to the accomplishment
of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly receptive to its implica-
tion under the statute.
441 U.S. at 703 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
163. See Note, How to Cure Your Sex Discrimination Ills: Take One Title IX
Private Action and Cannon v. University of Chicago, Then Sue Them in the Morn-
ing, UTAH L. REV. 629, 645-46 (1980), for the argument that the question of effective
enforcement is the critical question regarding creation of a private remedy. The
student author recommended a three-tiered test embodying a strict necessity
approach.
164. 441 U.S. at 704-05.
165. Since the Cannon opinion was written, the Department of Education was
created. 20 U.S.C. § 3411 (1979).
had candidly admitted the need for additional enforcement via
private causes of action.166
The fourth Cort criterion is whether finding a private cause of
action would be inappropriate because the subject matter in-
volves an area of traditional state concern. 67 Justice Stevens
paused at this criterion only briefly. The federal courts, he stated,
have always served a "primary and powerful" role in protecting
citizens against discrimination of any kind, including sex discrim-
ination. 168 Because Justice Stevens found that all four Cort crite-
ria militated for allowing a private cause of action, however, he
reserved for another day the question of how these criteria should
be weighed when they are not resolved uniformly. 69
Justice Rehnquist concurred, but in an odd way. His opinion
strongly suggested that unless Congress explicitly created a pri-
vate cause of action, the Court should not infer such a private
right. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that, because
"[w]e do not write on an entirely clean slate," in that Congress
had become accustomed to relying on the courts to determine
whether private causes of action should be implied, the Cannon
Court need not reject the private cause of action.170 He warned
that in the future, however, the Court should not be as tolerant.
Dissenting, Justice White agreed with Justice Stevens that the
Cort analysis was the proper approach to the issue, but disagreed
with his version of the legislative history of Title VI and Title IX.
Justice White concluded that Congress did not intend to add any
private remedy beyond that available through section 1983.'71
Justice Powell also dissented, although upon more fundamental
grounds. He strongly rejected the Cort analysis for two reasons:
first, it invited independent judicial lawmaking172 and second, it
encouraged Congress to avoid taking the hard step of explicitly
determining whether it wished to create a private cause of ac-
166. 441 U.S. at 707-08 & nn. 41 & 42. In the lower court, HEW had taken the po-
sition that a private cause of action under Title IX should not be granted. See
Note, Title IX: No Longer An Empty Promise-Cannon v. University of Chicago,
29 DE PAUL L. REV. 263, 283-86 (1979) (suggesting that HEW's inconsistent position
was just another sign of the agency's inadequate enforcement of Title IX).
167. 422 U.S. at 78.
168. 441 U.S. at 708 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974), quot-
ing F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928)).
169. 441 U.S. at 709.
170. Id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rhenquist also may have
concurred in Cannon because of his recent concurrence in Justice Stevens' opin-
ion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice Stevens as-
sumed arguendo that Mr. Bakke did have the right of a private cause of action
under Title VI.
171. 441 U.S. at 719-24 (White, J., dissenting).
172. 441 U.S. at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 9: 315, 1982] Changed Perspective
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tion.173 Adopting the canon of construction expressio unius est
exclusio alterius,174 he emphasized that unless Congress explic-
itly created a private cause of action, it necessarily had rejected
the creation of such a private action. For the Court to then create
a private cause of action, he reasoned, was an improper extension
of its jurisdiction and authority.
Justice Stevens' opinion in Cannon exemplifies many of his sex
discrimination opinions. First, he accurately recognized the prob-
lem. In Cannon, the problem involved a plaintiff discriminated
against by private universities. As he had demonstrated in his
Seventh Circuit Cohen 175 opinion, state action was a significant
hurdle to a section 1983 action by such a plaintiff. Title IX was
specifically aimed at the problem of sex discrimination in any ed-
ucational facility, public or private, which received federal funds.
If Title IX offered no additional remedy, however, the statute
would not be able to achieve the very purpose for which it was
enacted.
Second, Justice Stevens arrived at the proper result. Justice
Powell's fears of judicial legislation were groundless. To find a
private cause of action was to achieve the policy goal of the stat-
ute. Indeed, to refuse to find such a private cause would have
amounted to a negative form of judicial legislation because it
would have frustrated the policy goal.
In addition, Justice Stevens astutely recognized that effective
enforcement was the key issue. The inference of a private cause
of action in federal regulatory statutes is necessary when, without
such a right, enforcement will suffer.1 76 As the Court stated in
Bell v. Hood, "where federally protected rights have been in-
vaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be
alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief."177
Justice Stevens emphasized the importance of quality of en-
forcement. The significance of the quality of enforcement is the
key contribution of his creative reinterpretation of the third Cort
173. Id. at 743.
174. The vitality of this canon is still hotly debated. See Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 29 (1979) (White, J., dissenting) (Court's
application of this canon inconsistent with rejection of the canon in Cort, 422 U.S.
at 82-83 n.14). See also Civil Rights and Private Wrongs, supra note 141, at 494.
175. See notes 33-44 supra and accompanying text.
176. See Note, supra note 166, at 263-64 n.4.
177. 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
standard. 78 He emphasized that a private cause of action should
be granted even if it were not "necessary" to enforcement of a
statute, so long as it would be "helpful" to enforcement. This
point is critical because some enforcement, specifically, termina-
tion of federal funding, was available under Title IX. It is a rare
statute indeed which does not provide at least some theoretical
means of enforcement. But, when Congress creates a scheme of
enforcement, it is not able to anticipate whether and where struc-
tural gaps in enforcement will appear.179 Therefore, the courts
must be able to fulfill Congress' purpose, eliminating sex discrim-
ination in federally funded educational institutions, by creating a
private cause of action. Otherwise, given the problems known to
result from poor enforcement, the Court would sanction the very
existence of the discrimination that Congress desired to
eradicate.
Because enforcement is the key criterion in deciding whether a
private right of action should be inferred, the other Cort criteria
amounts to abstruse surplusage. For even if the other factors
should be negative, a structurally inadequate enforcement
scheme alone should be a sufficient reason to infer a private
cause of action.1 80 Moreover, when enforcement is inadequate,
provision of a private right of action is not an encroachment on
the legislature's area of power, because the judiciary is not usurp-
ing the legislature's role of creating laws; it is staying within its
authority by providing effective enforcement of the law which
Congress has made.
Although the result Justice Stevens reached was pragmatically
correct, the route he used to arrive at that result was less than a
model of judicial artfulness. Unlike other opinions in which he
would demonstrate creative persuasiveness, in Cannon, only two
other justices squarely agreed with his opinion.'81 In order to
178. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
179. See Civil Rights and Private Wrongs, supra note 141, at 499.
180. See Overview of Implied Right, supra note 141, at 1022-24 (courts should
follow the rationale of effectuating congressional goals in the most beneficial man-
ner, regardless of the existence of an explicit enforcement mechanism). But see
Note, supra note 163, at 647 (the student author argues that even if private en-
forcement is shown to be necessary, a plaintiff should not be allowed a federal
remedy if a state remedy exists). But such a view applied to race discrimination,
for example, would gut effective enforcement.
181. Justices Brennan and Marshall were the only two justices in full agree-
ment with Justice Stevens. Although Justices Rehnquist and Stewart technically
joined the Stevens' opinion, Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion, in
which Justice Stewart joined, which clearly disagreed with Justice Stevens' rea-
soning; it amounted to a concurrence "just this once" by announcing that, in the
future, these justices would not find a private cause of action where not explicitly
authorized. Justice Burger concurred separately without writing an opinion. Jus-
tice Blackman joined Justice White's dissent.
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reach a result granting Ms. Cannon a private cause of action, Jus-
tice Stevens had to make a difficult choice. He could either
"stretch" the Cort analysis, or he could demand that the Cort test
be modified or abandoned. 82 He chose to stretch Cort and in so
doing, he left some gaping analytical holes for future cases.
The first Cort criterion, whether the plaintiff is a member of the
special class for whose benefit the statute was passed, unnecessa-
rily duplicates the tests required for standing. 83 Additionally, the
conflicting evidence of congressional intent proferred by Justices
Stevens and White shows the complexity, indeed the futility, of
attempting to divine "the" congressional intent of a statute. Al-
though the oldest canon of statutory interpretation may be the
shibboleth that a statute should be construed with "the" overrid-
ing purpose of the legislature kept firmly in mind, 84 the fact is
that there are numerous conflicting statements in most legislative
histories.
Certainly, courts should not ignore legislative history in all
cases, as advocated at the turn of the century by Justice
Peckham. 85 Congress today is hardly a "lawyer's paradise ...
where men express their purposes not only with accuracy, but
182. Perhaps Justice Stevens had no practical choice, for if he abandoned the
Cort approach, Justices Rehnquist and Stewart may have felt free to dissent out-
right, in which case the votes to deny a private cause of action would have become
a majority. Thus, perhaps Justice Stevens' embodiment of Cort, fractured as it
was, was necessary to secure an affirmative result.
183. See Note, supra note 163, at 637-38 (either the first Cort criterion goes too
far, in that it duplicates the standing test, or it does not go far enough, in that it
does not question the extent of protection Congress intended to give the protected
class).
184. See In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Ry. Co., 641 F.2d 482, 487
(7th Cir. 1981) (suggesting "the" legislative intent). But the notion of "the" legis-
lative intent is too narrow and does not accord with reality. As Lord Justice Far-
well stated: "In the case of an Act dealing with a controversial subject ambiguous
phrases are often used designedly, each side hoping to have thereby expressed its
own view, and the belief of each that it has succeeded is more often due to the
wish than to any effort of reason." King v. County Council of the W. Riding of
Yorkshire, 2 K.B. 676 (1906) (Farwell, L.J.), quoted in HURST, STATUTES IN COURT
143 (1970). See also United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (Mar-
shall, C.J.) ("When the mind labores to discover the design of the legislature, it
seizes every thing from which aid can be derived ... ."). See also note 417 infra.
185. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897)
("Looking simply at the history of the bill from the time it was introduced in the
Senate until it was finally passed, it would be impossible to say what were the
views of a majority of the members of each house in relation to the meaning of the
act.").
with fullness."1 86 Justice Stevens' creative view of the "history"
of Title 'IX, however, went beyond what was actually a part of the
history of that Act and incorporated what, according to him,
should have been a part of the history of that Act.
Moreover, Justice Stevens' "new" history, although relevant,
was far from conclusive. Justice Stevens concluded that Congress
must have intended to create a private cause of action for Title IX
in a non-class action case because it must have been aware of the
Bossier case. In finding without doubt that Congress had such an
intent, 187 Justice Stevens brushed aside the following: that Boss-
ier was a circuit court of appeals case and that the Supreme
Court often reverses the circuit courts and with no compunction;
that the private cause of action language in Bossier may have
been dictum because section 1983 was an alternative remedy; that
Bossier was a class action suit, not an individual action; that there
was no actual reference to Bossier in the legislative history; that
the Bossier progeny in the lower courts were distinguishable; and
that the attorneys' fees statute arguably applied only to section
1983 actions. 88 Perhaps Justice Stevens may have overcome each
of these objections had he specifically confronted them, but he
failed to do so. Similarly, his finding that the fourth Cort crite-
rion,189 interference in an area traditionally regulated by the state
was met, was totally conclusory. With regard to three of the four
Cort criteria, then, Justice Stevens did not confront head-on the
hard objections to the Cort analysis.
As previously discussed, Justice Stevens did directly confront
the critical third Cort criterion, enforcement. Indeed, he explic-
itly broadened the Cort standard to allow the inference of a pri-
vate remedy when to do so would be helpful, even though not
necessary, to effective enforcement. Interestingly, however, Jus-
tice Stevens neglected to consider the Court's role in demanding
vigorous enforcement of the administrative mechanism which
Congress had created.
Justice Stevens implied that a major reason for finding a private
cause of action was HEW's ineffective enforcement of Title IX.
Within its limitation, that argument is strong, but Justice Stevens
said nothing in Cannon to demand more vigorous enforcement of
Title IX. Just as the Court had ignored the underlying problem in
Frontiero,190 unequal opportunities for desirable assignments, in
186. Wyzanski, Judge Learned Hand's Contribution to Public Law, 60 HARv. L.
REv. 348 (1947).
187. 441 U.S. at 703.
188. See Note, supra note 163, at 639-41.
189. See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
190. See notes 66-80 supra and accompanying text.
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approving a palliative remedy of a dual-track promotional system,
so in Cannon Justice Stevens approved a palliative, although nec-
essary, remedy while ignoring the underlying problem. Thus, the
Cannon decision did not go far enough. It created the needed pri-
vate cause of action but said nothing to demand vigorous enforce-
ment from the appropriate administrative agency. In this sense,
the Cannon result may serve as a "pressure valve" to deflect criti-
cism from, and perhaps even to sanction inaction by, administra-
tive agencies.191
In summary, Justice Stevens' opinion in Cannon was prag-
matic, creative, and responsive to the serious problem of sex dis-
crimination plaintiffs. The decision significantly advanced the law
regarding the inference of a private cause of action if "helpful" to
effective enforcement. Ultimately, however, Justice Stevens' opin-
ion in Cannon was not persuasive. He reached the right result in
granting sex discrimination plaintiffs needed access to the courts
under Title IX. He even reached that result, to some extent, for
the right reason, in that such access to court was helpful to effec-
tive enforcement. Yet, in the end, he did not write a fundamen-
tally solid opinion.
2. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Novotny
In Cannon, Justice Stevens emphasized the pragmatic
problems of enforcement in allowing sex discrimination plaintiffs
to seek relief in federal courts. But in a concurring opinion in
Great American Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Novotny,192 he demonstrated, as he had in his Seventh Circuit Co-
hen opinion,193 that he was willing to at least partially close the
courtroom doors on sex discrimination plaintiffs.
Novotny involved a male bank officer who had been fired after
he complained of sex discrimination by the bank against female
employees. He sued the bank for sex discrimination under Title
VII and for conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection and
privileges under the laws under section 1985(3).194 Title VII does
191. See Note, supra note 166, at 283-86, 285.
192. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
193. See notes 33-44 supra and accompanying text.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire ... for the pur-
pose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of per-
not allow jury trials and limits awards to back pay and, in some
cases, attorneys' fees. 195 Section 1985(3), however, could allow
jury trials and punitive as well as compensatory damages.196 The
question before the Court was whether section 1985(3) could be
used to vindicate deprivations of rights against sex
discrimination.197
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart concluded that con-
spiracy to discriminate on the basis of sex did not come within
the purview of section 1985(3). Justice Stewart reasoned that, in
Title VII, Congress had created a comprehensive plan emphasiz-
ing nonadversary resolution of claims through voluntary coopera-
tion.198 Citing Brown v. GSA,199 in which the Court held that
Title VII was the exclusive remedy for discrimination against fed-
sons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws. . . the party so injured or deprived may have
an action for the recovery of damage occasioned by such injury or depriva-
tion, against any one or more of the conspirators.
195. 442 U.S. at 374-76.
196. Id.
197. There was a serious question regarding whose sex discrimination rights
Mr. Novotny was attempting to vindicate. The majority and concurring opinions
assumed, without discussion, that Mr. Novotny was asserting only his right to be
free from retaliation under § 704(a) of Title VII. Section 704(a) provides: "It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any
of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful em-
ployment practice by this subchapter .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976). As the
dissent emphasized, however, Mr. Novotny was also attempting to vindicate the
rights of women employees under section 703(a) of Title VII to be free from sexual
discrimination. Section 7 03(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees ... in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
The result in Novotny was made easier for the majority and concurring opinions
because they dodged this important issue regarding Mr. Novotny's rights. First,
Mr. Novotny could very well have been injured in the course of a conspiracy to
deny § 703(a) rights to female employees. Second, the protection afforded Mr.
Novotny under § 704(a) was somewhat fortuitous. Section 704(a) protects only
employees and applicants. Others, such as customers, suppliers, or officers, are
not specifically protected. Thus, if Mr. Novotny had been a bank director only, and
not also an employee, and had been dismissed from his directorship for com-
plaining about sex discrimination, he would not have had a claim under § 704(a).
See 447 U.S. at 337-38 (White, J., dissenting). Because the existence of a § 704(a)
claim at all was fortuitous, the dissent interpreted the majority's holding to apply
as if Mr. Novotny was seeking to vindicate § 703(a) rights of female employees.
198. 442 U.S. at 372-73.
199. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
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eral employees, Justice Stewart emphasized that allowing other
than Title VII remedies would interfere with the "balance, com-
pleteness, and structural identity" of Title VII.200 The Court's de-
nial of a separate cause of action was not an implicit repeal of
section 1985(3), Justice Stewart reasoned, because section 1985(3)
had not created any rights. Section 1985(3) was merely a reme-
dial statute, allowing a cause of action when some "otherwise de-
fined" federal right was breached. 201
What rights, then, would section 1985(3) protect? The Court did
not address this issue in the majority opinion, but both Justices
Powell and Stevens did address the issue in their concurring
opinions. Justice Powell, in his concurrence with the majority
and with Justice Stevens, declared that section 1985(3) protected
only "those fundamental rights derived from the Constitution."20 2
Justice Stevens, agreeing with both the majority and with Jus-
tice Powell, concurred separately in order to explain his views on
the legislative history of the post-Civil War civil rights statutes.
The predecessors of sections 1983 and 1985 referred to "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution" and to
"equal protection of the laws" and "equal privileges and immuni-
ties under the laws."203 This language, Justice Stevens reasoned,
suggested that these sections were merely vehicles to provide fed-
eral remedies for deprivation of rights under the Constitution, es-
pecially the newly ratified fourteenth amendment.204 Although
some privileges and immunities of citizenship205 are protected
against interference from private action, the right to equal protec-
tion of the laws refers only to protection against state action. 20 6
Justice Stevens reasoned that section 1985(3) has an implied state
action requirement. It only protects constitutional rights, and the
constitutional right here at issue was under the fourteenth
amendment, which also only protects against state action, not pri-
vate discrimination.2 7 Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that sec-
200. 442 U.S. at 376 (quoting Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. at 832).
201. 442 U.S. at 376. The assertion that § 1985 is not substantive but purely re-
medial is critical to the majority opinion. Justice Stewart, however, could provide
no authority for that assertion.
202. Id. at 379 (Powell, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 382 (Stevens, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 383.
205. The right to engage in interstate travel and the right to be free of badges of
slavery were those listed by Justice Stevens. Id.
206. Id. at 383-84.
207. Id.
tion 1985(3) does not cover private conspiracies to discriminate on
the basis of sex. 20 8
Justice White dissented, noting the practical harm created by
the Court's decision: employers could now conspire with invidi-
ous discriminatory animus and escape the more severe liabilities
of section 1985(3).209 He also emphasized that the majority and
concurring opinions had begged the question regarding whose
rights were at issue.210
In his dissent, Justice White agreed that, at a minimum, section
1985(3) protected rights guaranteed by other federal laws.2 11 He
emphasized that section 1985(3) also does more. It provides a
remedy for any person injured as a result of a deprivation of a
substantive federal right. Thus, it creates a substantive right in
cases where the persons injured are persons other than those to
whom the underlying federal right extends.2 12 Novotny was just
such a case. Mr. Novotny was seeking redress for an injury
caused to him as a result of a denial of the female employees' Ti-
tle VII rights. Justice White suggested that Mr. Novotny might
not even have a Title VII remedy. Even if Mr. Novotny did have
such a remedy, other 1985(3) plaintiffs might not be so fortuitous.
Justice White reasoned that the majority's holding made no sense
because such plaintiffs would then be left with no remedy-a re-
sult clearly contrary to congressional intent.2 13
Justice White further reasoned that persons who did have a
right of action under Title VII also had a separate right of action
under section 1985(3). He stated that simply because there was
some overlap between section 1985(3) and Title VII, an implied
repeal of section 1985(3) was not warranted.214 The statutes did
not seriously overlap because they protected two distinct rights.
Section 1985(3) protected the right not to be subject to an invidi-
ous conspiracy to deny other rights, and Title VII created the
right to be free from discrimination in employment.
Moreover, even if section 1985(3) were purely remedial, Justice
White emphasized the lack of precedent for an implied repeal of
that statute. He reasoned that the majority's reliance on Brown
was misplaced, because in Brown Congress clearly intended that
federal employees have a right of action only under Title VII.215
208. Id. at 385.
209. See note 196 supra and accompanying text.
210. See note 197 supra.
211. 442 U.S. at 388 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White emphasized, however,
that other federal law could be either the Constitution or statutory law.
212. Id. at 390.
213. Id. at 390-91.
214. Id. at 391.
215. Id. at 393.
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That a statute created a remedy, and not a substantive right, had
never been held sufficient for finding an implied repeal of that
statute. Here, the remedial aspect of 1985(3) supplemented Title
VII. Thus, there was no inconsistency between the statutes. 2 16
Justice White concluded that even if the plaintiff could get some
relief under Title VII, he should also be allowed to get the more
complete relief available under section 1985(3).217
Given the seriousness of the problems 2 18 presented by the ma-
jority's holding, identified by the dissent, and given the emphasis
Justice Stevens placed in Cannon on ensuring access to federal
courts for sex discrimination plaintiffs confronted with ineffective
enforcement, Justice Stevens' opinion in Novotny is hard to
fathom. First, neither Justice Stevens nor the Court truly ex-
amined the putative inconsistency between section 1985(3) and
Title VII. They merely asserted that the two conflicted and chose
to favor the latter at the expense of the former.219 Yet under es-
tablished principles of statutory interpretation, the dissent's con-
clusion that a sex discrimination victim should have the remedies
of both Title VII and section 1985(3) seems better reasoned.220
Second, the use of precedent by both Justice Stevens and the
majority was shaky. The majority's opinion was flawed because it
overemphasized Brown and virtually ignored a key line of cases
suggesting that causes of action under both Title VII and the post-
Civil War rights statutes should be allowed.221 Justice Stevens
did not examine the Court's failure to give weight to all of the rel-
evant precedent.
216. Id. at 393-94.
217. Id. at 394-95.
218. For a critical discussion of Novotny, see generally Note, Civil Rights-Sex
Discrimination-Novotny v. Great American Savings & Loan Association, 47 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 903 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sex Discrimination]; Note, Civil
Rights-Employment Discrimination-Great American Federal Savings & Loan
Association v. Novotny, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 114 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Em-
ployment Discrimination ].
219. See Employment Discrimination, supra note 218, at 124.
220. See Sex Discrimination, supra note 218, at 932-33 n.29.
221. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 n.9 (1974); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88
(1971). The Griffin case is especially important because not only did the Court
suggest that § 1985(3) might have substantive content, but also in a separate con-
currence, Justice Harlan, not known for his expansive views on federal rights of
access, strongly implied that he found § 1985(3) to supply a substantive right. See
Employment Discrimination, supra note 218, at 117 n.20. See generally Sex Dis-
crimination, supra note 218, at 931-33, 940-41.
Even more significantly, Justice Stevens had dissented from the
Brown holding, that federal employees were limited to Title VII
and could not use section 1981 which was relied on so strongly by
the Novotny majority. In Brown, Justice Stevens concluded that
the legislative history of the relevant section of Title VII did not
show a clear intent to limit federal employees to Title VII.222
Moreover, Justice Stevens found that the logic of earlier cases al-
lowing dual remedies223 applied with equal force to federal em-
ployees. 2 24  Justice Stevens recognized the apparent
inconsistency between his two opinions, but concluded that there
was no real inconsistency because of his conclusion that section
1985(3) protected only constitutionally guaranteed rights and that
protection against sex discrimination was not such a right.
Justice Stevens failed to confront the basic problem. He had
concluded in Brown that Title VII and section 1981 were not mu-
tually exclusive and that a race discrimination applicant could
sue under both statutes. Yet in Novotny, he concluded that a sex
discrimination plaintiff could not sue under section 1985(3), the
conspiracy equivalent to section 1981. As Justice White pointed
out, this view of section 1985 was extremely narrow and inconsis-
tent with the Court's decision in Griffin v. Breckenridge.225 In
Griffin, the Court held that section 1985(3) could be used where
there was some "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidi-
ously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."226
Sex discrimination should certainly qualify as an "otherwise
class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." Thus, Justice
White seemed to have the better argument. The Court's decision
in Novotny and Justice Stevens' concurrence did impliedly repeal
section 1985(3). Thus, Novotny has operated to virtually elimi-
nate any practical utility to a sex discrimination plaintiff of sec-
tion 1985(3).227
Justice Stevens' two sex discrimination opinions dealing prima-
rily with access to the courts are essentially, but not totally, in-
consistent. In Cannon, he held that a sex discrimination plaintiff
must have access when such access would be helpful-not even
"necessary"-to full enforcement of the statutory scheme. Then,
in Novotny, Justice Stevens wrote an opinion pragmatically, al-
though not doctrinally, inconsistent with Cannon. In a crabbed
222. 425 U.S. at 837 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. See note 221 supra.
224. 425 U.S. at 837 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
226. Id. at 102.
227. See Employment Discrimination, supra note 218, at 126; Sex Discrimina-
tion, supra note 218, at 941.
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opinion, he held that a sex discrimination plaintiff could not use
section 1985(3), even where that statute allowed remedies not
provided by Title VII. In both cases, Justice Stevens showed an
ability to marshall legislative history in support of his views. But
in neither case did he acknowledge the limitations of the history
he had relied on or the merits of the legislative history relied on
by the brethren with whom he disagreed. For this reason, and be-
cause both opinions were exercises in conclusory rather than
thoughtful reasoning, neither of his opinions regarding access are
ultimately distinguished nor persuasive.
B. Laws Ostensibly Benefiting Women
1. Craig v. Boren
If Justice Stevens' reasoning was conclusory in Cannon and
narrow in Novotny, it was downright muddled in his concurring
opinion in Craig v. Boren.228 The plurality opinion in Craig was
extemely important. But aside from adding a quotable cryptic,
but irrelevant, sentence, it is doubtful that Justice Stevens' opin-
ion added anything to the law.
In Craig, the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute prohibit-
ing the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one
and to females under the age of eighteen as unconstitutional be-
cause it violated the equal protection clause.229 Craig is impor-
tant because, in the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan explicitly
announced a new constitutional test for sex based classifications.
Such classifications would not be reviewed under either the ra.
tional relationship or strict scrutiny tests but, rather, under what
became known as an "intermediate tier" of review. 2 30 Sex-based
classifications, Justice Brennan declared, "must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives." 23 1
228. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
229. Id. at 210.
230. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 33; The Supreme Court, 1976
Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 177-78 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court, 1976
Term]; Comment, Gender-Based Discrimination and Equal Protection: The
Emerging Intermediate Standard, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 582 (1977); Closer Look at
Equal Protection, supra note 53, at 835-39; Note, The Search For a Standard Re-
view in Sex Discrimination Questions, 14 Hous. L REV. 721 (1977).
231. 429 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added). Justice Brennan previously had held to
the position that sex classifications should be considered "suspect" and given the
highest degree of scrutiny. Perhaps in Craig he decided to give ground on this po-
The new Craig equal protection test asked two questions re-
garding statutes which discriminate on the basis of sex. First, is
the state's purpose "important"? Under the rational relationship
test, even when given "bite," the purpose merely had to be "legiti-
mate." Second, are the means created by the statute "substan-
tially" related to the objective, rather than merely being
"rationally" related to that objective?232
In Craig, the defenders of the statute claimed its purpose was
the enhancement of traffic safety.233 The Court accepted this, ar-
guendo, as an "important" state purpose, although it did question
whether traffic safety was truly the purpose of the statute.234 The
Court found that the answer to the second question, whether the
means were "substantially" related to the objective of traffic
safety, was fatal to the statute. The statistical evidence presented
on behalf of the statute was characterized as "weak."235 Taken at
sition in order to garner a majority to move, albeit not as far as he would like, in
the direction of scrutinizing sex classifications more rigorously. Cf. Fiss, Dom-
browski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1121, 1127, 1134-54, 1160-64 (1976-77). It will be recalled
that in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, see notes 106-112 supra; involving social security
benefits to mothers but not fathers, Justice Brennan apparently attempted to gain
a majority by avoiding any explicit reference to the standard of review.
Justice Brennan succeeded in his attempt. Justices White, Marshall, and Black-
mun agreed with him. 420 U.S. at 191. Justice Powell also accepted Justice Bren-
nan's approach, although he expressed some discomfort with the "middle-tier"
approach. Id. at 210-11. Justice Stewart did not specifically indicate a position on
the standard to be used but argued that Craig could have been decided under the
rational relationship test. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented.
But see Comment, supra note 230, at 591 ("Apparently dissatisfied with the use
of 'suspect' terminology in the sex discrimination area, the Court appears to agree
with Chief Justice Burger's proposition that the phrase 'suspect classification' has,
in actuality, tended 'to stop analysis while appearing to suggest an analytical pro-
cess.' ") (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 730 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
232. See Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 33.
233. 429 U.S. at 199.
234. Id. at 199-200 n.7. The statement of purpose was provided to the Court by
the attorney for Oklahoma. Although the Court accepted the traffic safety purpose
for the Craig appeal, it raised two questions. First whether the purpose was the
"true" purpose in light of the fact that the Oklahoma attorney acknowledged in
oral argument that he could not assert that traffic safety was "indeed the reason"
for the statute. Id. Second, whether any statement by the attorney defending the
statute-as opposed to consideration of whatever legislative history might exist
(or consideration of the fact that legislative history materials did not exist)-could
be accepted as competent evidence for the determination of purpose. Id.
The plurality's superficial acceptance of the purpose advanced in Craig sug-
gested that the Court might not actually wrestle with the "purpose" question until
it had considered the "means" question. Perhaps the Court will not proceed to a
full examination of purpose until after the state has met its burden of showing a
substantial relationship between the statute and the state objective. Thus, if the
statute is defective in means, an important purpose cannot save it. By using this
approach, the Court would economically use its deliberative resources. See Note,
supra note 230, at 734.
235. 429 U.S. at 190. The inferences to be drawn from the Court's discussion of
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its best, that evidence tended to show that two percent of males
in the eighteen to twenty-one year old age group compared to
two-tenths of a percent of females in that age group had been ar-
rested for drunken driving. "While such a disparity is not trivial
in a statistical sense, it can hardly form the basis for employment
of a gender line as a classifying device. '236 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that the relationship between the sex classification and
traffic safety was not "substantial" and the statute therefore vio-
lated the right of eighteen to twenty year old males to equal pro-
tection of the laws. 237
Justice Stevens began his concurring opinion with the cryptic
and frequently quoted sentence: "There is only one Equal Protec-
tion Clause."238 Presumably this meant that he rejected either a
double or triple-tier method of analysis. 239 It is not clear, how-
ever, to what extent he actually disagreed with the plurality. He
did not state that the old two-tiered analysis or the new three-
tiered analysis in Craig were in any way incorrect, but merely
that they were only methods of explanation rather than methods
of decision.
Rather than disagreeing on the merits of the plurality's holding,
as he might have done, Justice Stevens wrote separately to make
an important point about the process and style of judicial decision
making. It is fruitless, he may have been suggesting, to attempt
to articulate an all-encompassing theory and then squeeze deci-
sions into that theory. Rather, he suggested that an inductive
method might be most helpful in identifying "the" standard of re-
view which the Court was using. What is needed, he stated, is "a
the statistics proffered differ. See Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 230, at
177-78 (suggesting the Court displayed a highly skeptical attitude toward the use
of statistics to validate broad social stereotypes). But see Note, supra note 230, at
734 (suggesting the Court is increasingly demanding empirical data supporting the
relationship between the means and the end).
236. 429 U.S. at 201.
237. Id. at 204. In so finding, the Court also explicitly disapproved Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), which upheld a state statute excluding women from
employment as bartenders.
238. 429 U.S. at 211.
239. Justice Stevens stated:
[The Equal Protection Clause] does not direct the courts to apply one
standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases.
Whatever criticism may be leveled at a judicial opinion implying that
there are at least three such standards applies with the same force to a
double standard.
Id. at 211-12.
careful explanation of the reasons motivating particular
decisions."240
Justice Stevens may have been emphasizing that the Court
should eschew creation of abstract models and should focus spe-
cifically on the pragmatic issues of each case. The problem with
his opinion was that the approach he used looked suspiciously
similar to a "tiered" model. The standard of review he proposed
asked two questions. First, was the classification "inoffensive," 241
"objectionable,"242 or "obnoxious"?24 3 Second, if the classification
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. Id. at 212-13. Justice Stevens neither defined nor explained the meaning
he attached to "inoffensive."
242. Justice Stevens did not define "objectionable" classifications. By example,
they would include classifications: (1) based on accidents of birth, (2) which are
"mere remnants of previous discrimination," and (3) which are "perverse in that,
presumably, their effects are contrary to the intended objectives." Id.
Classifications which are "mere remnants of previous discrimination" are to be
distinguished from classifications based on "pervasive, historic" discrimination.
As an example of the "mere remnant" concept, Justice Stevens noted that
Oklahoma was the only state which still discriminated by sex regarding the drink-
ing age. But Justice Stevens failed to explain why, in any given case, discrimina-
tion should be considered less offensive when practiced infrequently than when
practiced frequently.
243. Justice Stevens did not define "obnoxious" but suggested that such classi-
fications must be regarding persons who have "been the victims of the kind of his-
toric, pervasive discrimination that has disadvantaged other groups." Id. at 212
n.l. A significant question regarding sex discrimination is, of course, whether wo-
men are included among such "other groups." Justice Stevens did not address
that question. In Craig, Justice Stevens focused on males, presumably because
the attack against the statute was that it discriminated against men. He found
that men have not been the victims of historic, pervasive discrimination. The
problem with this analysis was that it failed to consider the argument that dis-
crimination that purportedly benefits a class can actually harm that class. This
problem did not occur in Craig because it was not a compensatory case, but the
lack of its consideration is a significant conceptual flaw in Justice Stevens' pro-
posed method of analysis. For the argument that Justice Stevens' opinion in
Craig signals the acknowledgement of past legal discrimination against males, see
Kanowitz, supra note 52, at 1390-91.
Justice Stevens did not address the issue of the identity, if any, between a "sus-
pect class" and a class which has been the victim of historic and pervasive dis-
crimination such that a classification discriminating against them would be
"obnoxious" within the meaning of his scheme. In Frontiero, Justice Brennan sug-
gested three factors as being relevant toward the categorization of a "suspect
class." The class must: (1) have an immutable characteristic determined solely
by accident of birth, (2) have suffered historical vilification, and (3) lack effective
political power and redress, due to the previous discrimination. 411 U.S. at 685, 686
n.17. See notes 66-80 supra and accompanying text. A fourth factor, the prerequi-
site that the class be a "discrete and insular minority," had been established in
the legendary footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,
153 n.4 (1938). For a discussion of these elements in sex discrimination cases, see
Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces
of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 980-83 (1975).
Justice Stevens' plan failed to precisely address how it incorporated the Fron-
tiero and Carolene Products criteria. Under Justice Stevens' plan, item one, im-
mutable characteristic due solely to birth, is not considered "obnoxious," but
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was "otherwise offensive,"2 " "then"245 was the purpose put for-
ward by the state "sufficient"246 to make the classification accept-
able?247 In answering these questions, Justice Stevens first
examined the statute's purpose248 and found that its legitimacy
was questionable. 249 Second, he examined whether the statute
merely "objectionable," whatever that meant. Item two, historic vilification, ap-
peared the key to the Stevens' category of "obnoxious." Justice Stevens, however,
drew a "bright line" between historic vilification (which he found did not apply to
males) and "a mere remnant of the now almost universally rejected tradition of
discriminating against males in this age bracket," which made, in his view, the
Craig discrimination "objectionable." 429 U.S. at 212. Justice Stevens did not re-
fer to the element of lack of political power. Id.
244. Id. at 213.
245. Id. The use of the word "then" implied that first, offensiveness should be
examined. If the classification is inoffensive, the use of the wording "otherwise of-
fensive" implied there would be no need to go further.
246. Justice Stevens did not discuss the critical question of by what standard
"sufficiency" should be judged. See Note, supra note 230, at 732-33 (suggesting
that the greater the invidiousness of the classification, from inoffensiveness to ob-
jectionable to offensiveness, the greater the degree of sufficiency required to up-
hold the state's justification of purpose). This question is critical because of
Justice Stevens' purported rejection of a three-tiered or double-tiered method of
decisionmaking. If the method he proposed required a different showing for the
sufficiency of the state's interest in a sexually discriminatory statute, based on the
offensiveness of the classification, there is no actual difference between that
method and double or triple-tier analysis. Although Justice Stevens did not state
how "sufficiency" was to be determined, it was clear that he rejected a mere ra-
tional relationship test because, although he found the Craig classification "not to-
tally irrational," he nevertheless rejected it. 429 U.S. at 213.
247. 429 U.S. at 213.
248. Justice Stevens' examination of purpose was more rigorous than the plu-
rality's. The plurality would consider purpose only after the means had been ac-
cepted. See note 234 supra. But Justice Stevens, perhaps, would consider purpose
in any event. The effect of this difference would place a higher burden on the
challengers of a statute. Justice Stevens' method of analysis suggested that a suc-
cessful defense of purpose could be made (although not made in Craig) on the
basis of empirical evidence, even where the announced purposes of the statute
had been found suspect. This "second chance" for purpose can be discerned from
the following language. After Justice Stevens found that it was doubtful that the
purpose of the statute was traffic safety, 429 U.S. at 213, he then stated, "moreover,
the empirical data submitted by the state accentuated the unfairness of the stat-
ute." Id. at 213-14. It could be argued that if the purpose was illegitimate, the use
of empirical data by the state should not save it. But by the use of the term
"moreover," which means "in addition to what has been said before." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1470 (1966), Justice Stevens suggested that
even if the purpose is unacceptable, empirical evidence may somehow yet save
the statute. Justice Stevens' method of analyzing purpose could enhance the abil-
ity of a sex-based statute to withstand equal protection attack by giving the de-
fenders of the statute two bites at the apple.
249. 429 U.S. at 212. Justice Stevens doubted that traffic safety was the real pur-
pose of the statute for two reasons. First, "I would not be surprised if [what actu-
ally motivated this discrimination] represented nothing more than the
actually accomplished its intended purpose and found that it did
not.250
Justice Stevens concluded that the classification was "objec-
tionable." 25 ' The state's purpose was not sufficient to overcome
that objection because the purpose was of questionable legiti-
macy. In addition, the statute did not even accomplish its pur-
pose. Therefore, the classification violated the Equal Protection
Clause.252
Justice Stevens' concurrence in Craig added little to the law.
Although the reasoning of the opinion did not create problems,
the style was internally inconsistent. He stated that he opposed
two or three-tiered models of decision, but in fact, he must have
used either a two or three-tiered model of some sort.25 3 He stated
that the Court should emphasize a "careful explanation of rea-
sons,"254 but his own statement of reasons was muddled and far
from precise.25 5 He did not indicate any specific area of disagree-
ment with Justice Brennan's new "substantial" relationship test,
although he did seem willing to give the state more opportunities
than would the plurality to demonstrate that a sex-based statute
was somehow justified.
2. Califano v. Goldfarb
In the case of Califano v. Goldfarb,256 both Justices Brennan
and Stevens further articulated their respective positions of the
equal protection analysis stated in Craig. Justice Stevens, con-
curring, departed significantly from the model of "purpose" analy-
sis that he had suggested in Craig. In Goldfarb, he focused on
pragmatic effects as the touchstone for equal protection examina-
perpetuation of a stereotyped attitude about the relative maturity of the members
of the two sexes in this age bracket." Id. at 213 n.5. Second, the statute dealt only
with the sale of beer, not access or consumption. Id. at 213-14 n.6.
250. Id. at 213-14. Justice Stevens characterized the state's best argument as
being that two percent of 18-20 year-old males probably had violated a liquor law.
Id. at 214. He found two problems with this argument: (1) the statute would
probably have little deterrent effect on the two percent, let alone the 98%, and
(2) even if the law did have deterrent effect, it is "an insult to all young men of
the State ... [to] visit. . . the sins of the 2% on the 98%." Id.
251. Id. at 212. It was "not as obnoxious as some the Court has condemned, nor
as offensive as some the Court has accepted." Id. (footnotes omitted). The classi-
fication was "objectionable" because: (1) it was based on an accident of birth;
(2) it was a "mere remnant" of previous discrimination against males; and (3) it
was perverse in that males are usually heavier than females and, thus, drinking
would impair their driving less.
252. Id. at 212-13.
253. See note 246 supra.
254. 429 U.S. at 212.
255. See notes 241-52 supra and accompanying text.
256. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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tion of purpose and suggested two requirements for "compensa-
tory" classifications. Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan
further explicated the new "substantial relationship" method of
equal protection analysis announced in Craig.25 7
Goldfarb involved a challenge to social security laws under
which benefits were paid to the widow of a covered wage-earner
automatically but were paid to the widower of a covered wage-
earner only if the widower proved that he had actually received
one-half of his support from his wife.258 The first question of Jus-
tice Brennan's analysis was whether the statute's purpose was
"important."259 In order to answer that question, it was necessary
to determine exactly what that purpose was.
The defenders of the statute had argued that the purpose was
not mere administrative convenience, but that it was to rationally
define different standards of eligibility based on differing needs of
widows and widowers as classes. Justice Brennan examined the
257. Although the specific Craig equal protection analysis used in Goldfarb
was new, Judge Brennan cited precedent for the result. He found that the equal
protection question of Goldfarb was "indistinguishable" from that presented by
Wiesenfeld, which had involved the payment of benefits to mothers but not fathers
of a dependent child. 430 U.S. at 204. The cases can be distinguished, however, in
an important aspect. Wiesenfeld involved the denial of benefits, while Goldfarb
involved required proof of dependency. See Comment, supra note 98, at 513-14.
In addition, Justice Brennan found that the decision in Frontiero also militated
for affirmance. 430 U.S. at 204. But Frontiero also can be distinguished from Gold-
farb. The Frontiero Court invalidated a law requiring males to prove dependence
on female spouses in order to qualify for military dependents' benefits, where the
only justification proffered for the classification was that of administrative conven-
ience. Other justifications were put forward in Goldfarb. See Comment, supra
note 98, at 513-14. Another important way in which the cases are distinguishable is
that the cost implications in Frontiero were minor, while the cost implications of
Goldfarb were staggering.
258. 430 U.S. at 201.
259. Two preliminary issues were raised. First, whether the analysis should fo-
cus just on discrimination against the widower or whether it should also focus on
discrimination against the deceased female wage earner. Justice Brennan found
that not looking at the discrimination against the wage-earner would be to deni-
grate the efforts of women, who, by working, sought to contribute earnings and
protection to their families. 430 U.S. at 205-07.
Second, the state argued that because the legislation involved social welfare
benefits, it should be given great deference and be reviewed with minimal scru-
tiny. The Court gave little consideration to this argument and did not deal, other
than in cursory fashion, with the precedent cited by Justice Rehnquist. See Com-
ment, supra note 98, at 513 n.61. "[T] he Court ignored the well established princi-
ple that Congress had traditionally been allowed broad discretion in making
classifications in noncontractual social welfare benefit programs." Id. See also
Note, Gender-Based Legislative Classifications, Califano v. Goldfarb, 57 NEB. L.
REV. 555, 573-79 (1978).
statute carefully, exhaustively inquired into the legislative record
as required by Wiesenfeld, 260 and rejected that argument. Justice
Brennan found that there was no congressional intent to remedy
the arguably greater needs of widows. Thus, the only possible
justification was one of administrative convenience which, after
Reed,261 was insufficient to justify a sex-based classification.262
Although Goldfarb did apply the new intermediate "substantial
relationship" test announced in Craig, it is important to identify
the precise nature of the Goldfarb analysis. In Craig, the Court
quickly passed over the. "purpose" question concerning whether
the statute's purpose was "important", and instead, exhaustively
analyzed the "means" question of whether the means were "sub-
stantially .related" to the purpose.2 63 In Goldfarb, however, the
Court did not consider the "means" question because it could find
no acceptable purpose for the statute.26 4 Thus, the Court closed
the door left open after Craig. It now seemed to hold that means
should not be examined if a purpose was insufficient. 265
Concurring, Justice Stevens departed from the method of analy-
sis he had proposed in Craig. In Craig, he had suggested a two-
step process. The first step considered how offensive the classifi-
cation was, in terms of the continuum from "inoffensive" to "ob-
jectionable" to "obnoxious." The second step involved whether
the purpose of the classification was "sufficient" to overcome the
degree of offensiveness. In Goldfarb, Justice Stevens focused
260. See notes 106-12 supra.
261. See notes 59-65 supra.
262. 430 U.S. at 217.
263. See notes 233-34 supra and accompanying text.
264. Justice Brennan's opinion never discussed whether the means were effec-
tive or even "substantially related" to the objectives; it never discussed means at
all, although it did make frequent references to the "intention" and "justification"
of the statute. "Intention" and "justification" seem closer to the meaning of "pur-
pose" than to the meaning of "means."
We conclude, therefore, that the differential treatment of nondependent
widows and widowers results not ... from a deliberate congressional in-
tention to remedy [needs of widowers] but rather from an intention to aid
dependent spouses of deceased wage earners, coupled with a presumption
that wives are usually dependent .... The only conceivable justification
for ... the presumption ... [is] that it would save the Government time,
money and effort .... [S]uch assumptions do not suffice to justify a gen-
der based discrimination ....
430 U.S. at 216-17 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). Contra, Comment, Equal
Protection, supra note 98, at 514 n.70. This Comment suggests the Goldfarb Court
did not address the issue of whether administrative convenience was sufficiently
important to justify a sex based classification. The student author argues that the
Court invalidated the statute because it failed the "means" test but acknowledges
authority to support the contrary conclusion that administrative convenience may
never be sufficient to uphold a sex based classification.
265. One practical effect of such a holding might be to reduce the emphasis on
widespread use of statistical arguments purporting to measure a statute's effects.
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only briefly on the classification and did not use the Craig termi-
nology. He stated that the Goldfarb classification was "not 'invid-
ious' "266 but that it did "treat similarly situated persons
differently solely because they are not of the same sex."2 67 Thus,
even though Justice Stevens had announced his rejection of a two
or three-tier model of equal protection analysis, once again he
seemed to be advocating a two or three-tier model in which one
tier was "invidious discrimination," another tier was "different
treatment solely because of sex," and perhaps a third tier was
"inoffensiveness."
Having dropped one shoe, Justice Stevens enigmatically re-
fused to drop the other. He moved on to the "purpose" question
without indicating what results, if any, attached to the new
"means" classifications that he had just set forth. He said that the
Goldfarb discrimination was not "invidious," but it did treat peo-
ple differently. To the question of what difference that distinction
signified, he had no answer.
Proceeding to the question of whether the statute's purpose
could overcome the harms of the sex discrimination, 268 Justice
Stevens examined the question in a manner markedly different
from that of Justice Brennan's examination. Justice Brennan had
rejected administrative convenience as an acceptable purpose
without reaching the question of whether or not the statute was
266. 430 U.S. at 218. Justice Stevens did not define "invidious," but suggested
that an "invidious" classification would "imply that males are inferior to females,"
[sic] would "not condemn a large class on the basis of... an unrepresentative
few," and would "not add to the burdens of an already disadvantaged and discrete
minority." Id. Presumably, Justice Stevens was suggesting that a classification
would be invidious if it implied either sex was superior to the other. Perhaps he
used "invidious" to correspond with his previous classification of "obnoxious," but
the particular descriptive phrases used seem to be closer to the category of "objec-
tionable." See notes 241-43 supra and accompanying text.
267. 430 U.S. at 219. Justice Stevens clearly was not implying that "different"
treatment of persons solely because of sex is "inoffensive." Thus, under his Craig
terminology, it might be expected that this classification would be considered "ob-
jectionable." But, if that is correct, what of the apparent similarity of the terms
discussed in note 266 supra to the category of "objectionable?"
268. In Craig, Justice Stevens examined the statute's purposes to determine if
they could outweigh the classification created. Although in Goldfarb he did not
specifically refer to the Craig formulation, presumably the same method of analy-
sis would apply: the justification for the statute must outweigh the harm created
by the "different treatment" of similarly situated members of the sexes. Justice
Stevens found that two "hypothetical justifications" existed for the statute: ad-
ministrative convenience and amelioration of widows' generally more severe eco-
nomic plight. He found neither to be "wholly irrational" but, nevertheless, both
were unacceptable. 430 U.S. at 219.
actually effective in achieving administrative convenience. Jus-
tice Stevens spent only one sentence on purpose per se and
quickly moved to question whether the statute actually created
administrative convenience.269 He concluded that because the
rule created a "staggering" economic cost, administrative conven-
ience could not have been the true reason for the
discrimination. 270
The second proposed justification for the classification had been
that it was intended to remedy previous discrimination against
women. As did the plurality, Justice Stevens examined the legis-
lative history and concluded that such compensation' had not
been intended. Justice Stevens' analysis of this issue was impor-
tant because he suggested the compensatory classifications could
not be based on negative stereotypes or traditional role-typing but
269. "Neither the 'administrative convenience' rationale. . . nor the [ameliora-
tive rationale] can be described as wholly irrational." Id. That sentence could
have serious implications. The term "rational relationship," in sex discrimination
cases, seems to have become so hopelessly confused-with pre- and post-Reed ra-
tional relationship, rational relationship with "bite," and the myriad of other pos-
sibilities emerging from the cases-and bandied about that it no longer serves any
communicative function. It conveys nothing about the nature of the relationship
required except to indicate that it does not refer to designation of a suspect class.
That Justice Stevens stated that administrative inconvenience is not "wholly irra-
tional," however, indicates that he disagreed with the majority's finding that ad-
ministrative inconvenience, without more, could not justify the classification. This
proposition is bolstered by two other factors. One, Justice Stevens proceeded to
find fault with the Goldfarb administrative efficiency rationale because it did not
truly lead to administrative efficiency. That analysis would have been unneces-
sary if administrative efficiency could not be sufficient as a justification. Two, Jus-
tice Stevens began the paragraph in which he discussed administrative efficiency
with the introduction, "Mr. Justice Rehnquist correctly identifies two hypothetical
justifications [administrative convenience and amelioration]." Id. Justice Rehn-
quist, in his dissent, argued that administrative convenience was an acceptable
justification. Id. at 237. Justice Stevens' use of the word "correctly" implied agree-
ment with Justice Rehnquist. Justice Stevens then stated that neither administra-
tive convenience nor amelioration were "wholly irrational." It was not until the
following sentence that, by the use of the word "nevertheless," he indicated any
disagreement with Justice Rehnquist: "Nevertheless, I find both justifications un-
acceptable in this case." Id. Thus, Justice Stevens appeared to agree with Justice
Rehnquist that administrative convenience could be ark acceptable state purpose.
270. Id. at 220. Although the rule eliminated some paperwork in not requiring
that widows prove dependency, it did so at the cost of an estimated $750 million
per year in payments to widows who might not qualify as dependents. Id. Justice
Stevens stated:
Congress simply assumed that all widows should be regarded as "depen-
dents".... It is fair to infer that habit, rather than analysis or actual re-
flection, made it seem acceptable to equate the terms "widow" and
"dependent surviving spouse." That kind of automatic reflex is far differ-
ent from either a legislative decision to favor females in order to compen-
sate for past wrongs, or a legislative decision that the administrative
savings exceed the cost of extending benefits to nondependent widows.
Id. at 222.
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must be aimed at remediation of specific injustices. 271
In Goldfarb, Justice Stevens did not shed light on his method of
equal protection analysis in sex discrimination cases, but he did
fill in some of the conceptual content of that analysis. His posi-
tion on "administrative convenience" suggested that he might up-
hold sexually discriminatory policies where such policies created
genuine cost savings. Despite that indication of regression from
previous cases, his opinion made a significant contribution to the
law of sex discrimination by suggesting that two conditions must
exist in order for "compensatory" discrimination to be upheld.
First, as had been emphasized in Wiesenfeld, the legislation must
be carefully examined to ensure that it is truly compensatory.
Second, Justice Stevens now added that the legislation must be
specifically focused on remediation of past injury and may not be
based on negative stereotypes.
Justice Stevens' opinion in Goldfarb shows a clear recognition
of the impediments that flow from stereotyped attitudes toward
women.272 Thus, in his emerging jurisprudence, at least when the
nature of the classification is questionable, he has demanded
proof that the legislature actually intended the compensation to
serve the specific interest claimed in argument before the
Court.273 The Court adopted these two conditions more specifi-
cally in Califano v. Webster,274 a per curiam follow-up to
Goldfarb.
271. Id. at 222. Justice Stevens then asked, if amelioration had not been truly
intended in the social security legislation challenged in Goldfarb, "what is to be
said about Kahn," which involved a property tax exemption law enacted in 1885.
430 U.S. at 223. In answering this question, Justice Stevens indicated firm agree-
ment with the Wiesenfeld holding that ostensibly compensatory discrimination
must be truly ameliorative and not be justified by a " 'mere recitation of a benign,
compensatory purpose.'- 430 U.S. at 224. (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975)).
272. See Taub, supra note 54, at 410.
273. Id. at 410 n.295.
274. 430 U.S. 313 (1977). In Webster, the Court applied the substantial relation-
ship test (or intermediate scrutiny standard of review) to a social security statute
which allowed women, but not men, to eliminate certain low earning years from
retirement pay calculations. The Webster Court found there was specific intent to
compensate female wage earners for past employment discrimination against wo-
men. Id. at 318-21. In addition, the Court cited Justice Stevens' dissent in Gold-
farb and emphasized that the sex classification in Webster was "not 'the
accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females."' Id. at 320
(citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring)). For a criti-
cal discussion of Webster, see generally Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 34-35; Supreme
Court, 1976 Term, supra note 230, at 180; Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protec-
tion-Standard Review Applicable in Sex Discrimination Cases, 45 TENN. L. REV.
514 (1978).
3. Michael M. v. Superior Court
In Goldfarb, Justice Stevens suggested that he might not place
a heavy burden on the defenders of a statute which discriminated
on the basis of sex. But he changed his mind on this issue in the
recent case of Michael M. v. Superior Court.275 In his dissent in
Michael M. he expressly emphasized that the defenders of a sex-
based statute must surmount a very formidable burden. His opin-
ion in Michael M. also clarified and expanded his reasoning, only
obliquely suggested in Craig, that equal protection analysis in-
volves something other than different "levels of scrutiny."
At issue in Michael M. was the constitutionality of California's
statutory rape law which penalized males for engaging in inter-
course with females under the age of eighteen. The Court was
unable to agree on the test to be used or the results of the appli-
cation of the various tests. The statute was upheld by one vote,
but the Court was deeply fractured. In addition to the plurality
opinion, there were two concurring and two dissenting opinions.
Writing for the plurality, Justice Rehnquist began his analysis
by skirting the critical issue of whether the Craig "intermediate"
standard of review would apply. Although he cited Craig, he did
so suggesting that Craig was merely one in a series of cases plac-
ing sex discrimination issues somewhere between the "rational
relationship" and "strict scrutiny" tests. 276 Given the consistent
use of the Craig standard in sex discrimination cases, it would
seem that the Court would have required, at the very least, signif-
icant analysis before the Craig equal protection analysis was
abandoned. 277 Justice Rehnquist provided no such analysis.
Justice Rehnquist first examined the statute's purpose. Under
Craig, the state must show an "important" interest in the pur-
pose. In Michael M., however, Justice Rehnquist held that the
government need only have a "strong" interest in the statute's
purpose. The specific purpose of the California statute had been
hotly disputed. Its supporters claimed that the purpose was to
prevent teenage pregnancies, but its challengers argued that the
purpose was to preserve the chastity of young women.278 Justice
Rehnquist emphasized that it was futile to search for one single
or even "primary" purpose because legislators may vote for a stat-
275. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
276. Id. at 468.
277. See note 303 infra. In Michael M., it was undisputed that the statute dis-
criminated on the basis of sex.
278. See 450 U.S. at 470 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., plurality op.); id. at 490, 494-95 & nn.9
& 10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ute for a variety of reasons.27 9 Justice Rehnquist utilized the fa-
miliar rule of statutory construction that the Court would not
strike down legislation as long as one of its purposes was permis-
sible.280 Thus, as long as prevention of pregnancy was at least
"one" of the purposes of the statute, and Justice Rehnquist was
satisfied that it was, 28 1 the statute would not be struck down if the
state had a "strong" interest in that purpose. Justice Rehnquist
found that the state did have a strong interest in preventing teen-
age pregnancy, because of the significant social, economic, and
medical consequences to the fetus, the mother, and the state.282
Justice Rehnquist then turned to the "means" question. The
Craig test requires that the means be "substantially" related to
the purpose. But, stating that "[tihe question whether a statute
is substantially related to its asserted goals is at best an opaque
one."283 Justice Rehnquist completely begged the question. He
found by conclusory reasoning that the means were "sufficiently"
related to the purpose to pass constitutional muster.284 Although
the term "sufficiently" can have no meaning except in relation to
some standard, Justice Rehnquist refused to identify what stan-
dard he was using. Justice Rehnquist then stated that it was
"hardly unreasonable" for the legislature to protect the female,
who must face all of the negative consequences of teenage preg-
279. Justice Rehnquist's approach to the problem of multiple "purposes" was
sound. However, he failed to reconcile this approach to purpose with the narrower
view propounded by the Court in Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979), its most recent sex discrimination case prior to Michael M. In Fee-
ney, where the veteran's preference statute was facially neutral, the Court sug-
gested that legislation did not discriminate on the basis of sex so long as its
"primary" purpose was other than discrimination. See notes 395-434 in ra.
280. 450 U.S. at 470 n.7.
281. Id.
282. Id. Justice Rehnquist emphasized that half of all teenage pregnancies end
in abortion. For those children who are born, Justice Rehnquist added, their ille-gitimate status makes them likely candidates to become wards of the state. Jus-
tice Rehnquist's assertion may be correct, but he provided no support for it, other
than by a general reference to other California legislation. Justice Rehnquist
noted that the preamble to the California Maternity Care for Minors Act, CAI.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 16145 (West Supp. 1979), stated, "[tihe legislature finds that
pregnancy among unmarried persons under 21 years of age constitutes an increas-
ing socialproblem in the State of California." 450 U.S. at 471 n.6. The quoted sen-
tence, without more, completely fails to support Justice Rehnquist's assertion that
children born to unmarried teenage mothers are more likley to become wards of
the state.
283. 450 U.S. at 474 n.10.
284. Id. at 473.
nancy, and to punish only the male.285 Thus, despite Justice
Rehnquist's apparent acknowledgment that sex discrimination is-
sues received a scrutiny more stringent than the rational relation-
ship test,286 he actually used nothing more than the rational
relationship test to uphold the statute. As will be discussed, Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion is a serious regression in sex discrimina-
tion law because it attempts to quietly abandon the use of the
intermediate level of scrutiny.
Although Justice Rehnquist did not announce his standard of
"sufficiency," he did explain the reasons by which he found the
means sufficiently related to the purpose. Since all of the harmful
consequences of pregnancy fell on the female, the legislature
could rationally decide to protect her from punishment and to
punish only the male. 287 Justice Rehnquist also reasoned that the
risk of pregnancy itself deterred unmarried teenage females from
engaging in intercourse.288 Since males suffered no similar "natu-
ral sanction," the imposition of the criminal sanction solely on
males served to "roughly 'equalize' the deterrents on the
sexes."
2 8 9
Justice Rehnquist then discussed the burden on the state to
show that a sex-neutral classification could not serve the same
purposes. He simply found that the state had no such burden.
285. Id.
286. His earlier apparent acknowledgment that sex discrimination required a
scrutiny somewhere between "rational relationship" and "strict scrutiny" was
carefully worded. His language at once gave the appearance of being consistent
with past precedent requiring an "intermediate" scrutiny but also carefully
avoided stating that any true increased level of scrutiny would be given.
[T] he Court has had some difficulty in agreeing upon the proper approach
and analysis in cases involving challenges to gender-based classifications
.... [W e have not held that gender-based classifications are 'inherently
suspect' and thus we do not apply so-called 'strict-scrutiny' to those classi-
fications .... Our cases have held, however, that the traditional mini-
mum rationality test takes on a somewhat 'sharper focus' when gender-
based classifications are challenged .... [Flor example, the Court [has]
stated that a gender-based classification will be upheld if it bears a 'fair
and substantial reltionship' to leitimate state ends ... and has restated
the test to require the classification to bear a 'substantial relationship' to
'important government objectives.'
Id. at 468-69 (citations omitted).
The tone of this language, including use of the phrase "restated the test," refer-
ring to Justice Brennan's Craig opinion, suggested that Justice Rehnquist was
agreeing that, although the Court had used varying language, sex classifications
were to be reviewed by Justice Brennan's Craig standards. Justice Rehnquist,
however, actually agreed to no more than requiring a "sharper focus" on the mini-
mum "rational relationship" test. Based on his later finding that the legislature's
action was "not unreasonable," he may not have even placed that "sharper focus,"
whatever that meant, on the challenged statute.
287. Id. at 473.
288. Id. Justice Rehnquist offered no evidence for this proposition.
289. Id.
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Citing Kahn,290 he stated that the Court did not need to review
whether the statute was "drawn as precisely as it might have
been,"29 1 but merely needed to determine whether the statute
was within constitutional limits. Justice Rehnquist's use of Kahn
provided only weak support because the legislation in Kahn in-
volved a property tax exemption to women based on past eco-
nomic discrimination against them while the legislation in
Michael M. concerned the application of the criminal sanction
against males but not females with no finding of any history of
past discrimination. Justice Rehnquist also concluded that a sex-
neutral statute would not be as effective as the challenged. statute.
He reasoned that effective enforcement would be frustrated by a
sex-neutral statute because females would be less likely to report
violations if they were criminally liable.292
Finally, Justice Rehnquist rejected the arguments that the stat-
ute was overbroad, because it also governed intercourse with
prepubescent females, and that, when applied to males under
eighteen, always assumed that males were the aggressors. The
overbroad argument failed, Justice Rehnquist reasoned, because
very young females were particularly susceptible to injury during
intercourse. Moreover, he concluded that it would be "ludicrous"
to limit a rape statute to older teenagers and exclude younger
girls. 293 Finally, according to Justice Rehnquist, the statute did
not presume that teenage males were always aggressors. Age was
irrelevant. The statute merely placed an additional deterrent on
males.294
Justice Stewart concurred and appeared to endorse the use of a
rational basis test. He began by downgrading the significance of
sex-based classifications. He reasoned that discrimination is ille-
gal when it classifies similarly situated people on the basis of im-
mutable characteristics with which they were born. Racial
290. 416 U.S. at 356 n.10.
291. 450 U.S. at 473.
292. Id. at 473-74. The challengers to the statute conceded a fatal point. Justice
Rehnquist cited their unconvincing argument that a sex-neutral statute would not
hinder prosecution because the prosecutor could take into account the relative
burdens on females and males and, generally, only prosecute males. As Justice
Rehnquist stated: "But to concede this is to concede all. If the prosecutor, in ex-
ercising discretion, will virtually always prosecute just the man and not the wo-
man, we do not see why it is impermissible for the legislature to enact a statute to
the same effect." Id. at 1206 n.9.
293. Id. at 475.
294. Id.
discrimination, therefore, is always unconstitutional because peo-
ple of different races are always considered similarly situated for
constitutional purposes. He reasoned that although sex classifica-
tions are sometimes unconstitutional, they are not always so, as
men and women are not always similarly situated.295 Justice
Stewart found the statute constitutional because young males
and females are not similarly situated with regard to the
problems associated with intercourse and pregnancy.296
Since females, but not males, confront the medical risks of
pregnancy or abortion and the social, educational, and emotional
consequences of pregnancy, Justice Stewart found it acceptable
for a legislature to attempt to protect unmarried teenage females
by prohibiting males from participating in intercourse. 297 Agree-
ing with Justice Rehnquist that the risk of pregnancy is a natural
deterrent to females, Justice Stewart stated that "[e]xperienced
observation" confirmed that males did not view pregnancy as a
deterrent. 298 Justice Stewart also agreed with Justice Rehnquist
that the state was not bound to draft a sex-neutral statute even if
doing so would accomplish its purpose more precisely.
Citing Dandridge v. Williams 299 and Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co. ,300 Justice Stewart endorsed the one-step-at-a-time approach:
"[TJhe Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State
must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not
attacking the problem at all."30 1 The decisions in Dandridge and
Williamson, however, involved applications of the rational rela-
tionship test. Indeed, the latter decision is infamous as an exam-
ple of the laxity of review under that test. Justice Stewart made
no effort to justify reliance on those cases.
Approaching the case in terms of privacy rights, Justice Black-
mun also concurred. Referring to the Court's abortion decisions,
including H.L. v. Matheson,302 decided the same day as Michael
M., Justice Blackmun stated he was "gratified" to see that the
plurality recognized the increasing incidence and serious conse-
quences of teenage pregnancy. He saw the basic social and pri-
295. Id. at 478 (Stewart, J., concurring).
296. Id. at 479.
297. Id. at 479-80.
298. Id. Justice Stewart did not explain what he meant by "experienced obser-
vation." Perhaps he meant that he would know when the sexes were not similarly
situated "when I see it." See note 71 supra.
299. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
300. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
301. 450 U.S. at 481 n.13 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 486-87).
302. Id. at 398 (1981). In H.L., the Court held a statute requiring physicians to
notify parents of minor females seeking abortions to be constitutional. Justice
Blackmun joined Justice Marshall's dissent.
[Vol. 9: 315, 1982] Changed Perspective
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
vacy issues in abortion cases as similar to the issues related to
this statutory rape case. He saw, however, a critical difference is
the time of the state's interference with the individual. In abor-
tion cases, the state was intervening after conception; it was inter-
fering with a woman's effort to deal with the consequences of
pregnancy. In the statutory rape law challenged in Michael M.,
the state intervened before conception; indeed, it intervened in
order to prevent conception. Thus, he found the interference with
a woman's privacy rights justified while he found interference re-
garding abortion less justifiable.
Justice Blackmun ducked the key question regarding the level
of scrutiny to be used. He stated that he voted to uphold the Cali-
fornia statute on the basis of the tests used in Reed, Craig, Bal-
lard, Weisenfeld, and Kahn. Those cases, however, used different
tests. Justice Blackmun did not cite the many post-Craig cases
which consistently used the Craig test.
Justice Brennan sharply dissented. He criticized Justice Rehn-
quist's attempt to erode the use of intermediate scrutiny. Justice
Brennan emphasized that, although prior to Craig the Court was
uncertain as to the proper test to be utilized in sex discrimination
challenges, since Craig the Court had clearly settled on the Craig
test.303 He strongly disagreed with Justice Rehnquist regarding
the burden to be placed on the state. According to Justice Bren-
nan, if a classification discriminates, the burden is on the state to
show the "importance" of the objective and the "substantial" rela-
tionship between the classification and the objective. In order to
meet that burden, he concluded, the state must show that a sex-
neutral statute would be a less effective means of achieving the
purpose.3 0 4
Justice Brennan focused exclusively on the "means" question,
to which, he stated, the plurality did not give enough emphasis.
Even if the purpose of preventing teenage pregnancy were "im-
portant," he reasoned, the state then had the burden to show that
303. Id. at 489-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan cited the follow-
ing cases using the Craig analysis that a sex classification must be "substantially"
related to the achievement of an "important" governmental purpose: Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 101 S. Ct. 1195, 1198-99 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S.
142, 150 (1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 270, 279 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977); and Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977).
304. 450 U.S. at 490-91.
a sex-based statute "substantially" furthered that goal in a man-
ner different from that achieved by a sex-neutral statute.
The plurality had accepted the argument that sex discrimina-
tion was necessary because enforcement would suffer if the stat-
ute was sex-neutral. California's theory was that females would
be less likely to report violations if they could be criminally liable.
Justice Brennan emphasized that the state merely argued this
point, however, it did not offer any evidence. The state was de-
fending its statute only on paper pleadings.305
Not only had the state failed to meet its burden of showing a
"substantial" relationship between the means and the purpose of
the statute, but Justice Brennan also found two flaws in the en-
forcement argument. First, although thirty-seven states now have
sex-neutral statutory rape laws, California had put forward no ev-
idence that those states were hampered in enforcement because
females were also subject to the criminal sanction. Also, the Cali-
fornia legislature had recently revised other sex crime definitions
to make them sex-neutral.306
Second, Justice Brennan correctly emphasized the key flaw in
the enforcement argument. Even if the statute made enforcement
more difficult, the state had not shown that those enforcement
problems would make a sex-based statute less effective than a
sex-neutral statute in deterring minor females from engaging in
sexual intercourse. 307 Justice Brennan seriously questioned
whether the statute as enforced had any substantial deterrent ef-
fect.308 Further, he reasoned that if the criminal sanction were
applied to females, whatever deterrent effect the law provided
could only be increased for the simple reason that the same de-
terrent would then apply to twice as many people.309 Justice
Brennan also questioned whether a sex-neutral statutory rape
law could withstand an attack based on the constitutional right of
privacy. He did not analyze this issue in detail because the Cali-
305. Justice Brennan stated: "[A] State's bare assertion that its gender-based
statutory classification substantially furthers an important governmental interest
is not enough to meet its burden of proof under Craig v. Boren. Rather, the State
must produce evidence that will persuade the Court that its assertion is true." Id.
at 492.
306. Id. at 493.
307. Id.
308. Justice Brennan noted that in recent years there had been an average of
413 prosecutions for statutory rape per year in California. There are approxi-
mately one million females between ages 13-17 per year. While there was no evi-
dence to indicate rate of sexual intercourse, there were approximately 50,000
teenage pregnancies during 1976. Thus, a male had a very low chance of being ar-
rested for sexual intercourse with a minor. Id. at 493 n.8.
309. Id. at 494.
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fornia statute had not been challenged on privacy grounds. 310
Finally, Justice Brennan turned to the "purpose" question. Re-
viewing the historical development of the statutory rape law, he
concluded that the prevention of pregnancy purpose had been
created only recently. Tracing the California statute's origins to
the Statutes of Westminster,31 1 enacted at the close of the thir-
teenth century, he demonstrated that the law was initially en-
acted on the premise that young females were legally incapable of
consenting to sexual intercourse. Because their chastity was con-
sidered especially precious, they were given special legal protec-
tion. Justice Brennan concluded, in part because California's law
had been "designed to further these outmoded sexual stereo-
types, rather than to reduce the incidence of teenage pregnancies,
that the State has been unable to demonstrate a substantial rela-
tionship between the classification and its newly asserted
goal."3 12
Justice Stevens also vigorously dissented. Although doubting
that any statutory rape law would have a deterrent effect,3 13 he
disputed Justice Brennan's conclusion that a sex-neutral statu-
tory rape law might be unconstitutional. In Justice Stevens' view,
the societal interests in reducing venereal disease and teenage
pregnancy outweighed the intrusion into a teenager's privacy
rights.3 1 4 Thus, Justice Stevens reasoned that a total ban on pre-
marital teenage sex could be constitutional. The constitutionality
of a total ban, however, provided no support for a ban solely
against males.
Justice Stevens then embarked upon a creative discussion of
the equal protection analysis required for sex discrimination
cases. Rather than saying that an equal protection analysis in-
310. Id. at 491 n.5.
311. 3 Edw. 1, ch. 34 (1285); 3 Edw. 1, ch. 13 (1275).
312. 450 U.S. at 496. Justice Brennan cited Justice Stevens' disapproval of
newly created purposes for a statute in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 223 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring).
313. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cited his opinion in Carey v.
Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 714 (1977):
Common sense indicates that many young people will engage in sexual
activity regardless of what the New York Legislature does; and further,
that the incidence of venereal disease and premarital pregnancy is af-
fected by the availability or unavailability of contraception. Although
young persons theoretically may avoid those harms by practicing total ab-
stention, inevitably many will not.
Id.
314. 450 U.S. at 497.
volved different "levels of scrutiny," he reasoned that it was more
precise for the Court to say that "the burden of sustaining an
equal protection challenge is much heavier in some cases than in
others." 315 In racial classifications, the burden placed upon a
challenger is very light because the state never has a legitimate
reason to treat persons differently because of race. Challengers of
economic classification face a high burden because such classifi-
cations must necessarily be made by a legislature and are pre-
sumptively valid. But sex-based classifications fall somewhere
between the other categories. Sex differences, Justice Stevens
stated, "are sometimes relevant and sometimes wholly
irrelevant."316
To analyze sex-based classifications, Justice Stevens deter-
mined, the Court should focus on the degree of relevancy. If sex-
ual differences were "obviously irrelevant" to the classification,
then a challenger should have only a light burden, similar to that
which must be sustained by challengers of racial classifications. 317
If, however, there was an "apparent connection" between the dis-
rimination and a physical difference between the sexes, then the
classification should be presumed lawful. That presumption
could be overcome by a showing that the apparent justification for
the discrimination was "illusory or wholly inadequate." This ex-
planation of imposing a heavier burden in some sex discrimina-
tion cases rather than others, Justice Stevens concluded, was
more accurate than saying the Court applied a "mid-level" scru-
tiny to all sex discrimination cases. 318 In the final analysis, Jus-
tice Stevens stated, quoting Professor Cox, "the Court is always
deciding whether in its judgment the harm done to the disadvan-
taged class by the legislative classification is disproportionate to
the public purposes the measure is likely to achieve."319
In Michael M., Justice Stevens found that there was an "appar-
ent connection" between the sex classification and the fact that
only females can become pregnant. The act of intercourse prohib-
ited by the law created a greater risk of harm for the female than
for the male.320 Therefore, the law was presumed lawful.
The question under Justice Stevens' analysis was whether the
presumption of constitutionality could be overcome by a showing
that the justification for the discriminatory classification was "illu-
315. Id. at 497-98 n.4.
316. Id. Justice Stevens did not explain to what the sex differences must be
"relevant." Presumably, he meant to the purpose of the legislation.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. (quoting Cox, Book Review, 94 HARv. L. REV. 700, 706 (1981)).
320. Id.
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sory or wholly inadequate."32 1 First, Justice Stevens rejected the
plurality's argument that teenage females had a "natural" deter-
rent and that applying the criminal sanction to males merely
equalized the situation. Not only was the risk of pregnancy a
"fanciful" deterrent,322 but that females were especially vulnera-
ble to the risk of pregnancy suggested that they needed coverage
rather than exemption under the statute.323 If pregnancy or an-
other special harm was suffered by one of the participants, that
would be a proper mitigating factor concerning punishment.324
Justice Stevens regarded a total exemption for the more endan-
gered class as "utterly irrational."325
Second, Justice Stevens found that the legislation incorporated
a presumption that the male was really "more guilty" than the fe-
male. He would find punishment of the "aggressor" acceptable if
the statute either provided for the punishment of the "aggressor,"
regardless of sex, or if the statute was directed at males but re-
quired proof that the male on trial actually was the "aggressor" or
at least "more responsible." 326 Justice Stevens reasoned that the
statute merely assumed that the male would always be the ag-
gressor. The state had proffered no evidence for such an assump-
tion. Thus, he concluded that the statute could have been based
only on "traditional attitudes toward male-female relationships"
and, as such, reflected nothing more than "an irrational
prejudice."32 7
Finally, Justice Stevens rejected the plurality's reasoning that a
sex-based statute was required because otherwise, females would
not report violations. If an "informant's exemption" was neces-
sary, then the statute could allow such an exemption in sex-neu-
tral terms. More importantly, Justice Stevens demanded that the
321. Id.
322. Id. at 498. Justice Stevens did not complete his analysis using the terms
with which he began. The conclusion of his opinion presents a scattered list of
reasons why the statute was unconstitutional. Presumably, the reasons demon-
strated that the apparent justification for the sex discrimination was actually Wu-
sory, but Justice Stevens did not organize these reasons into the new
conceptualization he proffered.
323. Id. at 499.
324. Id.
325. Justice Stevens asked: "Would a rational parent making rules for the con-
duct of twin children of opposite sex simultaneously forbid the son and authorize
the daughter to engage in conduct that is especially harmful to the daughter? That
is the effect of this statutory classification." Id.
326. Id. at 500.
327. Id.
Court view the totality of the enforcement issue. Even if there
would be some loss in enforcement by making the statute sex-
neutral, that loss would be outweighed by the "paramount inter-
est in even-handed enforcement of the law."328 Thus, Justice Ste-
vens concluded that the requirement that "the sovereign must
govern impartially" was more important than some loss in report-
ing by females.
The Court's decision in Michael M. was a severe retrenchment.
Until this decision, two aspects of sex discrimination law seemed
clear. These were that the Court would apply the Craig "interme-
diate" scrutiny to sex based classifications and that the Court
would judge a statute in terms of the legislature's actual intent,
rather than in terms of later purposes hypothesized at argument.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion, and the severe fragmentation re-
corded in five separate opinions retreated from each of these fun-
damental principles.
Justice Brennan's opinion thoroughly rebutted the plurality's
reluctance to endorse the Craig standard. Justice Brennan docu-
mented Justice Rehnquist's sleight-of-hand. Certainly if Craig is
to be overruled, at the very least it should be overruled openly.
Neither Justices Brennan nor Stevens, however, pointed out the
critical flaw in Justice Rehnquist's opinion. Justice Rehnquist
found that the means used by the California statute was "suffi-
ciently" related to the purpose, but he refused to say what stan-
dard of sufficiency was required. Thus, his opinion amounts to
the very raw display of judicial power for which he, in other cases,
has criticized his Brethren.329 In the final analysis, the California
statute involved in Michael M. was sufficiently related to its pur-
pose only because five Justices said it was.
Justice Rehnquist's Michael M. opinion did present a realistic
view of legislative intent. All legislation results from a mixture of
different motives; there is no such thing as one "primary" mo-
tive.3 30 But Justice Rehnquist did not carry his analysis far
enough. That there may be no "primary" motive should riot allow
the state to "create" hypothetical motives at argument in order to
defend a challenged statute. Yet both Justices Brennan and Ste-
vens documented that prevention of pregnancy was not even one
of the legislative purposes of the state.3 31
328. Id. at 502.
329. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (Justice
Rehnquist joined Justice White's dissent).
330. See note 184 supra and accompanying text; note 417 infra and accompany-
ing text.
331. As Justice Brennan stated, "[i]t was only in deciding Michael M. that the
California Supreme Court decided, for the first time in the 130-year history of the
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In Michael M., Justice Stevens attempted to focus on his con-
cept of equal protection analysis, but he still remained unable to
articulate a clear difference between his concept and the Craig
standard. He began an interesting discussion of the difference be-
tween a "level of scrutiny" analysis and a "burden" analysis.
That discussion, however, was consigned to a footnote, and it was
no sooner begun than it ended. More greviously, Justice Stevens
did explicitly apply the model he had just propounded.
Contrary to Justice Stevens' assertion, the "burden" the Court
imposes on the challenger of a sex-based statute is the same as
the level of scrutiny the Court applies. If the Court imposes
"strict" scrutiny, the burden on a challenger is minimal. If the
Court imposes "rational relationship" scrutiny, the burden on a
challenger is virtually insurmountable. The key area, of course,
lies somewhere in the middle.
In this middle area and as a result of Michael M., Justice Ste-
vens has now defined a new and more precise distinction. Until
Michael M., it was assumed that all sex discrimination received
the intermediate test. Justice Stevens had not previously quar-
reled with this proposition, although he suggested that the Craig
focus on levels of scrutiny was not the best way to define that in-
termediate standard. Justice Stevens has now refined his test
within the area of sex discrimination.
Usually, all legislation is considered to carry with it the pre-
sumption of constitutionality. The practical effect of strict scru-
tiny, however, ensures that racial classifications are, in effect,
presumptively unlawful. Justice Stevens has suggested that, for
sex classifications where physical sex differences are "obviously
irrelevant," such legislation should also be considered presump-
tively unconstitutional. If the statute's defenders can show an
"apparent connection" between physical sex differences, then the
legislation is accorded its normal presumption. That presumption
can then be overcome by a showing that the justification for the
classification is "illusory or wholly irrelevant."
The Craig standard applies a heavy burden to defenders of all
sex-based classifications. Justice Stevens would apply an even
heavier burden to sex-based classifications "obviously irrele-
vant"--but perhaps would apply a lighter burden to other sex-
statute, that pregnancy prevention had become one of the purposes of the stat-
ute." Id. at 495 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
based classifications, such as those showing an apparent connec-
tion between sex differences and the purposes of the statute. Jus-
tice Stevens' new test is at once creative and precise. The new
test is consistent with the Court's refusal to strike down all sex-
based classifications, but it refuses to extend any protection to
sex-based classifications not having an apparent relationship to
physical differences.
Justice Stevens' new test is not dramatically different from the
Craig test in terms of how the Craig test works. As noted earlier,
Justice Stevens' reasoning leads to the use of a "tiered" approach
quite similar to that specified in Craig. But Justice Stevens' new
test is dramatically different from the Craig test in terms of
where it is applied. All sex-based classifications, he reasons, are
not the same. The Court should now apply a tiered approach
within the area of sex-based classifications, he concluded. In do-
ing so, it may give less protection to some classifications and
more to others.
The problem with Justice Stevens' new test is that he did not
discuss any standards and criteria for its use. What is to deter-
mine whether a statute is "obviously irrelevant" or "apparently
connected" to sex differences? Moreover, Justice Stevens' opin-
ion in Michael M. is not internally consistent. Although he an-
nounced a new method of equal protection analysis, it is doubtful
that he actually applied that new method. He certainly did not
apply it clearly.
Justice Stevens' new formulation of equal protection analysis
may be the most important "breakthrough" in sex discrimination
analysis since Reed. Although not outlawing all sex-based classi-
fications, it might effectively outlaw all sex-based classifications
not specifically related to physical sex differences. This test may
bode favorably for many of the new sex discrimination chal-
lenges, because most issues now raised do not relate to specific
physical differences. On the other hand, Justice Stevens' new test
may allow the "rational relationship" test to be smuggled in. If so,
Justice Rehnquist stands ready to do that smuggling. Justice Ste-
vens, to avoid such a move backward, must now provide further
conceptual spadework. Justice Stevens' next steps are to articu-
late his new test more precisely, to explain how it differs from the
Craig test, and to apply it more clearly.
C. Laws and Policies Which Disadvantage Females
1. United Air Lines v. Evans
In his opinions regarding policies ostensibly benefiting women,
Justice Stevens consistently found for the plaintiff claiming dis-
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crimination. Although his reasoning in those cases was less than
clear, Justice Stevens seemed to be genuinely striving for a prin-
cipled method of deciding such cases. Writing for the majority in
United Air Lines v. Evans, 3 2 however, he found against the sex
discrimination challenger in what must be described as a superfi-
cial opinion. The Evans opinion has become very important in
lower court sex discrimination cases for its definition of the na-
ture of a "continuing" violation of Title VII. Nevertheless, the Ev-
ans opinion is ultimately unsound.
Justice Stevens faced a familiar problem area in Evans. In the
Seventh Circuit Sprogis case, he had dissented from the major-
ity's holding that the airlines' no-marriage rule for stewardesses
violated Title VII.33 On the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens was
faced with a slightly different challenge to the effects of that rule.
The Evans plaintiff had been forced to resign under the no-mar-
riage rule. She had been rehired four years later, but was denied
seniority for her prior service. She alleged that the airline's sen-
iority system constituted a "present" and a "continuing" violation
of Title VI.334
A strong tension exists between the policies underlying protec-
tion of seniority sytems and the policies underlying civil rights
legislation. 33 5 One attempt to mediate that tension in Title VII
was at issue in Evans. Section 703(h) of Title VII allows employ-
ers to establish different terms of employment based on seniority
systems provided that the systems are "bona fide" and that the
332. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
333. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J.
dissenting), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1972). See notes 14-23 supra and accompa-
nying text.
334. 431 U.S. at 557. The respondent argued that the seniority system created a
present discrimination against her as compared to males who were hired after her
termination but before her reinstatement because those males now had greater
seniority than she did. Second, she argued that the seniority system was a contin-
uing violation of Title VII because it perpetuated the effects of the no-marriage
rule discrimination. Id.
335. Seniority plans strengthen the right of an employee to keep a job and to
receive increasing preference and benefits based on increasing length of employ-
ment. Some of the policies behind civil rights legislation strengthen the right not
to lose protections against layoffs nor to receive less chance of promotions or addi-
tional benefits than persons hired under discriminatory practices. See generally
Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1962); Vaas, Title VII Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDus. & COM.
L. REV. 431 (1966); Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 230, at 250-65; Note, Title
VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L REV. 1260
(1967).
differences are "not the result of an intention to discriminate." 336
The Evans plaintiff had not challenged the "bona fide" nature of
United's seniority system. Thus, the issue was whether the sen-
iority system created a prohibited discrimination on the basis of
sex. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens found that the sys-
tem had not constituted such discrimination, either "present" or
''continuing."
Justice Stevens found that the United plan had not created a
"present" sex-based differential because, during the plaintiff's pe-
riod of non-employment, both males and females had been
hired.337 Additionally, Justice Stevens rejected the plaintiff's
charge of a "continuing" violation of Title VII. He found the sen-
iority system to be neutral for two reasons. It did not discrimi-
nate against female former employees; nor did it treat former
employees who were discharged for a discriminatory reason any
differently than former employees who were discharged, or who
resigned, for a non-discriminatory reason.338
If Justice Stevens' opinion in Evans was "reasoned," the rea-
soning was conclusory. Justice Stevens breezily rejected the ar-
gument that section 703(h) of Title VII only protected seniority
systems from attacks based on acts prior to the effective date of
Title VII in 1965.339 His rejection of this argument was effectively
rebutted by Justice Brennan in the dissent. Justice Brennan, in
Evans, relied on his joint concurring opinion with Justice Mar-
shall in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
336. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) provides, in relevant part: "[Ilt shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply... different terms...
of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ... provided that
such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race,
color, sex, or national origin."
Justice Stevens did not consider the Gilbert question of the extent to which a
showing of a violation of Title VII must be similar to a showing of a violation of
equal protection. He began consideration of whether the challenged application of
the seniority system was protected by Title VII by assuming, arguendo, that the
no-marriage rule itself was a violation of Title VII. He then found that neither of
the plaintiffs allegations amounted to a violation of Title VII. 431 U.S. at 557.
337. Id. Thus, although the plaintiff may have been denied employment be-
cause of sex discrimination, Justice Stevens refused to see the seniority differen-
tial as "sex based." Both males and females had acquired increased seniority
rights over the plaintiff; in addition, both male and female employees who re-
signed or were discharged prior to the plaintiff, but who were later rehired, also
had received no seniority credit for the previous service. Id.
338. Id. at 557-59. Justice Stevens disregarded the decision in Franks v. Bow-
man Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), which he characterized as holding that retro-
active seniority was an appropriate remedy to be awarded under Title VII after an
illegal act had been proved. He determined that Franks did not control in Evans
because Franks was a "remedy" case while Evans was a "violation" case.
339. 431 U.S. at 560.
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States,3 40 decided the same day as Evans. In Teamsters, Justice
Brennan had determined that both Franks v. Bowman Transpor-
tation Co.3 41 and the legislative history of section 703(h) limited
the immunity provided by section 703(h) to pre-Act discrimina-
tion.342 Justice Stevens' only response to this strong argument
was the mere assertion that such a reading of the statute was "too
narrow."
343
Justice Stevens' Evans opinion created numerous difficulties
for analysis. Teamsters and Evans, taken together, as Justice
Brennan correctly charged in Teamsters, "bootstrapped" the prop-
osition that section 703(h) protected seniority systems from at-
tacks alleging post-Act discrimination. Justice Stevens' reasoning
was circular. Evans relied either only on mere assertion or im-
pliedly on Teamsters; but Teamsters relied on Evans.344 While
340. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
341. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). See note 338 supra.
342. 431 U.S. at 381-84. In Teamsters, the major issue was whether § 703(h) pro-
vided immunity to pre-Act discrimination. A minor issue involving post-Act dis-
crimination was handled in a footnote which stated that Evans held that post-Act
discrimination came within § 703(h) protection. Id. at 348 n.30. Justice Brennan,
in Teamsters, attacked footnote 30 as "sheer bootstrapping," and stated that the
Evans Court only considered the issue of post-Act discrimination in a single para-
graph which was devoid of any analysis of legislative history and which was sim-
ply conclusory. Id. at 383-84.
In Franks, the Court held that "constructive seniority" was the correct remedy
for discrimination which had occurred prior to the effective date of the Civil
Rights Act. 424 U.S. at 761. In Teamsters, the majority distinguished Franks by
stating that the principle of retroactive seniority in Franks could apply to victims
of post-Act discrimination. 431 U.S. at 347. In Evans, Justice Stevens dist-
inguished Franks from Evans in that Franks was a remedy case while Evans was
a violation case. But Justice Stevens did not cite Franks for the proposition that
§ 703(h) covered post-Act discrimination; indeed, Justice Stevens cited no author-
ity for that proposition.
Moreover, Justice Stevens could not have cited Franks for the proposition that
§ 703(h) covered post-Act discrimination. Justice Brennan directly rebutted the
Teamsters finding that Franks interpreted § 703(h) to protect post-Act discrimina-
tion by quoting directly from Franks:
As we stated just last Term, "it is apparent that the thrust of (§ 703(h) ] is
directed toward defining what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory
practice in instances in which post-Act operation of a seniority system is
challenged as perpetuating the effects of discrimination occurring prior to
the effective date of the Act."
Id. at 384 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 761 (emphasis added
by Justice Brennan in Teamsters)). In his dissent in Evans, Justice Brennan in-
corporated by reference this portion of his concurring opinion in Teamsters. In
Teamsters, Justice Brennan also produced numerous legislative history materials
tending to show that § 703(h) was not intended to protect post-Act discrimination.
343. 431 U.S. at 560.
344. See 431 U.S. at 560, 561-62; 431 U.S. at 348 n.30, 383-84.
Justice Stevens dealt with precedent and legislative history, he
did so only long enough to ride roughshod over them.3 45 Then,
Justice Stevens did not examine the competing social policies or
equities involved in the case. This failure may become important
in subsequent cases as it may suggest rationales with which to
distinguish and avoid Evans.346 In addition, the Evans rejection
of "continuing violation" theories would henceforth place a very
high burden on sex discrimination challengers. 347
345. See Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 230, at 257-58.
All the legislative history, as well as the Court's decision in Franks, indi-
cates that section 703(h) was enacted to maintain only those seniority
rights existing in 1965, the effective date of Title VII. Moreover, it is diffm-
cult to imagine that Congress could have intended to protect any new sen-
iority expectations of incumbent workers which were "dependent on
whites benefiting from unlawful discrimination" after the Act.
Id. at 257 (quoting Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 384
(footnote omitted)).
Justice Stevens did not suggest any principles regarding the use of legislative
history. In Frontiero, the Court explicitly considered legislative history materials,
424 U.S. at 765 n.21; in Teamsters, the Court acknowledged that such materials ex-
isted but declined to give them "more than little, if any, weight," 431 U.S. at 345
n.39; and in Evans, Justice Stevens made no reference whatsoever to the volumi-
nous legislative history. See 431 U.S. at 384-90 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) for materials detailing legislative history prior to the passage
of the Civil Rights Act. See also id. at 390-94 for materials subsequent to passage of
the Act which referred specifically to § 703(h), but did not change it, and for cases
collected by Justice Marshall suggesting that relevant subsequent legislative his-
tory is entitled to "great weight."
As was noted in Cannon and Novotny, legislative history materials may be far
from conclusive, especially when adversaries on both sides can point to supportive
history. Justice Stevens, however, did not even discuss any problems of the Team-
sters-Franks-Evans legislative history. He merely ignored that history.
346. See Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 230, at 264-65. For example, it
might be argued that since United had abandoned its no-marriage rule, its interest
in repose should outweigh the plaintiff's attack on the seniority system. This anal-
ysis would not, however, apply to the question of appropriate remedies that Jus-
tice Stevens explicitly declined to reach. 431 U.S. at 558.
347. See Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 230, at 261-63, for a discussion of
"continuation theory" as compared with "perpetuation theory." Perpetuation the-
ory refers to challenges of actions not as discriminating per se but as perpetuating
the effects of a previous violation. Continuation theory refers to challenges alleg-
ing that the discriminatory act itself continues. Id.
Evans disallowed the perpetuation theory that "neutral" policies violated Title
VII by perpetuating the original injuries. 431 U.S. at 558. But the concept of neu-
trality is critical to the perpetuation analysis. If a plaintiff can show that the pol-
icy perpetuating the discriminatory effects is not perfectly neutral, Evans might
not stand as a bar. Supreme Court 1976 Term, supra note 230, at 262-63. It has
been suggested that the test for neutrality should be an examination of discrimi-
natory effects. To the extent that present practices have discriminatory effects be-
cause they perpetuate prior acts of the defendant, a stronger test of effect should
apply. To the extent that the practices perpetuate "pervasive historical patterns of
discrimination within society," an easier showing for the plaintiff should be al-
lowed. The student authors present three types of situations in which discrimina-
tory practice may have been terminated but in which a continuing violation might
nevertheless be found. They suggest that none of the types would be inconsistent
with the denial of relief in Evans: (1) major policy change with notice to previ-
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Finally, the reasoning in Evans seemed to be grounded only on
the logic of ipse dixit. The opinion was unpersuasive. Justice
Stevens made no reference to previous sex discrimination cases.
Nor did he even refer' to the Teamsters race discrimination case
decided the same day, presumably relied on by him, and specifi-
cally referred to by the dissent. It may very well be that the Ev-
ans sex discrimination claim was properly rejected, but Justice
Stevens did not write an opinion to support that conclusion.
2. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart
Justice Stevens' majority opinion in City of Los Angeles v. Man-
hart348 was an order of magnitude different from his conclusory
Evans opinion. In a bold and strongly reasoned opinion, Justice
Stevens helped the Court announce a more clearly articulated
principle of sex discrimination analysis. The opinion was not
revoluntionary; it seemed to adopt a "go slow" attitude on the
question of relief. It did, however, represent a major step forward
by the Court.
The Manhart case involved a Title VII challenge to an employee
pension plan in which females were required to contribute fifteen
percent more per month than males, although both sexes re-
ceived the same monthly benefit. The higher contribution was
based on actuarial statistics and the employer's experience that
women as a class lived longer than men and, therefore, would,
over time, receive fifteen per cent more in total benefits.349
Just as Evans had involved a clash between civil rights and pro-
tection of seniority rights, Manhart involved a unique clash be-
tween the competing social policies of anti-discrimination and
protection of pensions.350 The clash of these policies is of enor-
ously affected employees, (2) end of overt discriminatory policies but continuation
of companion policies, and (3) end of overt policies but no make-whole relief to
previous victims. Id.
348. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
349. Id. at 704-05.
350. Two of the policies behind the Civil Rights Act were to prevent employ-
ment decisions from being made on the basis of broad class stereotypes and to
prevent discrimination against individuals. In addition, one of the policies behind
employment law was that of "allowing relevant employment factors to be consid-
ered in differentiating among individuals." Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 553
F.2d 581, 586 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added).
But employers' decisions regarding pension and insurance plans cannot be
made on the basis of individuals but must be made on the basis of class character-
istics. See 435 U.S. at 726 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). See generally Bernstein &
mous importance. Fifty million people participate in retirement
plans other than social security; the assets held in trust for those
people were estimated to be over $500 billion by the end of 1978
and were increasing by approximately $50 billion per year.351
Justice Stevens squarely faced this new3 52 issue. First, he
found that the difference in payments to the pension fund did
amount to sex discrimination within the meaning of section
703(a) (1) of Title VII.353 He reasoned that Title VII prohibited de-
cisions based on stereotypes implying female inferiority.3 54 Of
course, in Manhart, the longevity generalization was true, at least
on the basis of total class statistics.35 5 Justice Stevens declared,
however, that it was equally true that on an individual basis the
longevity generalization did not and could not apply. Many wo-
men do not outlive the "average man" while many men do outlive
the "average woman." 356 Justice Stevens found that Title VII pro-
Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classifications in Pension Programs, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (1974); Note, Sex Discrimination and Sex-Based Mortality Ta-
bles, 53 B.U.L. REv. 624 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sex Discrimination and Mor-
tality Tables]; Note, Mortality Tables and the Sex-Stereotype Doctrine: Inherent
Discrimination in Pension Annuities, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw 323 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Mortality Tables and Sex Stereotypes].
351. 435 U.S. at 721 (citing AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, PENSION
FACTS 20-23 (1977)). For a thorough discussion of sex discrimination in insurance
plans, see Brilmayer, Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans:
A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 505 (1980).
352. See Note, Title VII-Employee Retirement Plans-Unequal Contribution
Requirements As Constituting Unlawful Discrimination on the Basis of Sex-Man-
hart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power, 11 Loy. L.A.L REv. 223, 225
n.19 (1977), which collected lower court cases indicating that the two policies of
forbidding stereotypes, but allowing individual decisions, had not conflicted before
because the general group characteristics challenged were capable of being mea-
sured on an individual basis.
353. 435 U.S. at 711. Since a female employee had to make a higher contribu-
tion, and the contributions were withheld from paychecks, a female employee took
home less pay than a male employee paid the same salary. Id. at 705. Compared
to a woman who had paid into the fund $18,171, a male earning the same salary
would have paid in $12,844. Id. at 705 n.5.
354. Id. at 707. Here and elsewhere in Manhart, Justice Stevens cited Sprogis,
the case in which he had dissented from the finding of sex discrimination. See
notes 13-20 supra and accompanying text. These citations suggest Justice Stevens
will accept the holding of a majority even where he strongly dissented from that
holding. This willingness to compromise was also evidenced in his Satty opinion,
see note 469 infra and accompanying text.
355. 435 U.S. at 708.
356. Id. See also Note, supra note 352, at 226 (quoting Henderson v. Oregon,
405 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Or. 1975) (challenging lower monthly retirement benefits to
women, although equal contribution rates)):
The great majority of men and women-84 per cent-share common death
ages. That is, for every woman who dies at 81 there is a corresponding
man who dies at 81. The remaining 16 per cent are women who live longer
than the majority and men who live shorter. As a result, each woman is
penalized because a few women live longer and each man benefits be-
cause a few men die earlier (footnote omitted).
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hibited not only the use of false generalizations, but also the use
of true generalizations, if they did not allow for individual
determinations.35 7
The second argument for the city was that the plan was actually
based on longevity and not on sex.3 5 8 Justice Stevens correctly
dismissed that argument as specious. Longevity, he stated, is
based on a number of factors. The plan distinguished only imper-
357. 435 U.S. at 708. Justice Stevens essentially used overinclusive analysis to
find that the application of the longevity generalization in the retirement plan pro-
vided no assurance that any individual woman would fit that generalization. The
facial examination of Title VII did not, however, dispose of the initial question of
whether the plan violated the statute. The question of fairness to males had to be
considered. Id. at 708-09. The supporters of the plan had argued that women, as a
class, would live longer and, therefore, receive more benefits. Since it was not pos-
sible to tell which women would live longer, it was necessary, they argued, to
charge the class higher premiums. To do otherwise, they argued, would be unfair
to males; equal payment would cause increased total payments by males in order
to subsidize the increased benefits used by females. Id.
Justice Stevens concluded, first, that the balancing regarding fairness had al-
ready been done. Congress had decided that classifications based on sex were un-
lawful, regardless of any resulting unfairness. Id. at 709. Moreover, he stated,
even if the statute were less clear and the Court had to be the primary determiner
of fairness, the basic policy of the statute required a focus on fairness to individu-
als and not groups. The legislation sought to reduce the allowance of classification
by classes because such classifications were based on and perpetuated negative
stereotypes. To examine the question of fairness to males, as a group, he con-
cluded, would be to fly in the face of the policy undergirding the statute. Id. at
709-10. Finally, Justice Stevens identified the basic flaw in the fairness-to-males
argument: "when insurance risks are grouped, the better risks always subsidize
the poorer risks." Id. at 710. Justice Stevens then concluded that for women to be
forced to make higher payments "simply because each of them is a woman, rather
than a man, is in direct conflict with both the language and the policy of the Act."
Id. at 711.
358. Id. at 711 n.22. The city argued the classification was based on a factor
"other than sex" within the meaning of the Bennett Amendment to Title VII and
was, therefore, protected by the Equal Pay Act. The Bennett Amendment, part of
§ 703(h), Title VII, provides in relevant part:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this Title for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount
of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such em-
ployer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section
6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) [Equal Pay Act].
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). The Equal Pay Act provides, in relevant part:
No employer.., shall discriminate.., between employees on the basis
of sex by paying wages ... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and re-
sponsibility ... except where such payment is made pursuant to ... a
differential based on any other factor other than sex.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963).
fectly between long and short-lived employees, but it distin-
guished precisely between males and females. 35 9 Justice Stevens
cited the Ninth Circuit's Manhart opinion: "[0]ne cannot say
that an actuarial distinction based entirely on sex is based on any
other factor other than sex. Sex is exactly what it is based on."360
Justice Stevens also rejected the third argument of the plan's
supporters that the plan was encapsulated by the protections
carved out in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.361 Gilbert had al-
lowed the exclusion of pregnancy benefits from disability policies
because its classifications, pregnant women and nonpregnant per-
sons, were found not to be sex-based. By contrast, the Manhart
plan, involving classifications of males and females, was specifi-
cally and expressly sex-based. 362
359. 435 U.S. at 711.
360. Id. at 713 (quoting Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 553 F.2d 581, 588 (9th
Cir. 1976)).
Justice Stevens gave little weight to legislative history materials indicating that,
during Senate debate on the Civil Rights Act, Senator Humphrey was of the opin-
ion that the Act would not cover differences in retirement plans. He did not, how-
ever, state that the Court should refuse to examine such materials.
A~tually, the Court will always look at legislative history materials. Only if the
outcome of the examination is inconsistent with the holding desired by the Court,
will the Court say that it should not consider the materials. See Justice
Peckham's opinion in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,
317 (1897), where he "looked at" congressional debates before deciding the Court
could not consider them. Justice Stevens ignored the legislative history of post-
Act amendments in Evans. See notes 345-47 supra and accompanying text.
Justice Stevens concluded that Senator Humprey's comment, isolated and made
on the floor during Senate debate, "cannot change the effect of the plain language
of the statute itself." 435 U.S. at 714. The same language by Senator Humphrey
had been approvingly cited in Gilbert by Justice Rehnquist. 429 U.S. at 144-45. See
also Note, supra note 352, at 231-32. Justice Stevens did not refer to the contradic-
tory treatments of the same language.
361. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
362. 435 U.S. at 715. Justice Stevens correctly stated the logic of the Court's
reasoning in Gilbert. Under his own reasoning, however, the Gilbert classifica-
tions were virtually all female and male respectively because they related to the
risk of pregnancy. This difference of opinion is not critical to Manhart because,
under either view, the city's plan was discriminatory. There are, however, other
arguments that Gilbert and Manhart are not consistent. See note 368 infra and ac-
companying text. Justice Stevens did not respond to those arguments.
In rejecting Gilbert as controlling, Justice Stevens also rejected an ingenuous
"effects" argument. In the process, he cleared up a question created by Gilbert.
In Gilbert,,the Court had noted that the district court had found that female em-
ployees, on an average, received more benefits from the disability program than
did male employees. 429 U.S. at 131 n.9. In its discussion of whether there had
been discriminatory intent, the Gilbert Court noted that benefit data tended to
show that the plan did not discriminate against women. Id. at 137-38. In Manhart,
the city apparently argued that since women received greater benefits, there was
no discriminatory effect, and, therefore, the plan did not violate Title VII. 435 U.S.
at 716. This argument was doomed, Justice Stevens found, because the Gilbert
Court did not reach the question of discriminatory effect until it had determined
that the exclusion there did not constitute discrimination per se. In Manhart,
however, there was discrimination per se. That finding could not be defeated by a
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Although concluding that the Los Angeles plan violated Title
VII, Justice Stevens attempted to defuse any suggestion that the
Court's reading of Title VII would "revolutionize" the insurance
industry.363 First, he allowed a wide escape route for employers.
Employers, he reasoned, need not increase their own contribu-
tions to pension plans; they could merely set aside equal contri-
butions and allow employees to secure their own money-purchase
plans.36 4 The problem with this escape route, however, is that it
could allow too much. The whole concept of pension plan invest-
ments based on pooled assets could be shattered by a system in
which employees could purchase only individual pension plans.
Second, Justice Stevens emphasized that Manhart did not
question the insurance practice of considering the class composi-
tion of a work force in determining cost estimates of a retirement
or death benefit plan.365 Justice Stevens decreased the sting of
the Manhart opinion in a third way, reversing the lower court's
award of retroactive relief to the plaintiff.366 He listed several rea-
sons for this reversal, emphasizing that pension administrators
may have believed that to require males to pay more might have
been illegal, and that major changes in the pension plan and in-
surance industries that could jeopardize the benefits of millions
of insured persons should not be made retroactively. 367
theory that there was no discriminatory effect. Id. In his discussion of this issue,
Justice Stevens emphasized that the Gilbert finding of no discriminatory effect
had not depended on the specific evidence submitted by General Electric to show
that women received more benefits than men. Rather, he said, that finding had
rested on the challenger's failure to prove either racial discrimination or discrimi-
natory effect. Id. at 716. Justice Stevens noted that this point was also made in
Satty. Id. at 716 n.29.
Justice Stevens also rejected an alternative argument that a prima facie showing
of discrimination per se could be rebutted by a demonstration of cost justification.
No such defense was available under Title VII, he stated. 435 U.S. at 716-17.
363. 435 U.S. at 717-18.
364. Id. For a discussion of the impact of Manhart on money purchase plans
and the broader economic ramifictions of Manhart, written after the circuit court
decision but before the Supreme Court decision, see Comment, Civil Rights-Title
VII Ban on Sex Discrimination Extended to Use of Sex-Segregated Mortality Ta-
bles for Determining Employee Contributions to Pension Plan-Manhart v. City of
Los Angeles, 12 SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 156, 172-77 (1978). Such plans, however, could
not avoid Title VII if they were "corporate shells." 435 U.S. at 718 n.33.
365. 435 U.S. at 718.
366. Id. at 723.
367. Id. at 719-23. Other reasons for the decision not to award retroactive relief
included: (1) the difficulty of amending a major pension plan "overnight," (2) con-
flicting wage and hour regulations, and (3) the district court did not display "equi-
table sensitivity" in its order. Id. at 718-20. The district court had ordered that
One doctrinal complexity in Manhart concerned Justice Ste-
vens' attempt to distinguish the Manhart pension plan from the
Gilbert disability plan. Pragmatically, he succeeded in this at-
tempt by garnering five other justices to agree that the pension
plan did violate Title VII. In terms of the legal principles with
which the two plans are viewed, however, some troubling aspects
remained. Justice Blackmun concurred separately in order to ex-
press the problems he saw in the attempt to reconcile Manhart
with Gilbert.368
plaintiffs receive the difference between what they paid and what males paid
rather than the difference between what they paid and what they would have paid,
had the payment rates been equalized. Id.
Justice Marshall, concurring, vigorously criticized all of Justice Stevens' reasons
for denial of retroactive relief. Justice Marshall reasoned that the city was put on
notice as to the possible Title VII violations. He disagreed with Justice Stevens'
approach regarding economic impact. Justice Stevens had agreed that the amount
of damages in Manhart would not threaten the program or the economy. Id. at 722
n.42. But Justice Stevens had voiced concern for the principle involved, fearing
"[a] regime of discretion that produce[d] different results for breaches of duty in
situations that cannot be differentiated in policy." Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)). Justice Marshall suggested that, if there
was no problem now, but merely fear of a future problem, the Court would have
"ample opportunity" to modify or reject retroactive relief if required. 435 U.S. at
732.
Finally, Justice Marshall reasoned that the "central" purpose of Title VII was to
make victims whole for previous injuries due to discrimination. Here, the plaintiff
had clearly suffered discrimination and had clearly been injured. Respondents
"actually earned the amount in question, but then had it taken from them in viola-
tion of Title VII." Id. at 733 (quoting Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 553 F.2d at
592). Thus, Justice Marshall would have affirmed the award of retroactive relief.
368. 435 U.S. at 723-25. Justice Blackmun began by noting some interesting
"line-ups." Justice Stewart wrote the Court's opinion in Aiello, joined the Court's
opinion in Gilbert, and joined the Court's opinion in Manhart. Justices White and
Powell joined Aielo, Gilbert and Manhart. Justice Stevens dissented in Gilbert
but wrote Manhart. Justice Marshall dissented in both Aiello and Gilbert but
joined most of Manhart. Justice Blackmun noted his own discomfort with Gilbert,
which caused him to concur separately there also. Id. at 723-24. In addition, Jus-
tice Rehnquist, who wrote Gilbert, dissented in Manhart, and the Chief Justice
joined Gilbert but dissented in Manhart. Justice Blackmun suggested that the ap-
parent agreement of Justices Stewart, White, and Powell, in joining Aiello, Gilbert,
and Manhart, should have been a sign that there was no tension between those
cases. Id. Instead, he stated, the votes of Justices Stevens and Marshall (and pre-
sumably those of Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger) indicated precisely
the opposite. Id. Justice Blackmun reasoned that a narrow view of distinguishing
Gilbert from Manhart because Gilbert permitted a class of nonpregnant persons,
which included males, was "just too easy," id. at 725, and he criticized Justice Ste-
vens for defending the very distinction he had criticized in Gilbert. Id. at 725.
Justice Blackmun suggested that the principles of Gilbert could require af-
firming the Manhart plan for several reasons. First, the pension plan was based
on life expectancy, a "nonstigmatizing" factor that happened to differentiate males
from females but was not measurable on an individual basis. Id. at 724. Second,
the plan was not arbitrary, irrational, or "discriminatory" because the difference in
life expectancies was an objective and well recognized method of computing rates
in retirement plans. Id. Third, the method of individual analysis used by Justice
Stevens should not apply in an insurance context. "[T]here is simply no way to
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Justice Blackmun found no principled way to square Gilbert
and Manhart. He concluded that Manhart limited Aiello and Gil-
bert. "I do not say that this is necessarily bad.... I feel, how-
ever, that we should meet the posture of the earlier cases head on
and not by thin rationalization that seeks to distinguish but fails
in its quest. '369
Justice Blackmun's criticism is logically founded. As a practical
matter, however, it may be that it is not realistic to expect the
Court to meet its Aiello and Gilbert decisions head-on and to
overturn those recent cases. But when Justice Stevens offered
his Brethren the opportunity to ease away from those cases in or-
der to increase the scope of protection against sex discrimination,
even if by "thin rationalizations," the Court was willing to follow
him.
The Manhart decision was notable in several respects. It dra-
matically indicated that Justice Stevens and the Court would re-
spond to the problems of sex stereotyping. As Justice Blackmun
implied, it would have been very easy for the Court to uphold the
Los Angeles plan on the grounds that it was not discriminatory on
the basis of sex but merely classification on the basis of longevity.
Indeed, as Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger rea-
soned,3 70 the life insurance and pension plan industries have al-
ways used sex-based mortality tables.3 71 However, Justice
Stevens recognized the critical weakness of that argument; the
particular stereotype had become so ingrained that it was no
longer recognized as a negative stereotype. Thus, in Manhart the
determine in advance when a particular employee will die." Id. Justice Black-
mun's final point was, perhaps, the most telling. To be sure, he stated, "[a] pro-
gram such as the one challenged here does exacerbate gender consciousness. But
the program under consideration in [Gilbert] did exactly the same thing and yet
was upheld against challenge." Id. at 725.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 725-28 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
371. See, e.g., id. at 709-10. "Separate mortality tables are easily interpreted as
reflecting innate differences between the sexes; but a significant part of the lon-
gevity differential may be explained by the social fact that men are heavier smok-
ers than women." Id. (quoting R. RETHERFORD, THE CHANGING SEX DIFFERENTIAL
IN MORTALrrY 71-82 (1975)). Justice Stevens also remarked that "other social
causes, such as drinking or eating habits-perhaps even the lingering effects of
past employment discrimination-may also affect the mortality differential." Id. at
709 n.17.
Perhaps Manhart will stimulate the use of unisex actuarial tables by insurance
and pension plan companies. For discussion of such tables and nonsex actuarial
factors which can be used for risk classification, see the authorities collected in
Comment, supra note 364, at 176-77.
Court took a forceful step, toward recognizing and striking down
one aspect of the use of sex stereotypes in insurance and pension
plans.
As Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger disapprovingly
recognized, Manhart cut away from the formalistic and restrictive
approach of Gilbert and Aiello. The decision appeared to imply
that the Court would place more importance on sex discrimina-
tion claims involving broad-based policy decisions which were
heretofore considered "givens" not subject to challenge. It must
be remembered, however, that Aiello and Gilbert involved preg-
nancy while Manhart did not. Thus, Manhart did not imply that
the Court was reconsidering its narrow approach providing little
protection from disparate treatment based on or related to
pregnancy.
Justice Stevens' opinion in Manhart was clearly reasoned and
articulated. It was a bold decision which was made in the face of
what must have been fierce resistance from the insurance and
pension lobbies.3 72 To be sure, Justice Blackmun correctly identi-
fied the inconsistencies between Gilbert and Manhart. He missed
the mark, however, in chiding Justice Stevens for that inconsis-
tency. Justice Stevens demonstrated creativity and precision in
allowing the Court to distinguish Gilbert and thereby move away
from its restrictive approach.
Although Justice Stevens moved the Court forward, he was un-
willing to do so quickly. Despite persuasive reasons set forth by
Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens refused to order retroactive re-
lief. Moreover, he left open the possibility of individual payments
by employers, a step which could seriously reduce pension plan
benefits for all employees.
Perhaps these aspects of Manhart are best understood in terms
of pragmatic political reasons. Justice Stevens wrote this opinion
at a time when the viability of the Social Security system was in
serious dispute. He was concerned about both the stability of a
vast insurance and pension plan industry and also the fate of over
fifty million Americans who were depending on the plans estab-
lished by that industry. An order of retroactive relief, he con-
cluded, might encourage more challenges to pension plans, which
could result in staggering losses. With regard to his suggestion
372. But the precise decision in Manhart may have been relatively easy. While
the Manhart action was pending in the lower courts, the City of Los Angeles, De-
partment of Water and Power, in response to a new law enacted by the California
Legislature (CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 7500 (West Supp. 1978)) modified its pension plan
in January, 1975. The new plan made no distinction in either contributions or ben-
efits on the basis of sex. Thus, the Court acted with clear knowledge of legislative
disapproval of the challenged plan.
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that employers could make individual payments to employees,
perhaps Justice Stevens was merely stating what appeared to be
a logical rather than a practical alternative. Justice Stevens did
not discuss the details of such a plan and may not have been seri-
ously proposing it. If he had carefully considered the idea and
was suggesting that it would be allowable, however, then his ap-
proach would amount to a serious retrenchment from the basic
focus of Manhart. Truly, this exception could swallow the Man-
hart rule.
Finally, Justice Stevens' Manhart opinion vividly represents his
shift regarding the proper judicial attitude toward negative ste-
reotypes. In his Seventh Circuit dissent in Sprogis,3 7 3 he had
concluded that courts should not utilize a concept of irrational
stereotypes because of the difficulty in developing judicially man-
ageable standards. Manhart represents his new conviction that
practices which perpetuate sex-based stereotypes are always in-
valid when they overtly differentiate between the sexes. Just as
certain social stereotypes, even if true, may not be the basis for
racially discriminatory practices, Justice Stevens and the Court
have now declared that sexual stereotypes, even if true, may not
be the basis for sexually discriminatory practices. 374
373. 444 F.2d at 1205-06. See notes 14-23 supra and accompanying text.
374. See Taub, supra note 54, at 408 & n.287. The essential difference between
sex and race discrimination is that "in no other kind of discrimination other than
that based on sex ... can the group that is alleged to be the beneficiary of such
discrimination be so accurately described also as its direct victim." Kanowitz,
supra note 52, at 1395. Professor Kanowitz also argues that Justice Stevens con-
cluded in Manhart that there is a direct sex based discrimination against males in
the workplace that results in their lower life expectancy. Id. at 1395-96.
At least one insurance company has concluded that Justice Stevens' strong lan-
guage is mere dicta. Aetna Life and Casualty has placed full-page advertisements
in the Wall Street Journal and other national media proclaiming "Our Case for
Sex Discrimination." See, e.g., Wall St. J., (Midwest ed.) July 1, 1981, at 8. The ads
defend Aetna's practice of differential life insurance payments and benefits based
on sex.
At first glance, the Aetna ad seems to fly directly in the face of the Manhart de-
cision. Aetna, however, argues that the no-sex-differential requirement of Man-
hart does not apply to insurance companies:
Manhart involved a very narrow set of facts. There was no independent
insurance company involved in the determination of plan benefits or fund-
ing requirements. It was completely administered by the employer itself.
The employer required all employees to contribute toward their future
pension benefits. Based on the fact that it cost the employer more to pro-
vide a life annuity to female employees, it required females to contribute
notably more to the plan than males.
The Supreme Court found that this practice by the employer violated
[Title VII and the Equal Pay Act]. It did not rule on the issue of whether
3. Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney
In his next opinion in the area of policies discriminating against
women, Justice Stevens did not face a strong social policy issue,
but wrote on an important matter of judicial process. In a short
dissent from the grant of certiorari in Board of Trustees of Keene
State College v. Sweeney,375 Justice Stevens emphasized his con-
cern for setting clear standards for lower courts. Describing cir-
cuit judges as "struggling desperately to keep afloat in the flood of
federal litigation," 376 he concluded that the Court should look at
the results of lower court action and forgive somewhat inconsis-
tent language.
The problem in Sweeney was of the Court's own making. Swee-
ney was an employment discrimination case under Title VII. The
Court had allocated the burden of proof for a Title VII case in Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.377 Under the Green test, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 78
The burden then shifts back to the employer to "articulate" a le-
gitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.37 9 Finally, if the
employer is able to articulate such a reason, the plaintiff must
unequal benefits would similarly be violative of the law. It further specifi-
cally pointed out that its ruling was not intended to affect the insurance
industry.
Letter from John D. Hatch, Counsel, Law Department, Aetna Life & Casualty Com-
panies, Hartford, Connecticut, September 9, 1981.
Aetna may be relying on distinctions without a difference. In declining to order
retroactive relief, Justice Stevens emphasized that the Manhart decision would
not affect pension and insurance plans already written. But the strong language of
Manhart condemning sex classifications cannot logically be limited only to pen-
sion plans written by entities other than insurance companies. If pension plans
which discriminate violate the law, insurance plans which discriminate must also
violate the law. Second, providing unequal benefits for similar rates necessarily
involves the same discrimination as the condemned Manhart practice of charging
unequal rates for similar benefits.
The thorniest argument in favor of the sex discrimination practiced by Aetna
and other insurance companies is that Manhart only applies to employers because
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act only apply to employers. This argument is. cor-
rect, as far as it goes. But, if a high percentage of pension plans are required or
sponsored by employers, those plans are indeed covered by Manhart.
In any event, the Aetna ads certainly throw down the gauntlet to proponents of
sexual equality. The Aetna ads must inflame feminists just as ads entitled, "Our
Case for Race Discrimination" would have inflamed blacks, had such ads appeared
after the Brown decision. Assuming the gauntlet wili be quickly picked up, the le-
gal fate of, and consumer reaction to Aetna's campaign flaunting sex discrimina-
tion will be interesting to follow.
375. 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
376. Id. at 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
377. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Although Green involved a Title VII action challenging
a refusal to hire, its principles have also been applied to discharge cases. See, e.g.,
Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1281 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977).
378. 411 U.S. at 802.
379. Id.
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then have a fair opportunity to show that the employer's stated
reason is merely a pretext for invidious discrimination. 80
The issue for lower courts, as might be imagined, was the ques-
tion of precisely what was required of an employer in "articulat-
ing" a nondiscriminatory reason. Could an employer merely state
a reason? Or must it meet some burden to "prove" a reason? In
Sweeney, the court of appeals had made inconsistent statements.
The court had stated that, after a plaintiff proves a prima facie
case of discrimination "[tihe burden then shifts to the defendant
to rebut the prima facie case by showing that a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason accounted for its actions."3 81 The circuit
court, however, had also said in referring to Green, that "in re-
quiring the defendant to prove absence of discriminatory motive,
the Supreme Court placed the burden squarely on the party with
the greater access to such evidence."382 The Supreme Court em-
phasized that there was a "significant difference" between "artic-
ulating" a nondiscriminatory reason and "proving" absence of
discriminatory motive.383 The Court stated that it had recently
held, in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters,3 84 that mere "articula-
tion" was sufficient. Thus, the Court remanded the Sweeney case
for reconsideration in light of the Furnco standard.
The problem with the Furnco opinion, as Justice Stevens
pointed out in his dissent, was that it actually added to the confu-
sion by using the words "prove" and "articulate" interchangea-
bly.385 Justice Stevens emphasized that the Sweeney court of
appeals had, despite its inconsistent language, used the correct
standard under both Green and Furnco; the burden of persuasion
380. Id. at 804.
381. Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 177 (1st
Cir. 1978).
382. Id.
383. 439 U.S. at 25.
384. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
385. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated:
When the prima facie case is understood in light of the opinion in
[Green], it is apparent that the burden which shifts to the employer is
merely that of proving that he based his employment decision on a legiti-
mate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race .... To dis-
pel the adverse inference from a prima facie showing under [Green ], the
employer need only "articulate some legitimate, non-discriminating rea-
son for the employee's rejection."
438 U.S. at 577-78 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 577) (em-
phasis added).
of discrimination remained at all times with the plaintiff.386 Jus-
tice Stevens implied that the circuit court may have used the in-
consistent language precisely because the Supreme Court had
done so; the circuit court's opinion virtually parroted the
Supreme Court's statements in Green and Furnco.387
Although Sweeney is not a major sex discrimination case, Jus-
tice Stevens' opinion emphasizes his concern for the Court's pro-
vision of clear guidelines to the lower courts. If the Court could
not avoid apparently inconsistent language, he maintained, it
should hardly criticize lower courts for valiantly attempting to fol-
low its conflicting signals. Justice Stevens correctly criticized
Furnco. The Furnco decision had merely added to the semantic
problem.
Recently, in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine,388 the Court seemed to acknowledge that Justice Stevens'
opinion in Sweeney was correct.38 9 Although initially referring to
the Green language, the Burdine Court attempted to clearly set
forth the proper standard in language which avoided the terms
"prove" and "articulate" but which referred instead to the parties'
respective burdens of production and persuasion. The Court em-
phasized that the ultimate burden of persuasion that the defend-
ant intentionally discriminated remains with the plaintiff at all
times. 390 While the plaintiff must "establish" a prima facie
case,391 the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the infer-
ence of discrimination created by the plaintiff's prima facie case.
To accomplish this, the defendant need not "persuade" the court
that it was actually motivated by discriminatory reasons. It must
merely "raise a genuine issue of fact" by "clearly set[ting] forth"
the reason for the employer's action. 392 If the defendant meets
this burden of production, the plaintiff retains the burden of per-
suasion. The plaintiff must be given an opportunity to demon-
strate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the
employment decision.3 93 Thus, the Burdine Court reafffirmed
Justice Stevens' opinion in Sweeney that an employer satisfies its
burden if it "simply 'explains what [it] has done' or 'produc[es]
evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.' "394
386. 439 U.S. at 29.
387. Id. at 27 & n.1.
388. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
389. Id. at 253.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 254-55.
393. Id. at 256.
394. Id. (quoting Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S.
at 25 n.2); id. at 28-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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4. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney
In Sweeney, Justice Stevens' dissent emphasized the need to
send clear guidelines to lower courts. In his next case concerning
discrimination against women, Personnel Administrator of Massa-
chusetts v. Feeney,395 Justice Stevens wrote a separate one para-
graph opinion emphasizing that to be actionable, sex dis-
crimination must penalize females and benefit virtually all males.
Justice Stevens' opinion, however, did not establish clear guide-
lines of his views of sex discrimination because it seemed incon-
sistent with his other more fully developed statements regarding
the requirements for a finding of sex discrimination.
In Feeney, the Court upheld a state civil service scheme con-
taining a lifetime absolute preference for veterans against an
equal protection attack claiming that the preference discrimi-
nated against women. Even though ninety-eight percent of the
veterans in Massachusetts were male,396 the Court held that the
creation of two classes, veterans and non-veterans, did not dis-
criminate on the basis of sex. Therefore, the Craig standard of
"intermediate scrutiny" need not be used. Under the "rational re-
lationship" standard, the statute easily passed constitutional mus-
ter. Stating that the equal protection clause was merely the
guarantor of "equal laws, not equal results," 397 Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, held that a law would be discriminatory
only if it were based upon sex, overtly or covertly, or if the ad-
verse effects reflected "invidious gender-based discrimination."398
In Craig, the Court had held that sex based classifications must
be reviewed by the intermediate standard.399 Craig had involved
overt sex discrimination on the face of the statute. Unlike Craig,
Feeney involved a statute that was not overtly sex based; all vet-
erans, both the ninety-eight percent male and the two percent fe-
male, were given the absolute preference. The real question
before the Court was whether it would apply the Craig standard
to such a "neutral" law.
395. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
396. Id. at 270.
397. Id. at 273.
398. Id. at 274. As Justice Stevens pointed out, the majority's two questions,
creating three classifications, really amounted to one question. Id. at 281 (Stevens,
J., concurring). If the statute was racially neutral, did it reflect covert, invidious
discrimination?
399. See notes 228-52 supra and accompanying text.
The Court gave a mixed answer. It said it would apply the
Craig standard if the alternative categories of "covert" sex dis-
crimination or "invidious" sex discrimination could be met. But it
set an extremely high standard for meeting these categories. The
Court said that discriminatory impact could signal covert discrim-
ination but held that such impact must show a disadvantage to
virtually all of the female class and a benefit to virtually all of the
male class. The statute did not benefit virtually all men since sig-
nificant members of nonveterans were men.
The Court then discussed whether the plaintiffs could prove
discriminatory intent by showing discriminatory effect.400 The
plaintiffs had argued that the adverse effect of the absolute vet-
eran's preference on women would be to freeze them out of state
jobs sought by men, and that this effect demonstrated intent be-
cause it was the natural and foreseeable consequence of the legis-
lature's action. In two earlier cases, Washington v. Davis40' and
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corpora-
tion,402 the Court had emphasized that equal protection plaintiffs
must show more than disproportionate results; they must show
discriminatory intent. But the Court had also emphasized that in-
tent could be inferred from the "totality of the relevant facts." 403
Indeed, Justice Stevens wrote separately in Davis to emphasize
that plaintiffs could properly use a foreseeability theory of intent.
He stated that, "the actor is presumed to have intended the natu-
ral consequences of his deeds," particularly with regard to gov-
ernment action "which is frequently the product of compromise,
of collective decision making, and of mixed motivation."404 The
Court subsequently approved Justice Stevens' remarks in Arling-
ton Heights .405
400. The Court seemed to equate discriminatory "intent," "purpose," and "mo-
tive." See Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assess-
ment After Feeney, 79 COLuM. L. REV. 1376, 1379 n.23 (1979).
401. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
402. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
403. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. See also Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 265-69. See generally Note, supra note 400, at
1379-81.
404. 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens prefaced the
quoted language by stating, "[f]requently the most probative evidence of intent
will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describ-
ing the subjective state of mind of the actor." Id.
405. The Court stated:
Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action
rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said
that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate
made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a par-
ticular purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one.
429 U.S. at 265 (footnote omitted).
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Thus, it would have seemed that the plaintiff's showing that the
effect of the Massachusetts statute would be to exclude women
from most nonclerical civil service jobs should have been strong
evidence of discriminatory intent. But the Feeney Court sharply
limited the use of the foreseeability test to show intent. Justice
Stewart reasoned that it was not proper to infer discriminatory in-
tent from foreseeability, because to have discriminatory intent a
legislature must act "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of' [a
law's] adverse effects upon an identifiable group."406 There was
no proof of any discriminatory intent, Justice Stewart concluded,
because there was no proof that the legislature adopted the vet-
eran's preference scheme because it would keep women in the
lower echelons of the civil service.407 Thus, since the law was
neutral on its face, and since there was no proof of discriminatory
intent such that the law was covertly or invidiously sex-based, the
law was found not to be sex-based.
Justice Marshall vigorously dissented. He attacked Justice
Stewart's conclusion that the creation of an absolute preference
for veterans, known to be overwhelmingly male, was not covertly
or invidiously "based on" sex. He noted that the Court had
clearly authorized judicial examination of objective factors, in-
cluding foreseeability, to determine whether an illicit considera-
tion, such as sex, was involved. 40 8 More importantly, he
emphasized that the Court had held that the illicit consideration
did not have to be the primary motivation, but merely "a" moti-
vating factor.4 09 Looking to the foreseeable consequences of the
Massachusetts statute, Justice Marshall found the evidence over-
whelming that the legislature must have known that the effect of
the statute would be to freeze women in lower echelon clerical
positions.4 10 Given this overwhelming evidence of the perpetua-
tion of a negative stereotype, he concluded that the burden
should shift to the state to show that the statute was not sex-
based, especially since there were many less discriminatory alter-
natives available to the legislature to provide a preference for
veterans.411
406. 442 U.S. at 279.
407. Id.
408. 442 U.S. at 282-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
409. Id. (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
at 265-66).
410. Id. at 284-85.
411. Id. at 284-86. Justice Marshall suggested that the majority was "myopic"
Justice Marshall concluded that, if examined under the Craig
intermediate scrutiny test, the Feeney statute would not pass con-
stitutional muster. Although the purposes advanced for the stat-
ute were "legitimate," and perhaps important,412 there was not a
substantial relationship between the means and the purposes. 413
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stated that be-
cause the number of males disadvantaged by the law (1.9 million)
was sufficiently close to the number of disadvantaged females (3.0
million), there was no sex discrimination. 41 4 Given the numerous
problems presented by the Feeney decision, Justice Stevens' con-
currence seems unusual. Even more unusual is the superficial
nature of his concurrence. Aside from correctly observing that
the majority's distinction of covert discrimination versus invidi-
ous discrimination was clumsy,415 his one paragraph added noth-
ing that was not covered by Justice Stewart. His opinion is
remarkable for what it did not say.
Earlier, Justice Stevens had written separately in Davis in or-
der to emphasize that discriminatory intent could properly be in-
ferred from a foreseeability test.416 In Feeney, the majority
downplayed the use of foreseeability in the face of the dissent's
strenuous assertion that a foreseeability test should be used.
Thus, even if Justice Stevens had been persuaded by the major-
ity, it was necessary for him to explain his views.
Similarly, Justice Stevens had earlier insisted that there was no
such thing as "one" legislative intent.417 This concept was a fight-
for rejecting the stereotype argument because nothing in the record showed that
stereotyping was a specific goal of the legislature. Id. He came very close to es-
pousing the position advanced by Taub, see note 54 supra, that stereotyping per se
should constitute illegal sex discrimination.
412. Justice Marshall did not address this question.
413. The state advanced three purposes. Justice Marshall found the first, facili-
tating veterans' transition to civilian status, plainly overinclusive because a sub-
stantial number of the veterans receiving the benefits of the statute were not
recently discharged and did not need adjustment assistance. 442 U.S. at 286-87.
Justice Marshall doubted that the second purpose advanced, encouraging military
enlistment, was an actual purpose and, even if it was, found it also overinclusive.
Id. at 287. Justice Marshall declared that the third purpose, rewarding veterans,
was not sufficient to outweigh the discrimination because the legislature could
have used less discriminatory alternatives. Id. at 287-88.
414. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
415. See note 398 supra.
416. See note 404 supra and accompanying text. See also Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 421 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding of discrimi-
natory intent in certain cases depends on objective evidence of "effects" rather
than subjective motivation of the decision makers).
417. See note 184 supra and accompanying text. Justice Stevens had also
quoted approvingly from McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973), as fol-
lows: "Mhe search for legislative purpose is often elusive enough, Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), without a requirement that primacy be ascertained.
Legislation is frequently multipurposed: the removal of even a 'subordinate' pur-
[Vol. 9: 315, 1982] Changed Perspective
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ing issue in Sweeney. The majority held that discriminatory in-
tent did not make a statute "sex-based" unless it was "the" intent
under a "but for" test; but for the discriminatory intent, the legis-
lature would not have passed the statute.4 18 Given his past opin-
ions, Judge Stevens would have been expected to agree with the
dissent that a legislature has numerous "intents" when it passes a
bill, and that so long as one of those "intents" is discriminatory,
the measure is "sex-based." Perhaps Justice Stevens had devel-
oped reasons to join the majority; he failed, however, to articulate
those reasons. Moreover, the "but for" test advanced by the ma-
jority has little support in prior case law, and it indicates a very
narrow view of discriminatory purpose.419 This narrow view
seems inconsistent with the Court's and Justice Stevens' prior in-
sistence that invidious discrimination is likely to stem, not from a
desire to harm women, but rather from "romantic paternalism."42 0
In past years, the Court had emphasized that it would invalidate
legislation which facially discriminated against women.42 1 In Fee-
ney, though, where the statute appeared facially neutral, the
Court virtually ignored the possibility that the statute was con-
taminated by negative stereotyping.
The Feeney decision also seemed inconsistent with Justice
Powell's prevailing opinion in Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke.422 In Bakke, Justice Powell implied that race could
be used as a "plus," but that it could not be used as an absolute
dispositive factor.423 In Feeney, however, the Court rejected the
dissent's argument that, while some preference for veterans could
be allowed, an absolute preference went too far. Although it has
been clear since Frontiero that sex discrimination is not accorded
the same constitutional solicitude as race discrimination, there
seems to be no principled basis for allowing an absolute prefer-
ence in the former area but not the latter.424
The majority's response to these criticisms was to reiterate that
Feeney did not involve "sex" discrimination; it merely involved
pose may shift altogether the consensus of legislative judgment supporting the
statute." 429 U.S. at 265 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring).
418. See note 375-93 supra and accompanying text.
419. See Note, supra note 400, at 1397-98.
420. See Powers, supra note 9, at 1283-86.
421. Id. at 1290-92.
422. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
423. Id. at 317.
424. Cf. The Supreme Court 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L REV. 60, 137-38 (1979).
"veteran" discrimination. The reasoning justifying this classifica-
tion is remarkably similar to the Aiello Court's reasoning that
differentiating on the basis of pregnancy was not "sex" discrimi-
nation but merely a classification of pregnant women versus non-
pregnant persons. 425 In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,426 Justice
Stevens pointed out the fallacy of the Aiello reasoning. In Gil-
bert, he rejected the formalistic reasoning similar to that in his
Sprogis dissent. Nevertheless, in Feeney, Justice Stevens either
failed to see or discounted the problem with the formalistic rea-
soning of the majority. The problem with the majority's reasoning
was that although the preference did disadvantage many males,
that fact did not contradict the inference that the legislature
seemed to have intended both: (a) to keep the nonclerical civil
service positions virtually all male, and (b) to disadvantage virtu-
ally all female applicants.427
The Feeney situation poses a tough problem. On one hand, it is
unquestioned that a state should be allowed to reward military
service. On the other hand, it is equally unquestioned that an ab-
solute veteran's preference on hiring for government jobs will
have the effect of severely penalizing females for many years.
The majority concluded that, since the discrimination was not
overt, and since the statute was not passed specifically to harm
women, the question should be reviewed only in the legislative
arena. 428 That answer seems too easy for such a difficult problem.
Perhaps the Feeney scheme should not have been invalidated
because there was not a strong enough showing of discriminatory
intent. After all, it has been hornbook law since Fletcher v.
Peck429 that the presence of one improper motive will not neces-
sarily invalidate a statute if there are also proper motives for the
statute. As Justice Stevens stated in Davis, "[a] law conscripting
clerics should not be invalidated because an atheist voted for
it."'430 Even if the statute could be upheld, it seems unsatisfactory
to allow it to evade serious scrutiny. Rather than writing a princi-
pled opinion, using impact as a factor to discover intent, the ma-
jority wrote a conclusory opinion, reasoning backwards from its
conclusion that there was no discriminatory intent.431 The lan-
guage of the opinion was muddled the analysis lacked rigor.
425. See notes 127-29 supra and accompanying text.
426. 426 U.S. 125, 161 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
427. See Note, Personnel Administrator v. Feeney: A Policy Decision, 34 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 343, 352 (1980).
428. 442 U.S. at 280-81.
429. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
430. 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
431. See Note, supra note 427, at 354.
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Perhaps a hidden issue in Feeney was a concern that the inter-
mediate level of scrutiny had "gone too far", that it had become
too close to "strict scrutiny."432 If so, that issue should have been
squarely addressed. Justice Stevens, moreover, should have been
the one to address it. Whether he stood by his concurrence or
whether he reconsidered and changed his views, Justice Stevens
could have forced a much more thorough and significant opinion.
For unknown reasons, he failed to do so. A more extensive analy-
sis of "discriminatory intent" was needed, rather than the intro-
duction of new terms and confusing models.433 Feeney was
precisely the type of case where the Court should have more
clearly explained its decision, as Justice Stevens demanded in
Craig .434
In summarizing the area of laws and policies alleged to discrim-
inate against women, Justice Stevens' opinions are mixed. In Ev-
ans he wrote a conclusory opinion that begged the major
questions in issue. In Manhart, however, he wrote a thorough
opinion which, although bold and strong, was pragmatically tem-
pered. Sweeney demonstrated Justice Stevens' concern for send-
ing clear guidelines to lower courts and his emphasis upon the
overall analysis of a lower court opinion, rather than on seizing
some semantic inconsistencies. As for Feeney, nothing can be
said of Justice Stevens' opinion except that it had nothing to say,
when something to say was desperately needed.
D. Laws and Policies Regarding Pregnancy
1. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
Part of the reason that Justice Stevens' brief but vapid concur-
rence in Feeney seemed surprising, was that it seemed inconsis-
tent with his brief but incisive dissent in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert.43 5 In Gilbert, decided shortly after he had been elevated
to the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens clearly rejected formalistic
reasoning of the kind evinced in his Seventh Circuit Sprogis dis-
sent. In Sprogis, he had reasoned that unequal treatment of
stewardesses, as compared to stewards, was not sex discrimina-
432. Cf. Supreme Court Review, 7 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 315, 444-45 (1980);
Supreme Court, 1978 Term, supra note 424, at 140-41.
433. See Note, supra note 400, at 1391.
434. See note 240 supra and accompanying text.
435. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
tion. His reasoning was based on the mere difference in job ti-
tles.43 6 The Gilbert majority extended the formalistic logic of
Aiello,437 which held that discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy was not discrimination on the basis of sex. Dissenting in
Gilbert, Justice Stevens briefly but precisely identified and dis-
sected the major flaw in the majority's analysis.
In Gilbert, the Court confronted a Title VII challenge to a pri-
vate employer's disability benefits plan which excluded coverage
for pregnancy. The question before the Court was whether
Aiello, which had upheld a similar state plan against an equal
protection challenge, 438 should be extended to cover this statutory
challenge. I I
The first and critical question was whether the showing needed
to establish sex discrimination under Title VII was the same as
the showing required under an equal protection challenge. If the
standard was the same, Aiello would control, and the sex discrim-
ination challenger would lose. If the standard was lower, the chal-
lenger might then be able to show a violation. Justice Rehnquist
began the majority analysis by noting that Congress had not de-
fined the term "discrimination." He suggested, without citing pre-
cedent, that the Court's decision interpreting the equal protection
concepts would serve as a "useful starting point"439 in interpret-
ing the standard44o to be applied. Since the challenged plan in
Gilbert was strikingly similar to the Aiello plan,"l he concluded
that the Aiello analysis should be used. Thus, exclusion of preg-
nancy from a disability benefits package was held not to be sex
discrimination per se because of the lack of identity between the
affected group and sex; the exclusion was held to merely create
two groups, pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.442
Justice Rehnquist bootstrapped the critical issue. He never de-
parted from Aiello, the alleged "starting point." The precise ques-
tion requiring resolution was whether equal protection analysis
should be used in construction of the statute. To begin the argu-
ment with the proposition that equal protection analysis should
436. See notes 14-20 supra and accompanying text.
437. See notes 124-32 supra and accompanying text.
438. See notes 123-33 supra and accompanying text.
439. 429 U.S. at 133.
440. Section 703(a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act provides in relevant part that it
shall be unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1) (1964).
441. 429 U.S. at 133-34.
442. Id. at 135 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20).
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be so used was to beg that question. Justice Rehnquist never ex-
plained why Aiello became controlling.
Although the General Electric plan was found not discrimina-
tory per se, there were two other tests under which it could have
been found to be discriminatory: if it was a "mere pretext" for in-
vidious discrimination against women or if it had a discriminatory
effect, even though facially neutral." 3 Justice Rehnquist found
that the exclusion was not a mere pretext for invidious discrimi-
nation because, even though pregnancy is limited to women, it
differs in other respects from disabilities typically covered by
such plans. First, it is not a disease. Second, pregnancy is "often
a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition."44 4 Next, :Justice
Rehnquist found that the plan did not have discriminatory effects
because it covered the same risks for both sexes, and there were
no risks for which men were covered and women excluded or vice
versa." 5 Having concluded that the plan was not discriminatory,
443. Id. at 134-37. The opinion made an oblique reference to intent ("[eIven as-
suming that it is not necessary in this case to prove intent to establish a prima
facie violation . . .") but did not discuss it as an element to be proved. See
Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 230, at 243 n.12 (suggesting the Court had
rejected any attempt to impose a "constitutional" requirement of intent in Title
VII cases).
444. 429 U.S. at 136. See Comment, Pregnancy Based Discrimination-General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert and Alternative State Remedies, 81 DicK. L. REV. 517, 527-28
(1977) (The author suggested that the reference to the "voluntary" nature of preg-
nancy was carefully phrased in an attempt to answer criticisms that other injuries
arising from voluntary activities were included.) Even if injuries due to voluntary
sports activities or elective cosmetic surgery could be considered voluntary, they
would presumably not be "desired." Several problems are created, however, by
this "voluntariness" rationale. First, many, if not most, pregnancies cannot truly
be considered "voluntary." Second, problems of freedom of religion exist in the
implied assertion that, if pregnancy is voluntary, a woman can choose to terminate
that pregnancy. It can be argued that, for religious reasons, many women cannot
voluntarily so choose.
445. 429 U.S. at 137-38. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 230, at
246-49. Three alternative ways were examined to measure risk in Gilbert: (1) the
Percentage of Total Risk method, which compares percentage of all risks compen-
sated for members of the protected class with the equivalent figure for members
of the nonprotected class (in Gilbert, males were protected against all risks, but
females were not); (2) the Dollar Value Received method, which compares the
per capita value of benefits which will be paid to the protected and nonprotected
classes (in Gilbert, although the parties had stipulated that women received
greater per capita benefits than men, the Court did not rely on this fact in its deci-
sion. The Court appeared to endorse this method, at least partially, in that it
viewed the cost to insure as extra compensation. The Court implied that if equal-
ity of compensation combined with no fringe benefits was acceptable, then equal-
ity of employer contributions could be acceptable, even if those contributions
ended up as benefit packages in which the classes were covered differently); and
whether per se, as a "mere pretext" for invidious discrimination,
or by effect, Justice Rehnquist also rejected the final argument as-
serted in favor of finding discrimination. He gave no weight to an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guideline that held
that disability benefits must cover pregnancy. 446
Justice Brennan wrote the primary dissent in Gilbert and Jus-
tice Stevens filed a brief dissenting opinion. The dissenting Jus-
tices rebutted the majority's conclusion that the proof required to
show a Title VII violation must be judged by the standard used to
show denial of equal protection and that, therefore, Aiello con-
trolled.4 4 7 The dissenting justices concluded that even if the pol-
icy was not considered facially discriminatory, it could properly
be considered a mere pretext for invidious discrimination.44 8
(3) the Analagous Risk method, which compares the equality of the percentage of
each type of risk covered (in Gilbert, this was the method primarily emphasized
by the Court).
See also Comment, supra note 444, at 530. The author suggested two problems
with the Dollar Value Received method. First, the "peace of mind" values, empha-
sized in insurance policies, were unequal because of the failure to cover preg-
nancy. Second, when total fringe benefits are compared,; addition of pregnancy
behefits would not necessarily result in a higher "compensation" to women be-
cause life insurance benefits, since they are typically keyed to earnings, and since
men typically earn more than women, would be higher for men.
446. 429 U.S. at 142-43. The opinion noted that the guideline could receive some
weight, but that it was not entitled to the deference which should be accorded to
an administrative regulation. The Court also found that it was not contemporane-
ous, and that it conflicted with earlier guidelines promulgated by the EEOC. Id.
It appeared to conflict with a Wage and Hour Administration guideline which indi-
cated that either the employer's contribution or the fringe benefits actually re-
ceived could be equal. See Comment, supra note 444, at 532 (discussing the
conflict between the two guidelines and suggesting that the Wage and Hour guide-
lines could have been narrowly construed in a way which could have resolved the
conflict).
447. Justices Brennan and Stevens found that the burden of proof regarding
the level of discrimination required to establish a Title VII violation need not be as
high as that needed to establish an equal protection violation. In Gilbert, Justice
Brennan cited numerous cases which rejected the "coterminus" proposition, and
both he and Justice Stevens cited Washington v. Davis, 427 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)
which stated: "We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicat-
ing claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applica-
ble under Title VII and we decline to do so today." 429 U.S. at 154 n.6 (quoting
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239). See also id. at 160-61 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
448. The majority presented three explanations in support of the proposition
that the plan was not a pretext. One, there was no risk for which men were cov-
ered and women were not or vice versa. Two, pregnancy was not a disease. Three,
pregnancy was "often voluntarily undertaken and desired." 429 U.S. at 136. Jus-
tice Stevens' reply to the first explanation was that, in the narrow sense of "risk,"
men were protected from male disabilities (e.g., prostate operation) while women
were not; in the broad sense of "risk," including unemployment caused by disabil-
ity, men received total protection against that risk while women received only par-
tial protection. Id. at 162 n.5. Thus, there was a difference in risks covered, and
the policy could be considered a disguise for invidious discrimination. In addition,
Justice Brennan documented a long history of General Electric practices which
[Vol. 9: 315, 19821 Changed Perspective
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
They also concluded that the plan discriminatorily affected wo-
men.4 9 Finally, Justices Brennan and Stevens reasoned that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guideline prohibit-
had undercut employment opportunities of women who became pregnant after
employment. Id. at 149-50 n.1. That history further showed that the plan was a
facade for a policy "which purposefully downgraded women's role in the labor
force." Id. at 149.
As to the second aspect of the rejection of the pretext argument, that pregnancy
was not a disease, Justice Brennan essentially replied, "so what." The label of dis-
ease could not be determinative because the plan even excluded actual "diseases"
when they were related to pregnancy. Id. at 151. Justice Brennan estimated that
10% of pregnancies ended in miscarriage, which was the functional equivalent of
disease, and that 10% of pregnancies were complicated by disease. Thus, 20% of
pregnancies had a true "disease" component but were not even partially covered.
Id. In addition, the plan did not cover diseases totally unrelated to pregnancy if
they occurred while a worker was on pregnancy leave. Id. Justice Brennan was
particularly struck by the experience of one of the Gilbert plaintiffs who took a
pregnancy leave and then suffered a stillbirth. Later, while still on leave, she was
hospitalized for a blood clot in the lung, a condition unrelated to her pregnancy.
She was not covered because she had been on pregnancy leave. Had she been
away from work for any other reason, she would have been covered. Id. at 151-52
n.4.
Justice Brennan also found the third argument of voluntariness unpersuasive.
Id. at 151. The proposition that pregnancy is voluntary is overbroad. Id. at 151 n.3.
Justice Brennan implied, however, it might be appropriate for an employer to treat
pregnancy as voluntary, even though many pregnancies were not, because of the
impossibility of determining which pregnancies were voluntary, "except perhaps
through obnoxious, intrusive means." Id. Voluntariness, however, could not be
the touchstone because the plan also covered other disabilities which could be
characterized as voluntary. Id. at 151.
449. Id. at 155. Justice Brennan's argument was that the plan covered all disa-
bilities that affect both sexes. The plan covered all disabilities that are male re-
lated or have a predominant impact on males. On the other hand, the plan did not
cover all female related disabilities or those which primarily had an impact upon
females. The plan excluded the most prevalent female specific disability, preg-
nancy. Therefore, the plan had a discriminatory effect on women. Id.
Justice Stevens declined to reach the "effect" issue, having found that the plan
was discriminatory on its face. Instead, Justice Stevens appeared to suggest a test
for "effect" that could have grave implications:
[F] acially neutral criteria may be illegal if they have a discriminatory ef-
fect. An analysis of the effect of a company's rules relating to absenteeism
would be appropriate if those rules referred only to neutral criteria, such
as whether an absence was voluntary or involuntary, or perhaps particu-
larly costly. This case, however, does not involve rules of this kind.
Id. at 161. The problem is that questions of voluntariness and cost are not truly
neutral. See note 444 supra. The question of neutrality was not critical in Gilbert
because Justice Stevens was not using the factors of voluntariness or cost to find
against the sex discrimination plaintiff. Nevertheless, the "neutrality" concept re-
mains as a possible "escape clause" for future sex discrimination cases. The sup-
porters of the General Electric plan had persuaded the majority that the case
primarily involved criteria of cost and, to a lesser extent, voluntariness. See id. at
138-39. Justice Stevens did not refer to the majority's arguments nor to the
counterarguments made by Justice Brennan. See id. at 148-53.
ing the exclusion of pregnancy should be given strong
deference. 450
In his brief dissent, Justice Stevens drove directly to the heart
of the matter. The majority's primary argument had been that
pregnancy discrimination was not per se sex discrimination. Jus-
tice Stevens incisively exposed the flaw in the majority's conten-
tion that the plan merely divided persons into two groups:
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. That characterization
was incorrect, Justice Stevens said, because disability programs
deal with future risks, not with past events. The correct classifica-
tion was between those persons who faced a risk of pregnancy
and those persons who did not.451 Thus, the rule, by definition
and on its face, "discriminates on account of sex; for it is the ca-
pacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the fe-
male from the male."452
Congress has subsequently acted to change the Gilbert and
Aiello results. Now, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is
considered discrimination on the basis of sex.45 3 But an under-
standing of Gilbert and Aiello is important because the Court will
again face the pregnancy issue and because the rationales in Gil-
bert and Aiello demonstrate the Court's narrow view of sex
discrimination.
Two primary themes can be seen in Gilbert, Justice Stevens'
first Supreme Court sex discrimination case. First, the negative
charges of the National Organization for Women and other femi-
nist organizations 45 4 may have persuaded Justice Stevens to re-
consider his views on sex discrimination. 455 A finding that
pregnancy exclusions in disability plans violated Title VII helped
to refute the charge of "consistent oppos[tion to] women's
450. Justice Brennan challenged the majority's conclusion that the guidelines
should be given little weight. He found that the guideline was "a particularly con-
scientious and reasonable product of EEOC deliberations and, therefore, merits
our 'great deference.'" Id. at 151. Justice Stevens did not reach this issue. He
had, however, given little deference to an EEOC guideline regarding the airlines'
"no-marriage" rule challenged in his Seventh Circuit Sprogis dissent. See notes
14-23 supra. Thus, it may be inferred that he would not have given the same
weight that Justice Brennan did to this EEOC guideline.
451. Id. at 161-62 n.51.
452. Id. at 162. In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated, "[s] urely it offends com-
mon sense to suggest ... that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not,
at the minimum, strongly 'sex related."' Id. at 149 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 652 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
453. Pub. L No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1976)).
454. See note 4 supra.
455. See Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Jurisprudence of Justice Ste-
vens, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 155 (1978).
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rights. '456 Second, Justice Stevens demonstrated that his reputa-
tion as a pragmatist was correctly placed. He rejected the exceed-
ingly formalistic approach of the majority45 7 in recognizing that
the classifications relating to pregnancy regarded potential risk,
not actual pregnant or nonpregnant status.
2. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty
Justice Stevens continued his pragmatic approach to pregnancy
issues in a creative concurring opinion in Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty.458 The question in Satty was whether a Title VII plaintiff
complaining of pregnancy discrimination was totally blocked by
Gilbert from obtaining relief. Justice Stevens created a path for
relief which managed to evade the contours of Gilbert.
In Satty, the plaintiff alleged that her employer's seniority and
sick pay plans violated Title VII. The seniority plan deprived em-
ployees returning from pregnancy leave, but not from other
leaves, of all accumulated seniority.459 The sick leave plan pro-
vided pay during leave for all disabilities except pregnancy.460
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist found that loss of the
accrued seniority did constitute a violation of Title VII,461 but he
remanded the question of sick pay for a determination as to
whether the sick pay policy constituted a "mere pretext" for in-
vidious discrimination.462 Justice Stevens concurred but arrived
at that result by a different "pragmatic" route.
Although Gilbert might have appeared to be "a useful starting
point," Justice Rehnquist did not follow his Gilbert analysis.463
While he cited the Gilbert holding that discrimination on the ba-
sis of pregnancy was not discrimination on the basis of sex,464 his
decision took pains to distinguish Satty from Gilbert. A key dis-
tinction was the specific section of Title VII to be applied. Section
703(a) (1) of Title VII was characterized by the Satty Court as re-
456. Stevens Hearings, supra note 4, at 83 (testimony of Margaret Drachsler).
Justice Stevens had not necessarily become an advocate of total legal sexual
equality, but it was now known that he would find for plaintiffs attacking sex dis-
crimination policies at least in some cases.
457. See Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 230, at 244.
458. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
459. Id. at 137.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 142.
462. Id. at 146.
463. See notes 439-40 supra and accompanying text.
464. 434 U.S. at 141.
lating to benefits provided or withdrawn by an employer.465 The
Gilbert case had been brought under section 703(a) (1), although
that decision had not emphasized the statutory subsection or the
"benefits" concept. Section 703(a) (2) was characterized by the
Satty Court as dealing with burdens imposed by an employer.4 66
Satty was brought under section 703 (a) (2).467
The majority opinion first examined the seniority plan and
found it to be "facially neutral."468 The Court then applied the
"benefit-burden" analysis to find that the Satty plan, unlike the
Gilbert plan,469 did have a discriminatory effect because the em-
465. Id. at 142. Section 703(a) (1) provides, in relevant part, that it is an unlaw-
ful practice for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges or employment, because of such individual's
... sex. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(a)(1) (1970).
466. 434 U.S. at 142. Section 703(a) (2) provides, in relevant part, that it is un-
lawful for an employer to "limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's ... sex ... ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(a) (2) (1970).
467. The Satty plaintiff could not state a claim that she had been discriminated
against regarding "terms of employment," but she did claim that she had been dis-
criminatorily "deprived of an employment opportunity." 434 U.S. at 142.
468. 434 U.S. at 140. The first issue in Gilbert had been whether a showing of
discrimination under Title VII was the same as that required under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. See note 439 supra and accompanying text. The issue of constitu-
tional versus statutory burdens of proof was not discussed in Satty. The next
Gilbert question had been whether the pregnancy classification had been discrim-
inatory per se. See note 442 supra and accompanying text. Although Justice
Rehnquist did not use the Gilbert terminology, presumably he was addressing the
"discriminatory per se" issue when he found the policy "facially neutral." 434 U.S.
at 140.
469. The Court distinguished Gilbert as follows. Gilbert was brought under
§ 703(a) (1), which forbids "discrimination" regarding the broad area of terms and
benefits of employment. The Gilbert plan did not "discriminate"; it covered both
classes equally. It merely failed to cover women against an additional risk; it
failed to extend an additional benefit. Satty was brought under § 703(a) (2), which
forbids deprivation or burden "on the basis of sex." The Satty plan did "deprive
or burden" the employee in that she no longer had a job. 434 U.S. at 140-42.
Although the Court distinguished the cases on the basis of benefits versus bur-
dens, it did not distinguish them on the basis of discrimination. Justice Stevens
noted that § 703(a) (1) uses the word "discriminate" while § 703(a) (2) does not. Id.
at 154. He argued that this difference was meaningless because a violation of
§ 703(a) (2) can occur if a facially neutral policy has a discriminatory effect.
The majority's emphasis on the different subsections is not persuasive because
the key requirement to both statutes is one of unfavorable treatment, be it "dis-
crimination" or treatment which "adversely affects," on the basis of sex. The ma-
jority never dealt with the following critical question. If the employer's action in
Gilbert was not discrimination because it merely divided persons into classes,
pregnant women and nonpregnant persons, why does not this analysis protect the
employer's action in Satty, regardless of whether the action was a burden or a re-
fusal to extend a benefit?
In relation to this problem, perhaps a critical shift in language occurred between
Gilbert and Satty: the substitution of the word "role" for the word "sex." The
Satty Court stated:
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ployee had been deprived of her job.470 Finally, the Court stated
in a footnote that its decision was consistent with an Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission guideline.47 1
The majority turned to the sick leave policy and found that it
was "legally indistinguishable" from the plan upheld in Gilbert:
the exclusion of pay during time taken for pregnancy leave was
not discriminatory per se.472 Thus, the sick leave plan was
facially neutral.4 73 Justice Rehnquist found, however, that the
We held in Gilbert that § 703(a) (1) did not require that greater economic
benefits be paid to one sex or the other "because of their differing roles in
'the scheme of human existence.. . ."' But that holding does not allow
us to read § 703(a) (2) to permit an employer to burden female employees
in such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities because of
their different roles.
434 U.S. at 142 (quoting 429 U.S. at 139 n.17 (emphasis added)). The use of the
word "role" in the extract from Gilbert, cited in Satty, was not. made by the
Supreme Court but by the district court. The entire Gilbert analysis was based
totally on "sex," and the Court refused to consider "role." 429 U.S. at 125. "[A]n
exclusion of pregnancy.., is not a gender based discrimination at all." Id. at 136.
There had been a political outcry against the Gilbert decision, and, as noted ear-
lier, legislation had been passed to void its holding. See generally Barkett, supra
note 114, at 481-88; Comment, Title VII Discrimination Against Pregnant Employ-
ees Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 24 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 247, 259 n.82 (1977). The shift
in language in Satty may have reflected the Court's recognition of the political
concern caused by the underlying issues of roletyping and stereotypical thinking
imbued in discriminatory practices. The Court's practical problem was how to
move from Gilbert without actually overruling it. Perhaps the language shift was
the Court's maneuver to attempt a cautious step away from Gilbert. Contra Bar-
kett, supra note 114, at 474-75 n.285 (suggesting that the analysis in Gilbert is per-
suasive and that the Satty opinion represents a strained analysis based on
equitable but not legal principles).
470. The Court found that it "was beyond dispute" that the employee was
clearly "deprive[d] ... of employment opportunities" and that her status was
"'adversely affect[ed]'" as required by § 703(a) (2). She was deprived and ad-
versely affected in two ways. First, because she had been stripped of seniority
credits, she did not qualify for a permanent position she otherwise would have
regained. Second, even if she had received a permanent position, she would have
felt adverse effects in terms of assignment to less desirable and low paying posi-
tions throughout her entire career with Nashville Gas Company. 434 U.S. at 138-46.
471. Id. at 142 n.4. The Court stated that the EEOC guideline in Satty was enti-
tled to more weight than a similar EEOC guideline given little weight in Gilbert,
see note 446 supra and accompanying text, because the Gilbert guideline had con-
flicted with earlier interpretations, while there was no consistency problem with
the Satty guideline. 434 U.S. at 142 n.4. For a discussion of the Court's handling of
the EEOC guideline, see Barkett, supra note 114, at 470 n.271 ("what does appear
to be clear is that the Guideline played no part in the Court's analysis or
conclusions").
472. 434 U.S. at 143-44.
473. Id. at 144. The Court implied that in some cases a showing of intent might
be required to prove a violation of § 703(a) (1) but indicated that no showing was
required under § 703(a)(2). Id.
plaintiff had not had the opportunity to show that the policy was a
"mere pretext" for "invidious discrimination" and remanded that
aspect of the case.474
Concurring, Justice Stevens attempted to reconcile Gilbert and
Satty and thereby formulate a mode of analysis to resolve the
confusion created by the majority opinions in those cases. 475 He
proposed a "pragmatic" approach to the question of when policies
"which attach a special burden to the risk of absenteeism are pro-
hibited by Title VII."476 First, he recognized that he would not be
able to convince a majority of the Court that his Gilbert dissent
should be the law. Thus, he stated, it was the law that not all
rules attaching a burden to the risk of pregnancy would be held
invalid.477 He would live with and abide by that reality; he did not
pursue his strong Gilbert argument that discrimination on the ba-
sis of pregnancy did violate Title VII.
Justice Stevens identified the critical problem posed by the Gil-
bert precedent; if discrimination against pregnancy is not sex-
based discrimination, then presumably burdens attached to the
risk of absenteeism would "never" constitute a violation of Title
VII.478 In Satty, however, the Court did find a violation. There-
In both Gilbert and Satty, Justice Rehnquist cited McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), as suggesting that a civil rights plaintiff under some cir-
cumstances, might have to show discriminatory intent in order to prove a violation
under § 703(a) (1). But in Green, the Court found that the plaintiff did not initially
have to show intent where the allegation was of explicit racial discrimination. 411
U.S. at 802. If the employer responded with a legitimate business justification for
the disparate treatment, the employer then had the burden of showing the action
was nondiscriminatory. Only if the employer met its burden did the employee
then have a burden to show intent. 411 U.S. at 804.
In Gilbert, Justice Brennan characterized Justice Rehnquist's reference to
Green as "cryptic," "most mystifying," "unexplained and inexplicable," and distin-
guished the Green and Gilbert cases at length. 429 U.S. 125 at 153-54 n.6. In Satty,
Justice Stevens noted that the intent requirement was not used as the basis for
any distinction between § 703(a) (2) because the Court expressly declined to reach
that issue. 434 U.S. at 154 n.4. See also Comment, supra note 469, at 257 n.68.
474. 434 U.S. at 145-46. The Court implied that the Gilbert rationale suggested
that the plaintiff would not be able to show discriminatory effect. Id. In Satty, the
Court appeared to lump the "mere pretext" test together with the "effects" test,
while in Gilbert those tests had been considered separately. For a discussion of
the "effects" test, as first developed in racial cases and then applied to sex dis-
crimination cases, see Barkett, supra note 114, at 446-56.
475. 434 U.S. at 153-57. The style of Justice Stevens' reasoning in Satty is clear
and concise; and it seems a world apart from his Novotny and Evans opinions. In
the introductory paragraph, Justice Stevens indicated that he was aware of the
confusion created in the lower courts after Gilbert. He explicitly stated that he
would attempt to reconcile the holdings of Gilbert and Satty in order to help the
lower courts. Id.
476. Id. at 153.
477. Id. Justice Stevens reiterated, however, that he continued to find his Gil-
bert opinion correct. Id. at 157.
478. Id. at 153-54.
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fore, the answer must be that policies which attach a special bur-
den on the risk of absence caused by pregnancy would
"sometimes" violate Title VII.479 Such policies could not be con-
sidered discriminatory per se because Gilbert clearly rejected
that argument.48 0 But the policies could still violate Title VII if
they had a discriminatory effect.481 The problem then became
what constituted discriminatory effect.
Justice Stevens differed with the majority regarding the test by
which discriminatory effect was to be identified.482 He rejected
the majority's reliance on the statutory distinction between "ben-
efits" and "burdens."4 8 3 He then set forth his '"pragmatic" analy-
sis of the way in which Satty could be distinguished from Gilbert.
His distinction is worth quoting in full:
Although the Gilbert Court was unwilling to hold that discrimination
against pregnancy-as compared with other physical disabilities-is dis-
crimination on account of sex, it may nevertheless be true that discrimina-
tion against pregnant or formerly pregnant employees as compared with
other employees--does constitute sex discrimination. This distinction
may be pragmatically expressed in terms of whether the employer has a
policy which adversely affects a woman beyond the term of her pregnancy
leave.4 84
In this way, Justice Stevens struck the critical compromise.
The employer's discriminatory treatment of pregnancy could oc-
cur only during the specific period of pregnancy leave. During
that period, an employer could reduce, withdraw, or fail to give
benefits. An employer's freedom to discriminate would be
sharply limited, however, by two important provisos. None of the
479. Id. at 154.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 154-55 n.4. Justice Stevens misunderstood part of the majority's rea-
soning. He understood the majority to propose two tests: (1) the difference be-
tween a "benefit" and a "burden;" and (2) the difference between § 703(a) (1) and
§ 703(a) (2). Id. The majority opinion, however, clearly equated the two tests in
that the difference between the two statutes was the distinction between a "bene-
fit" and a "burden." Id. at 142. But even though Justice Stevens rejected what he
saw as both tests, this confusion did not detract from his criticism of the majority's
rationale.
483. Id. at 154 n.4. Justice Stevens realized that the labels were subjective and
conclusionary. He stated that, in benefit-burden analysis, "the favored class is al-
ways benefited and the disfavored class is equally burdened." Id. He argued that,
even though § 703(a) (1) used the word "discrimination" while § 703(a) (2) did not,
the difference in language played no analytical role because the primary issue to
be decided was "discriminatory effect," which could be found under either subsec-
tion. Thus, he found the rationale suggested by the Court 'Illusionary." Id. at 154.
484. Id. at 155.
limits on benefits could adversely affect the employee after her
return to work,485 and the employer's policy must be consistent
with the determination that pregnancy is not an illness. 486
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Satty attempted to set
the course for the Supreme Court, as well as for lower courts,
with regard to pregnancy discrimination issues. 487 In one stroke,
he gave the Court a way to live with Gilbert as well as a way to
move away from Gilbert. in addition, he developed a relatively
simple and easily applied method of analysis to replace the ab-
struse formalisms found in Aiello, Gilbert, and the majority's
Satty opinion. Justice Stevens did not address the time before
pregnancy, as that period was not involved in Satty. But his opin-
ion suggests that rules such as the airlines' "go when you know"
rule will be struck down.
Justice Stevens' opinion may have been created partly as polit-
ical compromise, and it is not completely consistent with the Gil-
bert rationale. No decision, however, could be entirely consistent
with the Gilbert rationale unless it upheld all policies involving
disparate treatment of pregnancy. 488 Justice Stevens was unwill-
ing to allow formalism such reign.
The Satty decision was a major step forward in the law of sex
discrimination. The entire Court upheld the decision to declare
485. Id. at 156. Thus, Gilbert could be rationalized because the plan did not dis-
criminate against pregnant employees before or after their maternity leave; it just
failed to provide benefits during that leave. Id. Justice Stevens admitted that the
Court's sanction of the aspect of Gilbert which failed to provide benefits for a non-
pregnancy related illness occurring while on pregnancy leave was difficult to rec-
oncile with his theory. He did, however, make the attempt. "I suppose this aspect
of Gilbert may be explained by the notion that any illness occurring at that time is
treated as though it were attributable to pregnancy and, therefore, is embraced
within the area of permissible discrimination." Id. at 155 n.5. That explanation,
however, merely restated the proposition rather than explained it.
486. Id. at 156 n.7. Justice Stevens did not elaborate on the "not an illness" pro-
viso, but he did state that the two limitations, policy limited to the period of preg-
nancy leave and policy consistent with the non-illness view of pregnancy, served
to focus the disparate effect of the policy on pregnancy rather than on pregnant or
formerly pregnant employees. Id. at 155 n.5. He recognized that policies which
place a burden on pregnancy also burden pregnant women. He concluded, how-
ever, that these burdens must be allowed under Gilbert, "but only to the extent
that the focus of the policy is ... on the physical condition rather than the per-
son." Id.
487. See Barkett, supra note 114, at 474 (suggesting Justice Stevens' opinion
will receive the most attention in the lower courts because of his pragmatic
approach).
488. The logical distinction Justice Stevens made between "treatment of preg-
nancy" and "treatment of pregnant persons" may become as hopelessly subjective
and illusionary as the distinction between "burden" and "benefit". See note 483
supra. Justice Stevens appeared to recognize this but implied that, as a practical
matter involving analysis of specific employer practices, the distinction could be
maintained. See note 484 supra and accompanying text.
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an employer's unpaid pregnancy leave plan invalid. Indeed, the
majority opinion was written by Justice Rehnquist who, just one
year earlier, had insisted in Gilbert that discrimination against
pregnancy was not discrimination against sex and whose opinion
may have been taken to infer that employer pregnancy policies
might be immune from Title VII attack. Further, the Court
showed an increasing willingness to reject policies based on role-
typing and stereotypical ways of thinking.489
Justice Stevens' concurrence allowed the Satty decision to pro-
vide relatively clear guidelines to lower courts facing pregnancy
discrimination questions. Loss of income, failure to provide bene-
fits for pregnancy, and other practices which immediately affected
an employee only during pregnancy leave, would probably not vi-
olate Title VII. Even failure to provide benefits for nonpregnancy
related illnesses otherwise covered and occurring during preg-
nancy leave would not be prohibited. Loss of seniority, failure to
provide reemployment, or reduction in pay or benefits occurring
after pregnancy, however, are no longer allowable.
The Satty decision was criticized because it did not incorporate
the logic of Gilbert.490 As has been noted, Satty cannot be logi-
cally squared with Gilbert's underlying principle. Criticism that
the Satty claim should have been rejected, however, misses the
mark. The Gilbert decision was harsh, restrictive, and poorly rea-
soned. It was the obstacle to avoid, not the answer to the future
questions. The Court needed a way out, but was unwilling to
overrule Gilbert. Justice Stevens' concurrence provided a crea-
tive solution.
The Satty decision can more properly be criticized because it
did not go far enough. It left a major area of concern, the time pe-
riod during pregnancy, unprotected. Such lack of protection is
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the dissents in Gil-
bert. In the final analysis, the Satty decision may best be viewed
as achieving an accommodation between conflicting social forces
and a truly "pragmatic" solution. In this sense, Justice Stevens'
opinion is a beliweather of the Court's attitude toward pregnancy.
The Court sees pregnancy issues more as political issues of dis-
tributive justice, to be addressed by the legislature, rather than as
489. See Barkett, supra note 114, at 475.
490. Id. at 474-75 n.285.
pure judicial sex discrimination issues.491
IV. CONCLUSION
The sex discrimination cases before the Court have involved
four categories: access to the federal courts, law and policies os-
tensibly benefiting women, laws and policies discriminating
against women, and pregnancy issues. In all of these categories,
the Court's approach to sex discrimination cases has been a pat-
tern of two steps forward followed by one step backward. Justice
Stevens' opinions have also followed that pattern. Although in-
consistent, he has accorded a generally positive reception to the
challenges launched by sex discrimination plaintiffs. The incon-
sistency is exemplified in the area of access by plaintiffs to fed-
eral courts. In Cannon, he placed a strong value on access, but in
Novotny, he was willing to require that sex discrimination plain-
tiffs remain under Title VII, even when other laws offered impor-
tant benefits. The decisions are not totally irreconcilable.
Novotny did not involve a complete denial of access, which per-
haps Justice Stevens would not countenance.
In the area of policies ostensibly benefiting women, Justice Ste-
vens has seemed somewhat preoccupied with models. In Craig,
he attempted to clarify the standard of equal protection analysis
to be used, but his opinion may have only added dirt to already
muddied waters. In Goldfarb, Justice Stevens found for the sex
discrimination plaintiff, but appeared to open a door for support-
ers of laws establishing unequal treatment. He implied that such
laws might be upheld if they truly demonstrated administrative
convenience, a proposition which had been considered dead after
Frontiero. Subsequently, no case has materialized in which a
statute's supporter has attempted to take advantage of Justice
Stevens' questionable reasoning on this issue. In Michael M., Jus-
tice Stevens began an excellent discussion of equal protection
analysis. Unfortunately, he allowed himself to get sidetracked
and never fully completed his discussion or even applied his new
model. It seems, though, that when he does completely develop
his model, the model begun in Michael M., it will lead to a more
precise analysis within the area of sex discrimination.
Perhaps the only clear pattern that may be drawn from Justice
Stevens' opinions in the area of discrimination against women is
that there is no pattern. His opinion in Evans was far from artful.
He virtually ignored all of the points made by a vigorous dissent.
491. See Kirp and Robyn, supra note 114, at 948. Of course, in the final analysis,
all sex discrimination issues are truly political questions of distributive justice.
See generally Powers, supra note 11.
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He may have concluded that all the major issues in Evans had
previously been decided and that he had no need to aggressively
defend those issues in his opinion.
With Justice Stevens' opinion in Manhart, the Court took a ma-
jor step forward. The challenge to sex discrimination policies had
now come to the broad arena of pension plans, and Justice Ste-
vens did not hesitate in striking down policies requiring unequal
contributions. He emphasized not only that the decision struck
down unequal pension plan policies, but also that no programs
based on stereotypes of a woman's limited role would be counte-
nanced by the Court. He did not, however, follow his logic to its
ultimate conclusion. He declined to order relief primarily be-
cause of a fear of "sliding slopes."492 Although relief was proper,
Justice Stevens seemed to say that if courts allowed many cases
like this, the insurance industry would be severely harmed. Addi-
tionally, he wrote puzzling and potentially dangerous dicta imply-
ing that employers could subvert pension plans by giving equal
contributions to employees.
In Sweeney, as well as in Satty, Justice Stevens demonstrated
his great concern for the lower courts. He emphasized that the
Court should not "nit pick" at every use of inconsistent language,
especially when the Court itself was unable to avoid the same in-
consistency.493 More importantly, Justice Stevens has empha-
sized that Supreme Court decisions must be interpreted by the
lower courts in thousands of differing factual situations. He has
strived for analysis which is clear, understandable, and as simple
as possible, in order to both help lower court judges and to de-
velop clear, and at least potentially consistent precedent. When
he has feared that the Court's opinion did not contain these quali-
ties of analysis, he has not hesitated to write separately.4 94 Unfor-
492. Alternatively, his fear may have been of allowing the camel's head into the
tent or perhaps just the camel's nose.
493. On another occasion, Justice Stevens has reminded the Supreme Court of
the many burdens upon lower appellate courts and admonished the Court to be
tolerant of intemperate dicta from those courts. Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501
(1976).
494. At his nomination hearings Justice Stevens told the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee that it was his practice to dissent frequently.
I know that there is one school of thought that the appearance of unanim-
ity tends to add stability and respect to the law. My own view is that it
actually facilitates the fair adjudication process if everyone states his own
conclusion as frankly as he can. I think it also serves the purpose to let
tunately, Justice Stevens has not always achieved the clear
analyses for which he strives.
Justice Stevens' emphasis on clear guidelines is one reason
why his timid concurrence in Feeney is so puzzling. Feeney con-
ceptually may be the toughest sex discrimination case the Court
has heard. The result the Court reached is certainly defensible.
That Justice Stevens concurred in that result is not a problem.
But the majority's language was sloppy and its reasoning was
fuzzy. The majority said that it was using the Davis test, but it
did not do so; it bootstrapped the fundamental proposition in is-
sue. Justice Stevens had the opportunity, by writing separately,
to supply the hard-headed analysis the case so desperately
needed. Had he merely failed to write, that failure would not be
worthy of comment. That he did write, but wrote of such inconse-
quence, is truly curious.
Aside from his Manhart opinion and the significant potential
embodied in his Michael M. opinion, Justice Stevens' greatest
contribution to the evolving law of sex discrimination has been in
the area of pregnancy issues. He displayed an incisive and prag-
matic approach to this area when he dissented from the Gilbert
holding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. It was sex discrimination, he rea-
soned, because the classification in fact discriminates on the basis
of risk of pregnancy, not actual pregnancy at any given moment.
In Satty, Justice Stevens attempted to salvage from the formal-
istic reasoning of Gilbert some protection against pregnancy dis-
crimination. In a creative opinion, he narrowed the implications
of Gilbert and developed a workable test which could be used by
the lower courts; did the disparate treatment continue after the
pregnancy leave ended?
Despite the inconsistencies in his opinions, Justice Stevens has
emerged as a strong, creative force on the Court. His perform-
ance on the Supreme Court regarding analyses of sex discrimina-
tion issues is far stronger than his performance on the Seventh
Circuit bench would have indicated. Perhaps Justice Stevens was
shaken by the strong criticisms of his nomination and reconsid-
ered his views regarding sex discrimination.
At the same time, Justice Stevens has not been a blind sup-
porter of sex discrimination plaintiffs merely because "the cause
is right," as are, perhaps, Justices Brennan and Marshall. His em-
phasis on precision has sometimes led to the conclusion that the
the litigants know that they have persuaded one or two judges, and I think
they are entitled to know that.
Stevens Hearings, supra note 3, at 41 (testimony of John Paul Stevens).
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cause was not right. But Justice Stevens himself has been dis-
tressingly imprecise at times, both when writing for and against a
sex discrimination challenger.
Although Justice Stevens cannot be characterized as the
"swing" vote in sex discrimination cases, he has played a unique,
indeed a critical role in determining the outcome of those cases.
Of the five "middle" justices, 495 Justice Stevens may be the most
effective in attempting to reconcile and compromise competing
positions. Justice Stevens' opinions do not reflect a pattern of
taking one position and repeating it through a series of cases.
Rather, he appears to take great efforts to compare and reconcile
the competing issues in each case. His differences have usually,
but not always, deemphasized ideological skirmishes, and have
focused on "pragmatic" methods of coming to grips with the diffi-
cult issues involved. Justice Stevens seems most effective not
when advocating a position in and of itself, but when reacting to,
or acting as, "negotiator" or "facilitator" between two competing
positions. In this sense, Justice Stevens appears to be neither a
legal realist nor a formalist. He does not endorse broad judicial
discretion in order to achieve desirable policy changes, but
neither will he tolerate excessively formalistic analysis in order to
prevent social change.
The general "reading" given Justice Stevens when he joined the
United States Supreme Court was that he was very pragmatic and
that he would be hostile to sex discrimination challenges. That
reading was only half true. Justice Stevens has shown himself to
be a pragmatist. But also, he has taken an important and critical
role in increasing the Court's rejection of sex-based laws and poli-
cies. While he is not yet a doctrinal "leader," he has the potential,
the creativity, and the persuasiveness to become a major force in
the emerging law of sex discrimination.
Neither the Court nor Justice Stevens has yet travelled far
enough. Many serious sexual inequities still exist. This examina-
tion has reviewed specific decisions, but it must be emphasized
that the Court avoids many controversial cases simply by not
hearing them. Both the Court and Justice Stevens, however, have
moved forward since Justice Stevens assumed the bench. Those
strides forward seem connected: Justice Stevens has assumed a
495. Justices Rehnquist and Burger, on the one hand, and Brennan and Mar-
shall, on the other, would comprise the respective "extremes."
flexible, progressive, yet pragmatic role; he has helped the law
eliminate many sex-based laws and policies. Much legal doctrine
remains to be developed. Justice Stevens will be a prime devel-
oper of that doctrine.
In the final analysis, Justice Stevens cannot be labelled. The
one thing that is clear is that he will decide future cases on the
basis of the particular facts involved, minimizing the importance
of pre-existing dogma. Justice Stevens would likely endorse
Learned Hand's statement that "[tihe truth really is that where
the border shall be fixed is a question of degree, dependent upon
the consequences in each case."496
496. United States v. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617, 625 (2d Cir. 1935)
(Hand, J., concurring).
